FELIX DE JESUS GUERRA, APPELLANT,
v.
ANGELA GUERRA, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court affirmed a dissolution judgment and attorney's fees award but reversed the provision declaring the fees nondischargeable in bankruptcy, holding that trial courts lack authority to make prospective determinations about bankruptcy dischargeability.
Trial courts lack authority to include prospective provisions in support orders determining whether obligations will be dischargeable in bankruptcy.
[1] Trial courts lack authority to include prospective provisions in support orders determining whether obligations will be dischargeable in bankruptcy.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We conclude that the trial court did not have the authority to make any binding legal ruling concerning the dischargeability of these debts in any future bankruptcy proceeding that might be filed.”
Court explaining that trial courts cannot prospectively determine bankruptcy dischargeability of support obligations.
Felix Guerra appealed a dissolution of marriage judgment and an order awarding his former wife Angela Guerra attorney's fees and costs, which included…
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Felix Guerra appeals the final judgment entered in his dissolution of marriage proceeding, as well as the order granting his former wife, Angela Guerra, an award of her attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm the circuit court’s judgment and order in all respects save one. Within the order, the circuit court included a provision characterizing its award of attorney’s fees and costs as a form of support that “is not dischargeable in bankruptcy or by any other means.” The entry of the award was appropriate under the facts of this case; however, we have held that prospective determinations purporting to decide whether support obligations will be dis-chargeable in bankruptcy are improper. See Roth v. Roth, 973 So.2d 580, 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (striking judgment’s provision concerning nondischargeability of periodic payment award while husband’s bankruptcy petition was pending); Meeks v. Meeks, 964 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (“We conclude that the trial court did not have the authority to make any binding legal ruling concerning the dis-chargeability of these debts in any future bankruptcy proceeding that might be filed.... ”). We therefore reverse the portion of the order that pertains to bankruptcy dischargeability and remand this case ■with instructions to the circuit court to strike that provision from its order.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
KELLY and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- Roth v. Roth, 973 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)
- Meeks v. Meeks, 964 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)