MARIE D. BLAIS, APPELLANT,
v.
JOSEPH R. BLAIS, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In a divorce case, the court upheld the trial judge's ruling that the husband could assert his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when cross-examined about alleged adultery, even though he had initiated the divorce action. The wife argued that invoking the privilege should result in dismissal of his complaint or denial of relief, but the court found this issue premature.
The husband did not waive his privilege against self-incrimination by filing the divorce complaint, and the trial judge correctly allowed him to assert the privilege. However, the court declined to address what sanctions the trial judge should impose for invoking the privilege, as no such application had yet been made.
“appellee has not waived his right to assert the mentioned constitutional privilege and the chancellor was correct in so holding”
Establishes the court's holding that invoking the privilege does not constitute a waiver simply by filing the divorce complaint
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe husband filed for divorce on grounds of cruelty. The wife answered with an affirmative defense of the husband's adultery. During cross-examination…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Waiver Of Privilege cases and more on FLexlaw
This interlocutory appeal questions the propriety of an order entered by the chancellor holding that appellee may assert his privilege against self-incrimination as guaranteed by Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A.
Appellee husband filed a complaint seeking divorce from appellant wife on the grounds of cruelty. The wife answered and asserted as an affirmative defense that plaintiff was guilty of adultery. After plaintiff’s direct examination in support of the allegations of his complaint, defendant’s counsel sought to cross examine plaintiff regarding the act of adultery alleged in her answer as a defense to the complaint. To specific questions concerning the alleged adultery plaintiff refused to answer on the ground of self-incrimination.
We are of the view that on the basis of the record before us appellee has not waived his right to assert the mentioned constitutional privilege and the chancellor was correct in so holding.1
Appellant concedes that absent waiver, appellee may lawfully assert the privilege of refusing to answer the questioned interrogatories propounded him on cross-examination upon the ground of self-incrimination. She urges, however, that having asserted such privilege the chancellor should strike appellee’s testimony, dismiss his complaint, or deny him the equitable relief prayed for in his complaint. No application having yet been made to the chancellor for an order imposing any of the penalties here advocated, the questions raised by appellant are patently premature. Since no ruling has yet been made by the chancellor on such contentions, we refrain from making any comment with respect to the merits thereof.
Affirmed.
STURGIS, C. J., and CARROLL, DONALD K., J., concur.