RICHARD N. FRIEDMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
MERCANTIL COMMERCEBANK, N.A., APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court properly determined the fair market value date, the deficiency amount, and the prejudgment interest rate based on the settlement agreement and the record provided.
[1] The date for assessing the fair market value of property in a deficiency judgment action, where no foreclosure sale occurs, is the date of recordation of the order transf…
[2] An appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate appellate record to support claims of error.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFollowing a settlement in a foreclosure action, the parties agreed to a deed in lieu of foreclosure with the bank reserving the right to seek a defici…
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Richard N. Friedman appeals an amended final deficiency judgment entered in favor of Mercantile Commerce Bank in the amount of $364,740.56 plus interest. We affirm.
The case was originally filed as a foreclosure action against Friedman and his wife, Marjan Nini Friedman, relating to property owned by the Friedmans in Miami-Dade County. However, on the day of trial, the parties reached a settlement. Pursuant to the terms of that settlement, Mercantile agreed to accept a deed in lieu of foreclosure, and reserved the right to seek a deficiency. Friedman reserved the right to assert any defenses to, or otherwise contest, any deficiency sought by Mercantile. It was further agreed that Mercantile would seek any deficiency judgment against Friedman only, and not against his wife. When the Friedmans failed to deliver the deed to Mercantile, the trial court entered an order conveying the property and transferring all of the Friedmans’ interest in the property to Mercantile. That order, rendered on June 27, 2012, was recorded by Mercantile on July 2, 2012.1 Thereafter, Mercantile sought a deficiency judgment against Friedman, and following a bench trial, the court entered the deficiency judgment, accepting the fair market valuation of Mercantile’s expert, and assessing prejudgment interest at eighteen percent.
Friedman asserts that the trial court erred in its determination of the proper date for assessing the fair market value of the property; in its assessment of the amount of the deficiency; and in awarding prejudgment interest of eighteen percent. We find no error.
We hold that the trial court properly concluded that the date for determining fair market value was July 2, 2012, the date of recordation of the order transferring interest in the property from the Friedmans to Mercantile. See Philippe v. Weiner, 143 So.3d 1086 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014).2
*312Further, the record on appeal provided by Friedman is otherwise inadequate3 to allow for meaningful review of related errors allegedly made by the trial court in its determination of fair market value and the amount of the deficiency. Based on the record provided, we conclude that the trial court, having considered the evidence, including competing testimony from each party’s expert, properly exercised its broad discretion in determining the fair market value of the property and the amount of the deficiency. Id. See also Khan v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 687 So.2d 16, 18 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (observing: “It is a long standing legal principle that the granting of a deficiency decree is discretionary with the trial court; such discretion is not absolute and unbridled, but rather one which must be supported by established equitable principles as applied to the facts of the case.”)
Finally, we hold that the trial court, in its amended final judgment, properly awarded prejudgment interest at the rate of eighteen percent. Mercantile, in its original foreclosure complaint, sought interest at the rate of twenty-five percent, a rate which Friedman alleged was usurious. Pursuant to the express terms of the settlement, the parties agreed that “the interest rate will be 18 percent and not 25 percent,” as sought by Mercantile in its complaint. Friedman was bound by the express terms of the settlement and has failed to demonstrate any error by the trial court in this regard.4
Affirmed.
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Citator
Authorities Cited (11 total)
- Pitcher v. Schneider (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)
- Albert v. Applegate et ux., 377 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 1979)
- Dane D. Morgan v. Kelly, 642 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
- Smith v. Dep't OF Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 573 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1991)
- Latin Am. Benefit Ctr., Inc. v. Raphael Johstoneaux, 257 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Waqar Ahmad (Mickey) Khan v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 687 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
- Cmty. Bank OF Homestead v. Valois, 570 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- Mizner Bank v. Adib, 588 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)
- Alexander v. Bamash, 814 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- Philippe v. Michael Weiner, M.D., 143 So. 3d 1086 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)