JORGE PABLO COLLAZO AND MARIA EDITH COLLAZO, APPELLANTS,
v.
HSBC BANK USA, N.A., APPELLEE
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The Collazos appeal a foreclosure judgment entered by HSBC over five years after the alleged mortgage default and acceleration. The court reverses and remands, holding that where the same default date is asserted in both an initial dismissed foreclosure suit and a subsequent suit filed more than five years later, the five-year statute of limitations bars the second action.
The court reverses the foreclosure judgment and remands for dismissal without prejudice, holding that where a second foreclosure suit is based on the same payment default and acceleration occurring over five years before the second suit's commencement, the suit is barred by Florida's five-year statute of limitations, regardless of the prior dismissal without prejudice.
[1] A prior dismissal of a foreclosure action without prejudice does not bar a subsequent foreclosure action based on continuing defaults in monthly payments.
[2] Each subsequent default in monthly mortgage payments creates a new cause of action for statute of limitations purposes.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The record in the present case discloses that HSBC asserted the same payment default date and basis for acceleration in both the 2008 and 2014 complaints, a date over five years preceding the commencement of the 2014 case in the circuit court.”
Establishes the critical factual distinction that doomed HSBC's second suit: the same default date was at issue in both the dismissed and current action, and that default predated the second suit by more than five years.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHSBC filed a foreclosure suit in 2008 based on a mortgage default and sent a notice of acceleration in 2008. That suit was dismissed without prejudice…
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On Motion for Rehearing
Upon consideration of the appellants’ motion for rehearing, we withdraw our opinion issued April 13, 2016, in this appeal, and substitute the following opinion in its place.1
Jorge and Maria Collazo appeal a final judgment of foreclosure entered on a defaulted residential mortgage. The appel-lee and mortgagee, HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (“HSBC”),2 commenced the lawsuit below in January 2014, over five years after (a) the alleged payment default, (b) acceleration of the entire indebtedness in a notice sent to the Collazos in 2008, and (c) the commencement of a previous foreclo*1013sure suit in 2008, dismissed without prejudice in 2011 following HSBC’s failure to comply with a court order. The Collazos maintain that the final judgment of foreclosure must be reversed because of the expiration of the five-year statute of limitations3 applicable to the mortgage note.
This Court’s decision issued on rehearing en banc in the case of Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Beauvais, 188 So.3d 938 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016), holds that the five-year statute does not bar a second foreclosure suit filed on a subsequent payment default occurring within the five-year statutory period preceding the commencement of the second suit. The Fifth District has reached a similar conclusion in the case of U.S. Bank National Association v. Bartram, 140 So.3d 1007, 1014 (Fla. 5th DCA), review granted, 160 So.3d 892 (Fla.2014) (“Therefore, we conclude that a foreclosure action for default in payments occurring after the order of dismissal in the first foreclosure action is not barred by the statute of limitations found in section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes, provided the subsequent foreclosure action on the subsequent defaults is brought within the limitations period.”).
The record in the present case discloses that HSBC asserted the same payment default date and basis for acceleration in both the 2008 and 2014 complaints, a date over five years preceding the commencement of the 2014 case in the circuit court. As a result, we reverse the final judgment of foreclosure and remand the case for dismissal without prejudice in accordance with this Court’s recent opinion on rehearing en banc in Beauvais.4
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
concurring.
I concur in the reversal of the final judgment of foreclosure in this case. I write only to dispel any confusion concerning whether this is a pipeline case under U.S. Bank National Association v. Bartram, 140 So.3d 1007 (Fla. 5th DCA), review granted, 160 So.3d 892 (Fla.2014), or Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas v. Beauvais, 188 So.3d 938 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (pending review, Case No. SC 16-732). The issue in those cases was whether an adjudication denying acceleration and foreclosure in one circumstance bars a subsequent action to foreclose the same mortgage. Both cases hold that a subsequent foreclosure action is not barred so long as the second action is brought on a subsequent default within the five-year limitation period for bringing the action under section 95.11(2)(c) of the Florida Statutes. Beauvais at 953; Bartram at 1014. The actions before their respective courts in Bartram and Beauvais were both based upon a subsequent default occurring within the five-year statutory period. Beauvais at 940; Bartram at 1009.
In contrast to these two cases, the foreclosure action in the case before us was commenced on January 24, 2014, based on a default in payment alleged to have occurred on April 1, 2008. Counsel for HSBC insisted on trying the case on the basis of that default. After hearing the evidence, the trial court entered final judgment and calculated all amounts due and payable based upon that default date over borrowers’ objections and involuntary dismissal motions. In short, unlike counsel for the lenders in both the Bartram and Beauvais cases, who circumvented the statute of limitations in those cases by *1014alleging a default within the five-year limitation period, counsel for HSBC, when challenged, doubled down on a stale default outside the limitation period. That fact distinguishes the case before us from both Bartram and Beauvais.
It is possible—it is always possible— that a decision in a case pending in our High Court may have some effect on a decision of this court that is not yet final. That is at least theoretically possible in the case before us. However, the validity of our decision in this case is not directly dependent upon the outcome of Bartram or Beauvais in the Florida Supreme Court.
SHEPHERD, J.,
concurring.
I concur in the reversal of the final judgment of foreclosure in this case. I write only to dispel any confusion concerning whether this is a pipeline case under U.S. Bank National Association v. Bartram, 140 So. 3d 1007 (Fla. 5th DCA), review granted, 160 So. 3d 892 (Fla.2014), or Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas v. Beauvais, 188 So. 3d 938 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (pending review, Case No. SC 16-732). The issue in those cases was whether an adjudication denying acceleration and foreclosure in one circumstance bars a subsequent action to foreclose the same mortgage. Both cases hold that a subsequent foreclosure action is not barred so long as the second action is brought on a subsequent default within the five-year limitation period for bringing the action under section 95.11(2)(c) of the Florida Statutes. Beauvais at 953; Bartram at 1014. The actions before their respective courts in Bartram and Beauvais were both based upon a subsequent default occurring within the five-year statutory period. Beauvais at 940; Bartram at 1009.
In contrast to these two cases, the foreclosure action in the case before us was commenced on January 24, 2014, based on a default in payment alleged to have occurred on April 1, 2008. Counsel for HSBC insisted on trying the case on the basis of that default. After hearing the evidence, the trial court entered final judgment and calculated all amounts due and payable based upon that default date over borrowers’ objections and involuntary dismissal motions. In short, unlike counsel for the lenders in both the Bartram and Beauvais cases, who circumvented the statute of limitations in those cases by alleging a default within the five-year limitation period, counsel for HSBC, when challenged, doubled down on a stale default outside the limitation period. That fact distinguishes the case before us from both Bartram and Beauvais.
It is possible—it is always possible— that a decision in a case pending in our High Court may have some effect on a decision of this court that is not yet final. That is at least theoretically possible in the case before us. However, the validity of our decision in this case is not directly dependent upon the outcome of Bartram or Beauvais in the Florida Supreme Court.
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Desylvester v. The Bank OF NEW York Mellon, 219 So. 3d 1016 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)…Bollettieri Resort Villas Condo. Ass’n v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 198 So. 3d 1140, 1142 (Fla. 2d DCA), review granted, No. SC16-1680 (Fla. Nov. 2, 2016). Thus, the facts of this case are distinguishable from the facts in Collazo v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 213 So. 3d 1012 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). In Collazo, unlike in this case, the plaintiff insisted on trying the case on the basis of a date of default that was outside the five-year statute of limitations period. Id. at 1012-13. Here, in addition to alleging the initial…
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Klebanoff v. Bank OF NEW York Mellon, 228 So. 3d 167 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)…prejudice based on a default that occurred outside of the five-year statute of limitations period. Id. (citations and footnote omitted). Hicks is consistent with the Third District Court of Appeal’s later opinion in Collazo v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 213 So. 3d 1012 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). In Collazo, our sister court similarly reversed a final judgment of foreclosure because the complaint was filed more than five years after the alleged payment default. 213 So. 3d at 1012. Notably, in his concurring opinion, Judge…
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The Bank OF NEW York Mellon Corp. v. Anton, 230 So. 3d 502 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)…as it exists at the time of appeal, even if there has been a change in the law subse [*504] quent to the trial); Nash v. General Motors Corp., 734 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). . Anton’s reliánce on our decision in Collazo v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 213 So. 3d 1012 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) and the Fifth District’s decision in Ventures Trust 2013-I-NH v. Johnson, 230 So. 3d 903, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D1482, 2017 WL 2821933 (Fla. 5th DCA June 30, 2017) is misplaced, as the foreclosure action in each of those cases was bas…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Americas v. Beauvais, 188 So. 3d 938 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)
- U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Bartram, 140 So. 3d 1007 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)