DAMIEN DAVIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Damien Davis appealed the denial of his motion for postconviction relief seeking resentencing as a juvenile offender under Florida's 2014-220 law, enacted in response to Graham v. Florida and Miller v. Alabama. The court affirmed the denial because Davis's 35-year sentence does not constitute a life, mandatory life, or de facto life sentence and thus does not violate the Eighth Amendment.
The court held that Davis's 35-year total sentences do not violate Graham or Miller because he was not sentenced to a life, mandatory life, or de facto life sentence, and therefore he is not entitled to resentencing under chapter 2014-220.
[1] A 35-year sentence imposed upon a juvenile offender does not constitute a mandatory life sentence or a de facto life sentence for purposes of constitutional review under Graham v. …
[2] Chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, provides for individualized sentencing consideration for juvenile offenders prior to the imposition of a life sentence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel and unusual punishments.'”
Establishes the holding of Miller v. Alabama that informed the creation of chapter 2014-220
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 2008, following a plea, Davis was convicted of second-degree murder and attempted robbery and sentenced to a total of 35 years' imprisonment. Davis…
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The appellant appeals the denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm the denial of the motion, and write to address one of the appellant’s claims.
In 2008, following a plea, the appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and attempted robbery and sentenced to terms totaling 35 years’ imprisonment. In his motion, he alleged that he is entitled to be resentenced pursuant to chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, which has been codified in sections 775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402 of the Florida Statutes, because he was a juvenile at the time he committed the crimes. Chapter 2014-220 was created by the Legislature in response to the supreme court’s decisions in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), which held that the constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment is violated when a juvenile offender is sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a nonhomicide offense, and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2460, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), which held that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” Chapter 2014-220 provides for individualized sentencing consideration pri- or to the imposition of a life sentence on a juvenile offender, and also provides for judicial review of certain sentences imposed upon juveniles who commit capital, life, or first-degree felonies punishable by life. However, the appellant’s 35-year total sentences do not violate either Graham or Miller, as the appellant was not sentenced to a life, mandatory life, or a de facto life sentence. See Kelsey v. State, 183 So.3d 439 (Fla. 2015) (holding that a 45-year *800sentence imposed upon a defendant who was 15 at time of crime was not a de facto life sentence), quashed, 206 So.3d 5 (Fla. 2016) (holding that 45-year sentence imposed after resentencing pursuant to Graham was improper where trial court did not resentence pursuant to chapter 2014-220: a defendant whose initial sentence violates Graham is entitled to new resen-tencing under the framework of chapter 2014-220).
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the summary denial of the appellant’s motion for post-conviction relief.
B.L. THOMAS, RAY, and KELSEY, JJ., CONCUR.
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Deryck Lee Katwaroo v. State, 237 So. 3d 446 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)…and the time for a review hearing has arrived. Nevertheless, in light of his 30-year sentence, the defendant was entitled to receive judicial review of his sentence. See Burrows v. State, 219 So. 3d 910 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017), but see Davis v. State, 214 So. 3d 799 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). However, it was error for the trial court to amend the sentence to provide for a review hearing without first conducting a resentencing hearing. Davis v. State, 230 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). Accordingly, we reverse and re…1 / 2
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Previewing 3 of 21 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (U.S. 2012)
- Graham v. Florida (1st Cir. 2010)
- Kelsey v. State, 206 So.3d 5 (Fla. 2016)
- Kelsey v. State, 183 So. 3d 439 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)