ALPHONSE MARCEL MELE AND HELEN SHAFFER MELE, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
WILLIAM HONLEY SUMMERS AND WILSON AND TOOMER FERTILIZER CO., A CORPORATION, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Meles sued Summers and his employer for damages from a vehicular collision. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, but the appellate court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact regarding negligence and contributory negligence existed and should have been submitted to a jury rather than resolved on summary judgment.
Summary judgment was improper because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the truck driver's negligence (failure to keep a proper lookout, excessive speed, and lack of control) and the automobile driver's contributory negligence. These factual issues should have been submitted to the jury rather than resolved on summary judgment.
“After a careful review of the record we are of the opinion that there existed genuine issues of material fact which should not have been resolved upon the motion for summary judgment but submitted to the jury.”
States the core holding that summary judgment was improper due to genuine factual disputes requiring jury resolution.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMr. Mele was driving his automobile eastward on Los Olas Boulevard in Fort Lauderdale at night when he stopped before entering Seventh Avenue, observe…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Nonsuit cases and more on FLexlaw
The automobile owned by Mr. and Mrs-Mele, and driven by Mr. Mele, collided with a truck owned by Wilson and Toomer Fertilizer Company and driven by its employee,. Summers. The Meles sued the owner and driver of the truck for damages caused by the alleged negligence of Summers. Negligence was denied and the defense of contributory negligence was interposed.
At the close of the plaintiffs’ case there was a motion for a directed verdict. The judge indicated his intention of granting the motion so the Meles took a non-suit.
The suit was refiled and issues were again joined on the allegations of negligence and: of contributory negligence. Wilson and Toomer Fertilizer Company and Summers-then filed a motion for summary final judgment supported by a transcript of the trial' proceedings. The motion was granted and the cause dismissed at the cost of the Meles.. Thereupon this appeal was taken.
After a careful review of the record we are of the opinion that there existed genuine issues of material fact which should not have been resolved upon the motion for summary judgment but submitted to the jury. Enes v. Baker, Fla.1952, 58 So.2d 551; Wilson v. Bachrach, Fla.1953, 65 So.2d 546; Anderson v. Maddox, Fla.1953, 65 So.2d 299.
The evidence submitted at the trial and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom may be summarized as follows:
Mr. Mele, operating his automobile east-wardly on Los Olas Boulevard in Fort Lau-derdale at night, stopped before entering Seventh Avenue and looked for on-coming traffic. There were no stop signs or traffic signals and neither street was a through thoroughfare. Mr. Mele observed lights of the truck approaching from the right in a *256northerly direction approximately 270 feet away. Believing' that a safe crossing could be made he proceeded into the intersection ahead of the truck. The automobile was 5 feet from the east edge of Seventh Avenue and well into the east lane of travel when struck broadside by the truck.
Summers saw the automobile only an instant before the crash. According to the calculations of an expert witness the truck could have been traveling at a speed slightly in excess of 33 miles per hour at the time of the accident, whereas the speed limit in that area was 25 miles per hour.
First of all, it would appear that Summers was not keeping a proper lookout, for he did not see the Meles’ automobile until an instant before the impact.
Next, it could reasonably be inferred from the evidence that the truck was exceeding the speed limit of 25 miles per hour at the time of the collision, and that Summers may not have had his truck under proper control.
And finally, although the truck would ordinarily be entitled to the right of way, as the vehicle on the right at the intersection, there may have been such a preemption thereof by the driver of the automobile as to require the driver of the truck in the exercise of ordinary care to yield the right of way.
A case quite analogous in Chaney v. Headley, Fla., 90 So.2d 297, in which a police car struck another vehicle within an intersection. Although the police car was the vehicle on the right at the crossing the Supreme Court ruled that it was error to instruct a verdict in favor of the police officer because there was an issue for the jury to decide as to whether he was negligent in the operation of his automobile. See, also, Drahota v. Taylor Const. Co., Fla.1956, 89 So.2d 16.
Mr. Mele came very close to being guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, but we are unable to say without any doubt that there was not a genuine issue as to this point. Therefore, the question was for the jury and should not have been resolved upon the motion for summary judgment. Manning v. Clark, Fla.1954, 71 So.2d 508; Williams v. City of Lake City, Fla.1953, 62 So.2d 732.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial in line with this opinion.
KANNER, C. J., and ALLEN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
VIA v. Tillinghast, 153 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)…iver on the through street from having to yield to a driver who already has preempted the intersection, even though the latter may have done so wrongfully and negligently. Weber v. Porco, Fla.1958, 100 So. 2d 146, 148; Mele v. Summers, Fla.App.1959, 113 So. 2d 254, 256. On the facts as presented at the hearing for summary judgment the Tilling-hast car was in the intersection and visible for approximately three seconds prior to the time it was seen by Hlavsa. Thus, on summary judgment it was necessary to infe…1 / 2
-
Lupoletti v. Miller, 269 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)…All aspects considered the liability issues should have been submitted to the jury and it was reversible error not to do so. Tooley v. Margulies, Fla.1955, 79 So. 2d 421; Dambakly v. Mason, Fla.App.1967, 194 So. 2d 35; Mele v. Summers, Fla.App.1959, 113 So. 2d 254. Appellant’s second point challenges the jury award of damages in the sum of $30,-000. We find no error or basis for remit-titur or reversal. [*69] The directed verdict in favor of plaintiff as concerns liability is reversed and the cause remanded…
-
Lloyd v. McKENNA, 179 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)…23, p. 273 (perm. ed). Neither driver entered the intersection sufficiently in advance to preempt the intersection. It appears obvious that the negligence of both drivers combined to proximately cause the accident. See Mele v. Summers, Fla.App.1959, 113 So. 2d 254; Kokotoff v. Higman, Fla.App.1958, 101 So. 2d 166. The admission of the other driver that he did not see the taxicab approach and enter the intersection, sufficiently certified his negligence and entitled plaintiff to a directed verdict against that…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Williams v. City OF Lake City, 62 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1953)
- Manning v. Clark, 71 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1954)
- Chaney v. Headley, 90 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1956)
- Anderson v. Maddox, 65 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1953)
- Wilson v. Bachrach, 65 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1953)
- Drahota v. Taylor Constr. Co., 89 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1956)