OMAR A. WILSON
v.
STATE

Fla. | 1934-01-08
113 Fla. 475 Florida Supreme Court (1934) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 152 So. 16
Cited by 1 case

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court affirmed a second-degree murder conviction, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict and that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a change of venue.


Holding

1. Yes, there was ample evidence for the jury to conclude the defendant did not act in self-defense and killed the deceased without apparent danger. 2. No, the denial of the motion for a change of venue was not reversible error.


Key Quotes

“The law as enunciated in neither of those cases is applicable here. In this case there was ample evidence from which the jury could have drawn the conclusion that the defendant did not act in self defense, but, on the other hand, that he shot and killed the deceased at and when he was in. [*476] no apparent danger of being assaulted or injured by the deceased.”

This quote establishes the court's reasoning for finding sufficient evidence to support the second-degree murder conviction.

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Facts & Procedural History

The plaintiff in error was indicted for first-degree murder and subsequently convicted of second-degree murder. He appealed, arguing that the evidence…

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Opinion of the Court
Buford, J.

Buford, J.

Plaintiff in error was indicted upon the charge of murder in the first degree and was convicted of the offense of murder in the second degree. He contends here that the evidence was' not sufficient to support a verdict of murder in the second degree, relying upon Holton v. State, 87 Fla. 65, 99 Sou. 244, and on Russell v. State, 91 Fla. 370, 107 Sou. 922.

The law as enunciated in neither of those cases is applicable here. In this case there was ample evidence from which the jury could have drawn the conclusion that the defendant did not act in self defense, but, on the other hand, that he shot and killed the deceased at and when he was in. *476no apparent danger of being assaulted or injured by the deceased.

His second contention is that the judgment should be reversed because the court denied his motion for change of venue. There is no material difference between this case in regard to that phase and to the case of Jeffcoat v. State, 103 Fla. 466, 138 Sou. 385, and we think that on authority of the opinion and judgment in the Jeffcoat case, supra, the record discloses no reversible error in the denial in this case of the motion for a change of venue.

The judgment should be affirmed and it is so ordered.

Affirmed.

Davis, C. J., and Whitfield, Ellis and Terrell, J. J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Phillips v. Greene, 994 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)
    …(1) requires notice to all interested parties and a hearing before a receiver is appointed. It is well established that courts are generally not warranted in appointing a receiver without notice. See, e.g., Leesburg Motor Co. v. Libal, 113 Fla. 742, 152 So. 16 (1934). [*373] Rule 1.620 requires compliance with the notice requirements of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610. Thus, incorporating rule 1.610 requirements, a receiver may only be appointed without notice if: (1) it appears from specific facts…

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