TROY MERCK, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Troy Merck, Jr., a death row inmate, appeals the circuit court's order striking his motion to substitute Linda McDermott as his counsel and his successive postconviction motion. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that substitution of counsel is a valid method to terminate an attorney's representation under Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.505(f)(2), and remanded for the circuit court to permit the substitution and address the postconviction motion.
The circuit court erred in striking the motions. Substitution of counsel is an authorized method for terminating an attorney's appearance under Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.505(f)(2), and therefore McDermott's motion to substitute was proper. Upon the defendant's written consent to the substitution, the circuit court must permit the substitution and then address the successive postconviction motion.
[1] An attorney's appearance for a party can terminate through substitution of counsel.
[2] A court errs in striking a motion to substitute counsel when the prior counsel has a conflict of interest precluding further representation.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.505(f)(1)—(3) "outlin[es] modes by which an attorney's appearance for a party terminates."”
Establishes that the rule provides multiple methods for terminating representation, not just by withdrawal motion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMerck is a prisoner under sentence of death. Linda McDermott had previously substituted for the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel for the Middle Reg…
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Troy Merck, Jr., a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the circuit court’s order striking his motion to substitute Linda McDermott for the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel for the Middle Region (CCRC-MR) as his counsel, as well as the successive postconviction motion that Ms. McDermott simultaneously filed on his behalf pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
Ms. McDermott previously substituted for CCRC-MR as Merck’s counsel in federal court following the federal court’s determination that a conflict of interest precludes CCRC-MR’s continued representation. Merck v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 2014 WL 5473574, at *1, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152243, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2014). CCRC-MR conceded below that the same conflict of interest precludes its continued representation of Merck in state court. However, the circuit court struck the motions at issue as unauthorized after construing our decision in Suggs v. State, 152 So.3d 471 (Fla. 2014), to condition the termination of an attorney’s representation upon the filing of a motion to withdraw, which CCRC-MR has not filed. In so ruling, the circuit court erred. As we explained in Suggs, Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.505(f)(1)—(3) “outlin[es] modes by which an attorney’s appearance for a party terminates.” Suggs, 152 So.3d at 472. Rule 2.505(f)(2) authorizes the termination of an attorney’s appearance through substitution of counsel, which is the method that Ms. McDermott sought in this ease after we specifically directed her to do so in Merck v. State, No. SC15-1439, 2016 WL 104164, at *1 (Fla. Jan. 8, 2016) (dismissing a prior notice of appeal that Ms. McDermott filed on Merck’s behalf “without prejudice for [her] to seek substitu*1286tion of counsel in the circuit court pursuant to Suggs”).
Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s order and remand with instructions for the circuit court to enter an order substituting Ms. McDermott as Merck’s counsel upon the filing of Merck’s written consent to the substitution with the circuit court. Once Ms. McDermott has been substituted as counsel, we further direct the circuit court to address the successive rule 3.851 motion that she filed on Merck’s behalf.
It is so ordered.
LADARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.
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L. T. v. State of Fla. & T.J.T. (Fla. 1st DCA 2020)…” and to be “heard” at court hearings pertaining to a criminal case. Barnett, 122 So. 3d at 405- 06. The trial court’s denial of the victim’s writ of mandamus was 4 Rules of Judicial Administration apply to criminal proceedings. See Merck v. State, 216 So. 3d 1285 (Fla. 2017); Suggs v. State, 152 So. 3d 471 (Fla. 2014). affirmed as the victim failed to show that the State Attorney violated a “clear legal right.” Id. at 406. Here, L.T. received notice and was informed of her right to be present at all heari…
Authorities Cited
- Suggs v. State, 152 So. 3d 471 (Fla. 2014)