ALEX U. SIRMONS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Alex Sirmons appeals his convictions for robbery with a deadly weapon, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and grand theft. The court affirms most of his claims but reverses his grand theft conviction due to insufficient evidence of the stolen phone's value and remands for resentencing due to errors in the sentencing scoresheet.
The court reversed the grand theft conviction because the victim's vague estimation of the phone's value ('like 3 hundred') was not competent, substantial evidence that the phone's value exceeded the $270 threshold required for grand theft. The court also found the scoresheet was erroneously calculated by including a charge for which Appellant was not convicted.
[1] A conviction for grand theft requires competent, substantial evidence of the stolen property's value exceeding the statutory threshold.
[2] A victim's vague estimation of an item's original cost is insufficient to establish its market value for purposes of a grand theft charge.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The value of property for grand theft must be shown either through direct testimony of the market value or 'through the following factors: original market cost, manner in which the item has been used, its general condition and quality, and the percentage of depreciation since its purchase.'”
Establishes the legal standard for proving property value in grand theft cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSirmons and several others jumped the victim, hit him with a gun, and stole his cell phone and $30 in cash. The victim testified he paid 'like 3 hundr…
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Appellant Alex Sirmons appeals his convictions and sentences for four counts, including robbery with a deadly weapon. We affirm without comment Appellant’s claims of error with regard to the admission of certain evidence and the trial court’s exercise of its discretion in denying Appellant’s request for a surrebuttal argument. We find merit, however, in Appellant’s claims of error with regard to his motion for judgment of acquittal for grand theft and an error on his scoresheet. We therefore reverse and remand.
Background
The victim in this case testified that Appellant and several other individuals jumped him, Appellant hit him in the face with a gun, and the victim’s cell phone and thirty dollars in cash were stolen. In addition to counts of robbery with a deadly weapon, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, Appellant was also charged with grand theft in the third degree, requiring the value of the theft to be at least $300. See § 812.014(c)l., Fla. Stat. As noted above, the State introduced evidence that thirty dollars in cash was stolen along with a cell phone. The only evidence of the phone’s value was the victim’s testimony that he paid “like 3 hundred” for the phone. A jury convicted Appellant on all four charges, including grand theft.
Prior to sentencing, a scoresheet was prepared, setting forth the four charges noted above, as well as an additional count of aggravated assault, a charge for which Appellant was not convicted. The score-sheet contained an additional eighteen points for this erroneously-included charge. These additional points pushed Appellant’s minimum sentence from the correct 86,85 months to an incorrect 100.35 months for all four of the charges that resulted in convictions, and caused the maximum sentence for two of the charges to be raised by the same amount. The State concedes that the scoresheet was erroneously calculated, but maintains it was harmless error as Appellant’s sentences would have been the same even without the error.
Analysis
The value of property for grand theft must be shown either through direct testimony of the market value or “through the following factors: original market cost, manner in which the item has been used, its general condition and quality, and the percentage of depreciation since its purchase.” Mansfield v. State, 954 So.2d 74, 76-77 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (quoting Gilbert v. State, 817 So.2d 980, 982 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)). The State’s rebanee solely on the victim’s “like 3 hundred” estimation was not competent, substantial evidence of the phone’s value being over the necessary $270 ($300-$30). The trial court therefore erred in denying Appellant’s motion for *89judgment of acquittal on this count. We accordingly reverse and remand for the trial court to enter a judgment of guilt of petit theft rather than grand theft. See Gilbert, 817 So.2d at 983.
As we are remanding this case for re-sentencing on the theft charge (as it is being reduced from grand theft to petit theft), the trial court is directed to correct the error with the original scoresheet and sentence Appellant anew with respect to all four of the convictions, with petit theft replacing the grand theft conviction.
Conclusion
Appellant’s conviction for grand theft is reversed and remanded with instructions to impose a judgment of guilt of petit theft. Appellant is also entitled to a new sentencing hearing on all counts, utilizing a corrected scoresheet.
Reversed and remanded.
Damoorgian and Gerber, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Russell v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2026)
Authorities Cited
- Gilbert v. State, 817 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- Mansfield v. State, 954 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)