MARSHALL S. VAUGHAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court reversed the summary denial of a habitual felony offender plea claim because the record did not conclusively show the defendant was informed of the maximum sentence consequences before accepting the plea.
A defendant's plea may be involuntary if the trial court failed to inform him of the possible maximum sentence as a habitual felony offender, and summary denial is improper when the record does not conclusively refute this claim.
[1] Prior to accepting a plea from a habitual felony offender, the trial court must provide written notice of intent to habitualize and confirm the defendant is personally aw…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[P]rior to acceptance of the plea: 1) the defendant must be given written notice of intent to habitualize, and 2) the court must confirm that the defendant is personally aware of the possibility and reasonable consequences.”
Citing Baker v. State and Ashley v. State for the requirements before accepting a habitual felony offender plea.
Marshall Vaughn appealed the denial of his motion to vacate his sentence, claiming he involuntarily entered his plea because he was not informed about…
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Marshall S. Vaughn appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his Second Motion to Vacate and Set Aside a Sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, in which he asserted three claims for relief. We affirm the trial court’s denial of Vaughn’s second and third claims without further discussion. In his first claim, Vaughn argued he involuntarily entered his plea because he was not informed about his possible maximum sentence as a habitual felony offender. “[P]ri- or to acceptance of the plea: 1) the defendant must be given written notice of intent to habitualize, and 2) the court must confirm that the defendant is personally aware of the possibility and reasonable consequences.” Baker v. State, 12 So.3d 281, 282 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (quoting Ashley v. State, 614 So.2d 486, 490 (Fla. 1993)). We find that the attached records do not conclusively refute Vaughn’s claim. Accordingly, we reverse the summary denial of the first claim and remand for the *117trial court to either attach records or hold an evidentiary hearing to conclusively establish that the trial court advised Vaughn of the consequences of his habitualization.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED with Instructions.
PALMER and BERGER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Ashley v. State, 614 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1993)
- Lidesmond Terrell Baker v. State, 12 So. 3d 281 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009)