KIDDE FIRE TRAINERS, INC., A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
v.
KEVIN EDDIE MCCREA, CHAUNTE T. MCCREA, HIS WIFE, AND TERRY MALEY, RESPONDENTS
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The appellate court denied a petition for writ of certiorari, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by waiving the work-product privilege for certain emails due to the defendant's intentional discovery violations. The ruling emphasizes the trial court's broad discretion in imposing sanctions for discovery misconduct.
No, the trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of law because there was competent substantial evidence to support the finding of intentional discovery violations, and the sanction imposed was within the trial court's discretion.
[1] A trial court's imposition of sanctions for discovery violations is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
[2] Waiver of the work-product privilege may be an appropriate sanction for intentional discovery violations.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“whether the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by imposing a particular sanction—the waiver of Kidde Fire’s work-product privilege as to numerous emails pertaining to Kidde Fire’s investigation and actions following an incident involving plaintiff Kevin Eddie McCrea— based on Kidde Fire’s, not counsel’s, serious and intentional discovery violations relating to the e-mails.”
This quote frames the central issue of the case regarding the trial court's sanction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKidde Fire Trainers, Inc. ("Kidde Fire") is accused of serious and intentional discovery violations concerning emails related to an investigation of a…
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The primary issue we must address in reviewing this petition for writ of certiorari filed by the defendant below, Kidde Fire Trainers, Inc. (“Kidde Fire”), is whether the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by imposing a particular sanction—the waiver of Kidde Fire’s work-product privilege as to numerous emails pertaining to Kidde Fire’s investigation and actions following an incident involving plaintiff Kevin Eddie McCrea— based on Kidde Fire’s, not counsel’s, serious and intentional discovery violations relating to the e-mails.1 As there is competent substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the discovery violations were intentional and because the sanction imposed by the trial court was well within its discretion, we find no departure from the essential requirements of law. See Ham v. Dunmire, 891 So.2d 492, 495 (Fla. 2004) (“It is well settled that determining sanctions for discovery violations is committed to the discretion of the trial court, and will not be disturbed ... absent an abuse of the sound exercise of that discretion.”); Toll v. Korge, 127 So.3d 883, 886-87 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (holding that a trial court’s determination of sanctions is committed to the trial court’s dis*757cretion). We, therefore, deny Kidde Fire’s petition for writ of certiorari.
Denied.
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- HAM v. Dunmire, 891 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 2004)
- Stockinger v. Ulrike A. Zeilberger, 152 So. 3d 71 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)
- Toll v. Korge, 127 So. 3d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)
- Millennium Diagnostic Imaging Ctr., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 129 So. 3d 1086 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)