EDWARD A. KOVACH, APPELLANT,
v.
HOLIDAY SPRINGS RV, LLC, APPELLEE
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An easement for ingress, egress, utility, and drainage that runs with the land may be used by the grantee and their invitees, not solely by the named grantee.
[1] An easement granting ingress, egress, utility, and drainage rights to a grantee, their heirs, and assigns, is not limited to use solely by the named grantee.
[2] The holder of an easement is entitled to use the easement in a manner reasonably necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the servitude, including normal development of…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant, the named grantee of an easement for ingress, egress, utility, and drainage, challenged a summary judgment that limited the easement's use …
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Appellant challenges a summary judgment. construing an easement contained within a deed. Concluding that the trial court misconstrued the easement, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The easement in question conveys “to the said grantee, and grantee’s heirs and assigns forever the following described land, situate, lying and being in Hernando County, Florida, to-wit: An ingress/egress, utility, and drainage easement over the following described property.” Appellant is named as “grantee." The trial court concluded that this easement may only be used by Appellant as named grantee and no other person, including Appellant’s invitees. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court misconstrued our decision in City of Orlando v. MSD-Mattie, L.L.C., 895 So.2d 1127 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). In that decision, we addressed an easement in gross where the grant was expressly confined to a limited use. Nothing in that decision supports the proposition that an easement that runs with the land may be used solely by the grantee. As a general proposition, the holder of an easement is entitled to use the easement “in a manner that is reasonably necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the servitude ... [including] normal development of the dominant estate.” Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 4.10 (2000).
Walters v. McCall, 450 So.2d 1139 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), upon which Appellee relies, is distinguishable. There, the easement stated that it was to be used “solely for the benefit of the owner or owners.” After making the threshold determination that it was ambiguous, our sister court then considered extrinsic evidence of what was originally intended and concluded that access by campground patrons exceeded the contemplated use as originally intended. Id. at 1143. Terrill v. Coe, 1 So.3d 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008), also relied upon by Appel-lee, reversed the trial court’s summary judgment because issues of fact precluded summary judgment.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ORFINGER, TORPY, and EVANDER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Walters v. McCALL, 450 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Laurance B. Hankin v. State, 895 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)
- City OF Orlando & Tampa Elec. Co. v. Msd-Mattie, L.L.C., 895 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)
- Terrill v. COE, 1 So. 3d 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)