ANTHONY WILLARD JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Anthony Johnson appeals the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief challenging the voluntariness of his plea agreement. Johnson argues the trial court failed to adequately advise him that his state and federal sentences might be served consecutively if the concurrent sentencing recommendation was rejected. The court affirmed the denial, finding the plea was voluntary and the plea agreement's terms regarding the non-binding nature of the concurrent sentencing recommendation were clearly communicated.
The plea was voluntary. Although Johnson expressed displeasure with the trial court's explanation that the concurrent sentencing recommendation was merely a recommendation, he acknowledged understanding the plea agreement and his right to decline it. The trial court thoroughly advised Johnson of his options, including the opportunity to have hearings on the probation violations and a trial on the new charges, and Johnson knowingly chose to enter the plea agreement.
[1] A plea agreement is a contract to which the rules of contract law apply.
[2] A defendant's acknowledgment within a plea agreement that a recommendation is not binding and will not serve as a basis for post-conviction relief precludes a later chall…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A plea agreement is a contract and the rules of contract law are applicable to plea agreements.”
Establishes the legal framework for analyzing plea agreements as contracts subject to contract law principles
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJohnson was on probation in five cases from 2005 and faced potential life sentences in each. In 2013, he faced new charges including attempted first-d…
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Anthony Willard Johnson appeals the denial of his “Second Motion for Post-Conviction Relief,” alleging that his plea was not voluntary because it was not entered with a full understanding of the ramifications of the plea. We affirm. .
At the time of the plea, Johnson was on probation in five cases that originated in 2005, and he faced potential life sentences in each of fhe cases. The plea resulted from new charges filed in 2013, including attempted first-degree murder with a firearm and possession 'of-a firearm by a convicted felon, Johnson faced mandatory life as a prison releasee reoffender in the new case.
Johnson entered into a written plea agreement that provided for. a twenty-five year prison sentence in each of the cases, including the probation cases and the new case. The State waived the minimum mandatory sentence requirement in the new case. Johnson was serving a two-hundred thirty-five month prison sentence in federal prison when he entered his plea.
In the written plea agreement, the State and Johnson requested that the trial court recommend that the State and federal sentences be served concurrently, and they further agreed that if the recommendation was not accepted -by either entity, this provision of the plea agreement would not support a- motion to vacate the plea or a motion for post-conviction, relief.-' Specifically, the relevant portion of the agreement provided as follows:
The State of Florida hereby requests that the Court recommend that the defendant’s sentence be served concurrently with his 235 month federal sentence in Federal. Case # l:13CR20619(s)MOORE. The defendant understands and acknowledges that this recommendation is not binding upon the federal *932government or State of Florida Department of Corrections, and is merely a recommendation. By accepting this plea agreement, the defendant acknowledges and accepts that if this recommendation is not honored, that would not serve as a basis for a post-conviction challenge to this plea agreement or a basis to vacate this plea agreement.
Johnson now claims that the trial court should have specifically advised him that, if the Florida Department of Corrections and the Federal Bureau of Prisons did not accept the trial court’s recommendation, he would be required to serve his state and federal sentences consecutively. He claims that the failure of the trial court to advise him accordingly resulted in an involuntary plea that he must be allowed to withdraw.
“A plea agreement is a contract and the rules of contract law are applicable to plea agreements.” Garcia v. State, 722 So.2d 905, 907 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). A reading of the entire plea colloquy demonstrates that the trial court engaged in a thorough discussion with Johnson. Although Johnson expressed displeasure with the trial court’s admonishment that the recommendation was just that, a recommendation, he acknowledged that he wanted to enter into the plea agreement. The trial court advised Johnson that he did not have to enter into the plea agreement, and that he could instead have hearings in each of the five probation violation cases and a trial in the new case, but Johnson declined that opportunity. Johnson opted to complete the plea colloquy and adhere to the plea agreement.
The order of the trial court denying Johnson’s motion for post-conviction relief is therefore affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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Cassel Foulks v. State, 306 So. 3d 1178 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)…permanent PRR waiver, Foulks’ violation of probation would have nullified the State’s waiver under traditional contract principles. “A plea agreement is a contract and the rules of contract law are applicable to plea agreements.” Johnson v. State, 225 So. 3d 930, 932 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (quoting Garcia v. State, 722 So. 2d 905, 907 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)). As part of that contract, the State and the defendant both receive a benefit for their bargain, but a defendant breaches the original plea agreement by viola…
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Cebez v. Junior (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)…court terminated his probation, it did not have jurisdiction to hear the motion to enforce the plea agreement. We disagree. “A plea agreement is a contract and the rules of contract law are applicable to plea agreements.” See Johnson v. State, 225 So. 3d 930, 932 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (quoting Garcia v. State, 722 So. 2d 905, 907 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)); see also State v. Gutierrez, 10 So. 3d 158, 159 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). Here, Mr. Cebez entered into a negotiated plea agreement and accepted the benefits of…
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State v. Kevrick M. Hall, JR. (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)…s are illegal.2 In other words, the trial court could not unilaterally modify a contract to which it was not a party. After all, "[a] plea agreement is a contract and the rules of contract law are applicable to plea agreements." Johnson v. State, 225 So. 3d 930, 932 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (quoting Garcia v. State, 722 So. 2d 905, 907 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)). And, " '[i]t is never the role of a trial court to rewrite a contract to make it more reasonable for one of the parties,' or, in the guise of interpretation,…
Authorities Cited
- Garcia v. State, 722 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)