J. K. LAWTON, HETTIE S. REYNOLDS, ET VIR.,
v.
CAROLYN M. MCILVAINE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this mortgage priority dispute, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed that when a mortgagee acquires fee simple title to protect her mortgage lien from intervening liens, no merger occurs that would extinguish her mortgage in favor of a senior mortgagee's lien. The court held that merger depends on the mortgagee's intent, and acquiring title to protect a mortgage lien demonstrates intent to preserve rather than extinguish the lien.
No merger occurred. The court held that merger is not a necessary result of uniting a greater and lesser estate in the same person; rather, the mortgagee's intent and interest determine whether merger takes place. When a mortgagee acquires title to protect the mortgage lien, no merger occurs even though the mortgagee becomes owner of the legal title.
“A merger takes place when a greater estate and a less meet in one and the same person, in one and the same right, without any intermediate estate, the lesser estate being thereby merged in the greater; but the merger is not a necessary result of the union of the two estates in the same person. The intention and interest of the party who unites the two estates in himself will determine whether or not a merger takes place.”
Establishes the foundational rule that merger is not automatic and depends on the mortgagee's intent and interest
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHettie S. Reynolds and D. W. Reynolds executed a mortgage to Lawton. Subsequently, they executed a mortgage to Carolyn M. McIlvaine on the same proper…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Mortgage Lien Priority cases and more on FLexlaw
In this case Hettie S. Reynolds and her husband, D. W. Reynolds, executed a mortgage to Lawton. Afterwards they executed a mortgage to Carolyn M. Mcllvaine encumbering the same property but before that mortgage became effective Lawton entered into a binding stipulation that his mortgage should constitute an inferior 'lien to that of the Mcllvaine mortgage. Later certain liens accrued against the same property and Mcllvaine was required to discharge those liens' to protect her mortgage. Thereupon she accepted a deed conveying the fee simple •title from Mrs. Reynolds and her husband to herself, the deed containing the clause, “subject to one first mortgage, paving liens, taxes' and mechanics and other liens now of record against same.”
Mcllvaine went into possession of the property.
Subsequent to all these transactions, Lawton filed suit to *744foreclose his mortgage. Mcllvaine filed answer alleging that her mortgage was a prior lien to that of the Lawton mortgage and prayed affirmative relief of foreclosure. In due course, testimony was taken and chancellor entered a decree in favor of Mcllvaine as a superior lien holder and Lawton as an inferior lien holder.
The appellants contended that because of the merger of the title in Mcllvaine that her mortgage was satisfied and that Lawton’s mortgage became a- first lien. It is the contention of the appellee that there was' no merger but that the title was taken simply to protect the lien.
We think the law. applicable to this case was enunciated by this Court in the case of Jackson v. Relf, et vir., 26 Fla. 465, 8 Sou. 184, in which it was said:
“A merger takes place when a greater estate and a less meet in one and the same person, in one and the same right, without any intermediate estate, the lesser estate being thereby merged in the greater; but the merger is not a necessary result of the union of the two estates in the same person. The intention and interest of the party who unites the two estates in himself will determine whether or not a merger takes place.
“Where a mortgage encumbrancer becomes the owner of the legal title, or of the equity of redemption, a merger will not be held to take place if it be apparent that it was not the intention of the owner, or if in the absence of any intention, the merger would be against his manifest interest. And a purchase of the mortgaged estate at a tax sale by ■the mortgagee to protect the mortgage lien and save the property from being lost to him, does not effect a merger.”
It appears that the chancellor resolved the facts against the contentions of the appellants and we have been shown no good and sufficient reason for overruling his conclusion. *745The decree appealed from should, therefore,' be affirmed. It is so ordered.
Affirmed.
Whitfield, P. J., and Brown, J., concur.
Davis, C. J., and Ellis and Terrell, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment. ...
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Walter J. Dolan Props., Inc. v. Vonnegut, 133 Fla. 854 (Fla. 1938)…t of the union of the two estates in the same person. The intention and interest of the party who unites the two estates in himself will determine whether or not a merger takes place. Jackson v. Relf, 26 Fla. 465, 8 So. 184; see Lawton v. McIlvaine, 113 Fla. 743, 152 So. 179. Where an incumbrancer, by mortgage or otherwise, becomes the owner of the legal title, a merger will not be held to take place if it be apparent that it was not the intention, of the owner, or if, in the absence of any intention, the m…
-
Alderman v. Whidden, 142 Fla. 647 (Fla. 1940)…person, ordinarily the mortgage is merged and the same ceases to be an incumbrance and the owner will hold the lands with an unincumbered title, if there be no other mortgage or lien. See Jackson v. Reif, 26 Fla. 465, 8 So. 184; Lawton v. McIlvaine, 113 Fla. 743, 152 So. 179; Dolan Properties, Inc., v. Vonnegut, 133 Fla. 854, 184 So. 757. ■ The record in this case has been. carefully studied, the briefs of counsel for the respective parties have been considered, and the authorities examined, and we have co…
-
Gourley v. Kermit Wollam and Lydia L. Wollam, 348 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)…quitable title in one person does not always have that result. The intention of the party who unites the two estates in himself is determinative of whether a merger results or not. Jackson v. Relf, 26 Fla. 465, 8 So. 184 (1890); Lawton v. McIlvaine, 113 Fla. 743, 152 So. 179 (1934); Fay v. Lougee, 113 Fla. 784, 153 So. 91 (1934); Friedman v. Pohnl, 143 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962); 22 Fla.Jur., Mortgages, § 535. As the Supreme Court of Florida stated in Relf: “When a mortgage on lands and the equity of re…
Authorities Cited
- Jackson v. Relf, 26 Fla. 465 (Fla. 1890)