ALEXANDER M. ALBRITTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Alexander Albritton, sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment for first-degree murder, challenges his sentence on the ground that he was a juvenile (16 years old) at the time of the offense. The court holds that under Miller v. Alabama and the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Atwell v. State, Albritton is entitled to resentencing if his juvenile status is established, rejecting the state's argument that parole eligibility after 25 years satisfies Miller's requirements.
A juvenile offender sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment is entitled to resentencing pursuant to chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, if the trial court determines that the defendant's allegation concerning juvenile status at the time of the crime is correct. Parole eligibility does not satisfy Miller's requirement for individualized consideration of a juvenile offender's characteristics.
[1] A mandatory life sentence for a juvenile offender convicted of first-degree murder may be inapplicable if the offender is parole eligible after twenty-five years.
[2] A juvenile offender is entitled to resentencing under chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, if the trial court determines the offender was a juvenile at the time of the crim…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In light of the Florida Supreme Court's intervening decision in Atwell v. State, 197 So.3d 1040 (Fla. 2016), we hold that Albritton is entitled to resentencing pursuant to the provisions of chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, if the trial court determines that Albritton's allegation concerning his juvenile status at the time of the crime is correct.”
Establishes the holding that juvenile offenders are entitled to resentencing if their age is confirmed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAlbritton was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment. He was allegedly sixteen years old at the time the crime …
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In this post-Miller 1 appeal, Alexander M. Albritton challenges his mandatory life sentence for first-degree murder because *1079he was allegedly sixteen years old at the time the crime was committed. The trial court summarily denied Albritton’s motion for post-conviction relief, concluding that Miller is inapplicable because Albritton is parole eligible after twenty-five years.
In light of the Florida Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Atwell v. State, 197 So.3d 1040 (Fla. 2016), we hold that Albritton is entitled to resentencing pursuant to the provisions of chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, if the trial court determines that Albritton’s allegation concerning his juvenile status at the time of the crime is correct. See Reid v. State, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D1216, — So.3d —, 2017 WL 2348615 (Fla. 3d DCA May 31, 2017) (“[W]e read Atwell to reject the notion that Florida’s current parole scheme provides the individualized consideration of a defendant’s juvenile status required under Miller.”); Michel v. State, 204 So.3d 101, 101 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (certifying conflict with Stallings v. State, 198 So.3d 1081 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016), and Williams v. State, 198 So.3d 1084 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016), “to the extent that those decisions suggest that relief under Atwell is dependent on the defendant’s presumptive parole release date.”).2
We therefore remand for the trial court to conduct such proceedings as are necessary to determine whether Albritton was a juvenile at the time of the offense, and if so, to resentence him for his first-degree murder conviction pursuant to chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, which has been codified in sections 775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402, Florida Statutes. See Atwell, 197 So.3d at 1050.
REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions.
WOLF, RAY, and BILBREY, JJ., CONCUR.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (U.S. 2012)
- Atwell v. State, 197 So. 3d 1040 (Fla. 2016)
- Jackson Stallings v. State, 198 So. 3d 1081 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)
- Budry Michel v. State, 204 So. 3d 101 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)
- Williams v. State, 198 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)
- M.M. v. State, 207 So. 3d 257 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)