JOHN CALVIN TAYLOR, II, PETITIONER,
v.
JULIE L. JONES, ETC., RESPONDENT

Fla. | 2017-10-12
No. SC17-1145
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ„ concur., LAWSON, J., concurs specially with an opinion., CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., dissent.
228 So. 3d 71 Florida Supreme Court (2017)

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Synopsis

John Calvin Taylor II petitioned for habeas corpus relief under Hurst v. Florida, challenging his death sentence imposed by a non-unanimous jury recommendation (10-2). The Florida Supreme Court held that Hurst applies retroactively to Taylor's final 2004 sentence and that the non-unanimous jury verdict constituted harmless error requiring reversal.


Holding

Hurst applies retroactively to Taylor because his sentence became final after Ring v. Arizona. The non-unanimous 10-2 jury recommendation violates Hurst and is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the court cannot determine that the jury unanimously found the aggravators sufficient or that aggravators outweighed mitigation.


Headnotes

[1] Hurst v. …

[2] A death sentence recommended by a jury vote of ten to two violates Hurst v. …

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Key Quotes

“the harmless error test, as set forth in Chapman[ v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967),] and progeny, places the burden on the state, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict”

Establishes the legal standard for reviewing constitutional error in sentencing

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Facts & Procedural History

Taylor's death sentence was recommended by his penalty phase jury by a vote of ten to two. The sentence became final in 2004 after direct appeal. The …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

John Calvin Taylor, II, petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus seeking relief under Hurst v. Florida, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). We have jurisdiction.* See art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const.

Taylor’s death sentence, which his penalty phase jury recommended by a vote of ten to two, became final in 2004. See Taylor v. State, 855 So.2d 1 (Fla. 2003), cert. denied, Taylor v. Florida, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S.Ct. 1605, 158 L.Ed.2d 248 (2004). We have held that Hurst applies retroactively to “defendants whose sentences became final after the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Ring[ v. Arizona 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) ].” Mosley v. State, 209 So.3d 1248, 1276 (Fla. 2016). *72Thus, Hurst applies retroactively to Taylor.

Because the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of ten to two, Taylor’s death sentence violates Hurst. See Kopsho v. State, 209 So.3d 568, 570 (Fla. 2017). Accordingly, we must consider whether the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt:

The harmless error test, as set forth in Chapman[ v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967),] and progeny, places the burden on the state, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.

Hurst, 202 So.3d at 68 (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986)).

While the aggravators in this case are such that no reasonable juror would have failed to find their existence,1 based bn the jury’s ten-to-two recommendation for a sentence of death, we cannot determine that the jury unanimously found that the aggravating factors were sufficient to impose a sentence of death. Nor can we “determine that the jury unanimously found that the aggravators outweighed the mitigation.” Kopsho, 209 So.3d at 570. “We can only determine that the jury did not unanimously recommend a sentence of death.” Id. Therefore, because we cannot say that there is no reasonable possibility that the error did not contribute to the sentence, the Hurst error in Taylor’s sentencing was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. Davis v. State, 207 So.3d 142, 174-75 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 2218, 198 L.Ed.2d 663 (2017).

Accordingly, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is hereby granted. We vacate the death sentence and remand to the circuit court for a new penalty phase. See Hurst, 202 So.3d at 69.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ„ concur.

LAWSON, J., concurs specially with an opinion.

CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., dissent.

LAWSON, J.,

concurring specially.

See Okafor v. State, 225 So.3d 768, 775-76, 2017 WL 2481266, at *6 (Fla. June 8, 2017) (Lawson, J., concurring specially).

Concurrence
LAWSON, J.,

LAWSON, J.,

concurring specially.

See Okafor v. State, 225 So. 3d 768, 775-76, 2017 WL 2481266, at *6 (Fla. June 8, 2017) (Lawson, J., concurring specially).


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