WILFORD LEE KING, APPELLANT,
v.
JACKSONVILLE COACH COMPANY, A CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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The appellate court reversed a trial court's judgment for the defendant in an automobile-bus collision case, finding that the jury should have been allowed to consider the doctrine of last clear chance.
Yes, the evidence was sufficient to apply the doctrine of last clear chance, and the factual questions arising from it were properly for the jury.
“We think the evidence at the trial was sufficient to make applicable the doctrine of last clear chance, and that there were questions of fact under that doctrine which were properly for the determination of the jury.”
Establishes the court's reasoning for reversing the lower court's decision.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe case involves a collision between an automobile driven by the plaintiff and a bus owned by the defendant. A jury returned a verdict in favor of th…
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In this automobile-bus collision case, after the jury brought in a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant filed a motion for judgment in accordance with its motion for directed verdict or, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial. The circuit court entered an order, which is appealed from herein, granting the motion for judgment but not ruling on the alternative motion for new trial. We think the evidence at the trial was sufficient to make applicable the doctrine of last clear chance, and that there were questions of fact under that doctrine which were properly for the determination of the jury. A motion for directed verdict was not properly grantable and we, therefore, reverse the order appealed from, with directions to consider and determine the said alternative motion for a new trial.
WIGGINTON, Acting Chief Judge, CARROLL, DONALD K., J., and FUSSELL, CARROLL W., Associate Judge, concur.
On Petition for Rehearing.
By petition for rehearing appellee for the first time questions this court’s jurisdiction to hear and determine the subject appeal. Our attention is belatedly invited to the fact that this appeal is taken from an order granting appellee’s motion for judgment in accordance with its motion for directed verdict made at the close of the evidence, and setting aside the verdict and judgment for appellant which was entered thereon. Why appellee failed to challenge the appealability of the questioned order either by motion, by its brief, or in the argument of its counsel before the court on its merits, is not explained.
An examination of the order from which appeal is taken clearly reveals that it is interlocutory in character and cannot be construed as a final judgment. Being unrelated to any question of venue or jurisdiction, this court is without jurisdiction to hear and determine the propriety of the order except on appeal from such final judgment as may be ultimately entered by the trial court.1
For the foregoing reasons the court’s opinion on the merits is withdrawn and the appeal dismissed without prejudice to the right of appellant to again seek review of the order in question, if such be deemed advisable, after entry of final judgment in the cause.
WIGGINTON, C. J., and CARROLL, DONALD, J., and FUSSELL, CARROLL W., Associate Judge, concur.
On Petition for Rehearing.
PER CURIAM.
By petition for rehearing appellee for the first time questions this court’s jurisdiction to hear and determine the subject appeal. Our attention is belatedly invited to the fact that this appeal is taken from an order granting appellee’s motion for judgment in accordance with its motion for directed verdict made at the close of the evidence, and setting aside the verdict and judgment for appellant which was entered thereon. Why appellee failed to challenge the appealability of the questioned order either by motion, by its brief, or in the argument of its counsel before the court on its merits, is not explained.
An examination of the order from which appeal is taken clearly reveals that it is interlocutory in character and cannot be construed as a final judgment. Being unrelated to any question of venue or jurisdiction, this court is without jurisdiction to hear and determine the propriety of the order except on appeal from such final judgment as may be ultimately entered by the trial court.1
For the foregoing reasons the court’s opinion on the merits is withdrawn and the appeal dismissed without prejudice to the right of appellant to again seek review of the order in question, if such be deemed advisable, after entry of final judgment in the cause.
WIGGINTON, C. J., and CARROLL, DONALD, J., and FUSSELL, CARROLL W., Associate Judge, concur. . Longo v. Collins, Fla.App.1958, 106 So. 2d 1; Greyhound Corporation v. Kelly, Fla. App.1958, 104 So. 2d 471.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Longo v. Collins, 106 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958)
- The Greyhound Corp. v. Wilton H. Kelly, 104 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)