JOHN O. RILEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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John Riley appealed the summary denial of his motion to recover a vehicle and personal property seized upon arrest. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court erred by summarily denying the motion without either holding an evidentiary hearing or attaching records conclusively demonstrating Riley had no ownership interest in the property.
The trial court erred in summarily denying the facially sufficient motion for return of personal property. Because Riley's motion was facially sufficient and the State's records did not conclusively refute his ownership claim, the trial court was required to either hold an evidentiary hearing or attach records conclusively demonstrating Riley had no ownership or possessory interest in the property.
[1] A facially sufficient motion for the return of personal property must allege ownership of the property, that the property is not the fruit of criminal activity, and that…
[2] A motion for the return of personal property must specifically identify the property sought.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A facially sufficient motion alleges that: (1) the movant owns the property; (2) the property is not the fruit of criminal activity; and (3) the State is not holding the property as evidence.”
Establishes the legal standard for what constitutes a facially sufficient motion for return of property
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRiley was arrested and his vehicle and personal property were seized. Riley filed a motion seeking return of the seized vehicle and other personal pro…
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Appellant John Riley appeals an order summarily denying his motion for return of personal property. Appellant sought the return of a vehicle and • other personal property seized upon his arrest. We reverse.
*890Motions for return of personal property are “governed by procedures similar to those used in postconviction proceedings.” Shade v. State, 55 So.3d 722, 723 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (quoting Bolden v. State, 875 So.2d 780, 783 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)). A facially sufficient motion alleges that: (1) the movant owns the property; (2) the property is not the fruit of criminal activity; and (3) the State is not holding the property as evidence. Scott v. State, 922 So.2d 1024, 1026 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). It also specifically identifies the property. Id. Appellant’s motion was facially sufficient in this case; thus, the trial court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing or attach records conclusively demonstrating that Appellant was entitled to no relief. Bolden, 875 So.2d at 782-83.
The State disputes that Appellant owns the subject property, namely the vehicle listed in Appellant’s motion.' However, the records submitted by the State, and relied on by the trial court, do not conclusively demonstrate that Appellant has no ownership or possessory interest in the property. Therefore, the trial court erred in summarily denying the motion. On remand, the trial court must attach records conclusively refuting Appellant’s claim to the property or hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion. “[I]f the State is ‘unable to connect the items to specific criminal activity, and no one else can be identified who can demonstrate a superior possessory interest in the property, it should be re-tened to [Appellant] or to such person(s) as he may designate.’ ” Id at 783 (quoting Stone v. State, 630 So.2d 660, 661 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TORPY and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Deatrick S. Bolden v. State, 875 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
- Stone v. State, 630 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Scott v. State, 922 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)
- Brock Shade v. State, 55 So. 3d 722 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)