PP TRANSITION, LP F/K/A PALMS OF PASADENA HOSPITAL, LP D/B/A PALMS OF PASADENA HOSPITAL, PETITIONER,
v.
SHARON AND RANDALL MUNSON, RESPONDENTS
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PP Transition, LP sought a writ of certiorari challenging the trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss a medical malpractice claim based on the plaintiffs' noncompliance with Florida's presuit investigation requirements. The District Court of Appeal granted the petition and quashed the trial court's order, holding that the trial court must make express findings regarding statutory compliance when ruling on such motions.
The court held that when a defendant files a motion challenging a plaintiff's compliance with chapter 766's presuit requirements, the trial court must make an express finding as to the plaintiff's compliance with those requirements. The trial court's summary denial of the motion without any findings regarding statutory compliance constituted a denial of procedural safeguards for which certiorari relief is appropriate.
[1] A trial court must make an express finding as to a claimant's compliance with Florida's pre-suit medical malpractice investigation requirements.
[2] Certiorari is an appropriate remedy to review a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss for noncompliance with statutory pre-suit medical malpractice investigation re…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“PP Transition's motion required the trial court to "determine" whether the Munsons complied with chapter 766.”
Establishes the trial court's mandatory duty to make a determination on statutory compliance when ruling on such motions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSharon and Randall Munson brought a medical malpractice action against PP Transition based on nursing care Ms. Munson received at the hospital. As par…
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PP Transition, LP is the defendant in a medical malpractice action brought by Sharon and Randall Munson based on the care Ms. Munson received from the nursing staff at a hospital PP Transition operates. It petitions our court for a writ of certiorari from an order denying its motion to dismiss based on-'the Munsons’ alleged .noncompliance with the presuit investigation -requirements . applicable to medical malpractice cases under chapter 766, Florida Statutes (2013). We grant the petition.
As a part of their attempt to‘ comply with the requirements of chapter 766, the Munsons submitted the affidavit of a California-licensed neurologist who expressed an opinion on the nursing standard of care in Florida. See § 766.203(2) (requiring a medical malpractice claimant to -submit a medical expert opinion to corroborate reasonable grounds to support the claim). PP Transition filed a motion to' dismiss for failure to plead a claim or for an evidentia-ry hearing on the Munsons’ compliance with chapter .766, in which it argued— among other things — that the California-based witness was ineligible to offer an opinion on the standard of care applicable to nurses in Florida. See § 766.206(1), (2). After a nónevidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion. It gave no explanation for its ruling either on the record or in. the subsequent written order denying the motion.
PP Transition’s motion required the trial court to “determine” whether the Munsons complied with chapter 766. See § 766.206(1); Martin Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Herber, 984 So.2d 661, 663 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); Duffy v. Brooker, 614 So.2d 539, 544-45 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), abrogated on other grounds by Archer v. Maddux, 645 So.2d 544 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); cf. Holden v. Bober, 39 So.3d 396, 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (“The circuit court must then determine whether the opposing party complied with the reasonable investigation requirements of sections 766.201 to 766.212.”). At a minimum, that required the trial court make an express finding as to the Munsons' compliance with the pre-suit requirements. See Martin Mem’l, 984 So.2d at 663 (granting certiorari where trial court denied a motion to dismiss but “did not determine whether plaintiff conducted a good faith investigation!/]' or reach a conclusion on whether there was a reasonable basis for the claim”). Here, the court summarily denied PP Transition’s motion without making any findings as to the Munsons’ compliance with chapter 766. This effected a denial of the procedural safeguards of chapter 766 for which certio-rari relief is appropriate. See Williams v. Oken, 62 So.3d 1129, 1134 (Fla. 2011) (“Florida courts have permitted certiorari review to determine whether the defendant was afforded the proper process through procedural compliance with the statutory requirements.”); Rell v. McCulla, 101 So.3d 878, 880-81 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (“[Wjhere a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action has failed to satisfy the presuit notice requirements set forth in section 766.203(2), the defendant in such an action would suffer a material injury that could not be remedied in a post-judgment appeal if the action was allowed to proceed.”).
For these reasons, which render PP Transition’s other asserted grounds for certiorari relief moot, we grant PP Transition’s petition and quash the order below.
Petition granted; order quashed.
LaROSE, C.J., and VILLANTI and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.
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Dial 4 Care, Inc. v. Brinson, 319 So. 3d 111 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021)
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Univ. of Miami v. Shanay Hall Jones, 338 So. 3d 401 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024)…se the trial court adopted Jones’s proposed order verbatim. “At a minimum, [section 766.206(1)] require[s that] the trial court make an express finding as to [the claimant’s] compliance with the presuit requirements.” PP Transition, LP v. Munson, 232 So. 3d 515, 516 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). Thus, the University alleges that the trial court could not adopt Jones’s proposed order outright. Trial courts are not precluded from adopting a party’s proposed order, so long as the order does not “substitute for a th…
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Adventist Health System/sunbelt, Inc. v. Machalek, 346 So. 3d 169 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)…tiff has complied with the statutory presuit requirements. Dontineni v. Sanderson, 346 So. 3d 169, 170 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (citing Osceola Reg’l Hosp. v. Calzada, 246 So. 3d 1300, 1301 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)); see also PP Transition, LP v. Munson, 232 So. 3d 515, 516 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (granting ---PAGE 3--- certiorari relief where the trial court denied the hospital’s motion to dismiss without making express findings as to whether the plaintiffs complied with presuit investigation requirements applicab…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Williams v. Keith Robinson Oken, M.D., 62 So. 3d 1129 (Fla. 2011)
- Patrick M. Duffy, M.D. v. Brooker, 614 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- Archer v. Ronald A. Maddux, M.D., 645 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Martin Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Herber, 984 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)
- Brian C. Rell, D.P.M., & Coastal Orthopedics & Sports Med. of Sw. Fla., P.A. v. McCULLA, 101 So. 3d 878 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)
- Holden v. Donna Schutzman Bober, M.D., 39 So. 3d 396 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)
- Trett v. State, 39 So. 3d 396 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)