ADA NEWKIRK, ET VIR.,
v.
HIGHWAY ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Supreme Court dismissed an appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate a final decree, holding that the appeal was untimely and frivolous because it was taken after the final decree had become conclusive.
No, an appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate a final decree, filed long after the decree became conclusive, is frivolous and must be dismissed. The appeal cannot affect a final decree that has already become conclusive against appeal.
“Whatever remedy appellants may now have, if any, to cure the situation attempted to be rectified, it is certain that the final decree cannot be opened up or affected by the appeal taken from an order entered after such final decree became conclusive as against appeal”
This quote explains why the appeal is dismissed, emphasizing that the order appealed from was entered after the final decree became conclusive.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants filed a motion to set aside a decree pro confesso and a consequent final decree long after the final decree was entered. The trial court de…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Motion To Dismiss Appeal cases and more on FLexlaw
— In this case motion is made to dismiss the appeal as frivolous because it was taken from an order entered by the chancellor denying defendant’s motion to set aside and vacate a decree pro confesso and final decree consequent thereon long after the entry of the final decree. The transcript shows the final decree to have been entered February 15, 1933. The motion to set aside the decree pro confesso was filed May 29, 1933. The order denying the motion to vacate, which is the order appealed from, was not entered until September 14, 1933.
Whatever remedy appellants may now have, if any, to cure the situation attempted to be rectified, it is certain that the final decree cannot be opened up or affected by the appeal taken from an order entered after such final decree became conclusive as against appeal; therefore, on the authority of Gasque v. Ball, 71 Fla. 257, 71 Sou. Rep. 329, *32and the reasoning therein set forth, the appeal herein should be dismissed, and it is so ordered.
Appeal dismissed.
Davis, C. J., and Whitfield, Terrell and Buford, J. J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Longo v. State, 157 Fla. 668 (Fla. 1946)…y the trial judge, he freely gave, his consent to a search of the car which he was operating and voluntarily turned over his keys to the arresting officer for that purpose. See Carlton v. State, 111 Fla. 777, 149 So. 767; Gant v. State, 114 Fla. 23, 152 So. 710; Powell v. State, 131 Fla. 254, 175 So. 213; Tomlinson v. State, 129 Fla. 658, 176 So. 543. But even had consent to a search not been given, we think that the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officers at the time the ar…
-
James v. State, 80 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 1955)…by the trial judge, he freely gave his consent to a search of the car which he was operating and voluntarily turned over his keys to the arresting officer for that purpose. See Carlton v. State, 111 Fla. 777, 149 So. 767; Gant v. State, 114 Fla. 23, 152 So. 710; Powell v. State, 131 Fla. 254, 175 So. 213; Tomlinson v. State, 129 Fla. 658, 176 So. 543.” From this it follows that a search by consent under the circumstances is not an “unreasonable search.” In the Longo case the testimony showed that the arr…
Authorities Cited
- Gasque v. Ball, 71 Fla. 257 (Fla. 1916)