IN THE INTEREST OF IDA GLENDLYN (9) AND GLENN EARL (8) EVANS, DEPENDENT CHILDREN
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A Florida appellate court dismissed an appeal from a juvenile court custody order because the appellant filed the notice of appeal after the statutory deadline. The court held that section 39.14(2) of the Florida Statutes requires appeals in juvenile dependency cases to be filed within ten days of the order, not the standard sixty days provided for other civil appeals.
The appeal was not timely filed and must be dismissed. Section 39.14(2) of the Florida Statutes requires that notice of appeal in juvenile court cases be filed within ten days after entry of the order, which is shorter than the standard sixty-day appellate period, and this statutory exception is valid under Florida Appellate Rule 3.2(b).
“Appeals under section 39.14, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., come within the exception noted.”
Establishes that juvenile appeals fall under a specific statutory exception to the general sixty-day appellate period
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA juvenile court entered a final order regarding custody of two dependent children, Ida Glendlyn Evans (age 9) and Glenn Earl Evans (age 8) on May 13,…
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This is an appeal from a final order of a judge of a juvenile court with respect to the custody of a child. Such appeals are properly brought to this court. Art. 5, §5(3), Fla.Const., 26 F.S.A.; In re C.E.S., Fla.App.1958, 106 So.2d 610; State v. J. K., Fla.App.1958, 104 So.2d 113.
The order appealed was entered May 13, 1959, and notice of appeal was filed June 15, 1959. This court of its own motion set the cause for argument on the question of jurisdiction relating to time for appeal in view of section 39.14(2), Fla.Stat., F.S.A.,1 Rule 3.2(b) Florida Appellate Rules, 31 F.S.A., and the holding of this court in the case of In re Campbell’s Guardianship, Fla.App.1959, 114 So.2d 352. We hold the appeal was taken after the time limited for such appeals by subsection (2) of section 39.14, supra, and the appeal must be dismissed. Cf. Placid York Co. v. Calvert Hotel Company, Fla.App.1959, 109 So.2d 604.
Rule 1.4, Florida Appellate Rules, 31 F.S.A., provides that from their effective date these rules shall supersede all conflicting rules and statutes, and that all statutes not superseded or in conflict with the rules shall remain in effect as rules promulgated by the Supreme Court. Rule 3.2(b) provides “[ajppeals from final decisions, orders, judgments or decrees shall be commenced within 60 days from the rendition of the final decision, order, judgment or decree appealed from, unless some other period of time for taking an appeal is specifically provided by statute or these rules.” Appeals under section 39.14, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., come within the exception noted.
There is sound basis in reason and logic why appeals from special statutory proceedings should be limited to a period of time less than that normally provided for appeals from final judgments. Accelerating the time for appeals so that the status of the juvenile may be promptly settled was within the legitimate discretion of the legislature and comes within the exception in Rule 3.2(b), Florida Appellate Rules, supra.
Appeal dismissed.
HORTON, C. J., and CARROLL, CHAS., J., concur.
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In re Est. of George H. Wartman v. Wartman, 118 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)…removal of tenant proceedings to be effective, even though that portion of the statute providing for an appeal to the circuit court had been superseded. Cf. In re Campbell’s Guardianship, Fla.App.1959, 114 So. 2d 352, and In re Evans, Fla.App.1960, 116 So. 2d 783. For the reasons set forth in the cited cases we are compelled to hold that § 732.16, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., limits the time for the taking of appeals from the county judge’s courts in probate matters to 30 days from the entry of the order appealed. Th…
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Susan Joyce Aronson (Individually) v. Congregation Temple de Hirsch, 123 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)…mpetents (In re Campbell’s Guardianship, Fla.App. 1959, 114 So. 2d 352); a 10 day appeal period fixed by statute (§ 39.14 (2), Fla.Stat., F.S.A.) as to an order of the juvenile court with respect to the custody of a child (In re Evans, Fla.App.1960, 116 So. 2d 783) ; and a two day appeal period specified by statute (§ 83.27(1), Fla.Stat., F.S.A.) in certain landlord and tenant proceedings in the civil court of record in Dade County (Placid York Co. v. Calvert Hotel Company, Fla.App.1959, 109 So. 2d 604). In…
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A. N. E. v. State, 167 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)…appellate courts have held that juvenile courts are “trial courts” within the meaning of those words in the constitutional amendment. See State v. J. K., 104 So. 2d 113 (Fla.App.1958), In re C. E. S., 106 So. 2d 610 (Fla.App.1958), and In re Evans, 116 So. 2d 783 (Fla.App.1960). Other amendments to Article V of the Florida Constitution adopted in 1956 had the effect of endowing the Supreme Court of Florida with the exclusive power to promulgate rules of appellate procedure that would supersede conflicting s…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. J. K., 104 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)
- State v. Brock, 106 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958)
- Placid York Co., Inc. v. Calvert Hotel Co., Inc., 109 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- In re Guardianship of Daniel Douglas Campbell, 114 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)