AMY SARGENT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE.
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The court reversed the trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, holding that the trial court should have stricken the motion as facially insufficient because the defendant was represented by counsel and failed to allege an adversarial relationship or meet the requirements of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii).
A trial court should strike a pro se motion to withdraw a plea filed by a represented defendant that does not allege an adversarial relationship with counsel or meet the requirements of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii).
[1] A pro se motion to withdraw a guilty plea filed by a represented defendant must be stricken if it does not allege an adversarial relationship with counsel or satisfy the…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAmy Sargent entered a nolo contendere plea to criminal mischief (third-degree felony) pursuant to a plea agreement and was sentenced to three years' p…
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The appellant, Amy Sargent, entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of criminal mischief (a third-degree felony) pursuant to a plea agreement. She was represented by counsel at the time of the plea. She was sentenced to three years' probation. A few days later, Sargent filed a facially insufficient, pro se motion to withdraw her plea. At the time the motion was filed, Sargent was still represented by counsel. See Escobar v. State, 126 So.3d 277, 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) ("[C]ounsel's obligation of representation to his client does not end upon the rendition of a judgment of conviction and sentence, but continues thereafter until either a notice of appeal is filed ... the time for filing the notice has passed, or good cause is shown upon written motion."). The trial court held a hearing and denied the motion. Sargent's counsel did not attend the hearing.
Sargent appeals, contending that her constitutional right to counsel was violated when the hearing was held without her counsel being present. We conclude that the trial court should have stricken the motion because Sargent was represented by counsel and the motion did not allege an adversarial relationship with her counsel. Moreover, the motion did not contain specific allegations that bring it within the ambit of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii). See Escobar, 126 So.3d at 279. Accordingly, we reverse the order under review and remand this case to the trial court to enter an order striking the motion.
REVERSED; REMANDED with instructions.
SAWAYA, EVANDER and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.