DENNIS SOCHOR, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE.
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Dennis Sochor appealed the denial of his third successive motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's summary denial, holding that Sochor's newly discovered evidence—a declaration suggesting his brother Gary was more responsible for the murder—was inadmissible hearsay and not material under Brady v. Maryland.
The court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief, holding that the Droste declaration was inadmissible hearsay that did not fall within any hearsay exception, and therefore could not satisfy the newly discovered evidence standard. The declaration was also not material under Brady because it did not create a reasonable probability that disclosure would have changed the outcome or undermined confidence in the verdict.
[1] A successive motion for postconviction relief that is legally insufficient on its face and refuted by the record may be denied without a case status conference or evident…
[2] A declaration containing a third-party confession is inadmissible hearsay if it does not fall within a recognized exception.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the declaration itself is inadmissible because it does not fall within a hearsay exception”
Establishes that Droste's declaration fails as newly discovered evidence because it lacks admissibility
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSochor was convicted of murder in connection with the death of Patricia Gifford. Years later, he filed a third successive motion for postconviction re…
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We hereby affirm the denial of Appellant's third successive motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Because the motion was legally insufficient on its face and refuted by the record, we find that the trial court's failure to hold a case status conference was harmless error, and that no evidentiary hearing was required. See Marek v. State , 14 So.3d 985, 999 (Fla. 2009) ; Rutherford v. State , 926 So.2d 1100, 1108 (Fla. 2006).
Additionally, the trial court did not err by summarily denying his claim based on newly discovered evidence and Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Sochor alleges that a recent declaration obtained from Marvin Droste details a confession from Gary Sochor, Appellant's brother, that Gary was actually "more responsible than anyone else" for the murder of Patricia Gifford. However, the declaration itself is inadmissible because it does not fall within a hearsay exception. See *196Robinson v. State , 707 So.2d 688, 691 (Fla. 1998) ; § 90.804(2), Fla. Stat. Accordingly, the declaration from Marvin Droste would not "probably produce an acquittal on retrial or yield a less severe sentence." Kormondy v. State , 154 So.3d 341, 353 (Fla. 2015). Therefore, the newly discovered evidence claim was properly denied. See id. Further, the new information obtained from Droste is not material under the Brady standard. See Strickler v. Greene , 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). Viewing the declaration by Droste in the context of the entire record, the content of the impeachment evidence against Gary Sochor does not undermine our confidence. See Mordenti v. State , 894 So.2d 161, 172 (Fla. 2004) (explaining that the materiality prong of Brady is satisfied if "there is a reasonable probability that this evidence 'put[s] the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.' " (quoting Kyles v. Whitley , 514 U. S. 419, 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) ).
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of relief.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Sochor v. State (Fla. 2026)
Authorities Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1963)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (U.S. 1999)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (U.S. 1995)
- Robinson v. State, 707 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1998)
- Mordenti v. State, 894 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 2004)
- Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985 (Fla. 2009)
- Rutherford v. State, 926 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 2006)
- Kormondy v. State, 154 So. 3d 341 (Fla. 2015)