IAN DECO LIGHTBOURNE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE.

Fla. | 2018-08-30
No. SC18-677
252 So. 3d 702 Florida Supreme Court (2018)

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Synopsis

Ian Deco Lightbourne appealed the circuit court's denial of his Rule 3.851 motion seeking postconviction relief based on the Hurst v. Florida decision regarding jury requirements in capital sentencing. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial, holding that prior precedent establishing Hurst's non-retroactive application barred Lightbourne's claims.


Holding

The Florida Supreme Court held that its prior denial of Lightbourne's appeal from the circuit court's denial of his successive postconviction motion raising similar claims constitutes a procedural bar, and that all of Lightbourne's claims depend upon retroactive application of Hurst to which he is not entitled under prior precedent.


Headnotes

[1] A prior denial of a defendant's appeal from the denial of a successive motion for postconviction relief can procedurally bar subsequent claims raising similar issues.

[2] Claims dependent on the retroactive application of Hurst v. …

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Key Quotes

“All of Lightbourne's claims depend upon the retroactive application of Hurst, to which we have held he is not entitled.”

Establishes the core basis for affirming the denial—Lightbourne's inability to benefit from Hurst's non-retroactive application

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Facts & Procedural History

Lightbourne filed a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 seeking relief based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

*703We have for review Ian Deco Lightbourne's appeal of the circuit court's order denying Lightbourne's motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Lightbourne's motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst ), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). Lightbourne responded to this Court's order to show cause arguing why this Court's decisions in Lightbourne v. State , 235 So.3d 285 (Fla. 2018), petition for cert. filed , No. 18-5012 (U.S. June 28, 2018), and Hitchcock v. State , 226 So.3d 216 (Fla.), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Lightbourne's response to the order to show cause, as well as the State's arguments in reply, we conclude that our prior denial of Lightbourne's appeal from the circuit court's denial of his successive motion for postconviction relief raising similar claims is a procedural bar to the claims at issue in this appeal. All of Lightbourne's claims depend upon the retroactive application of Hurst , to which we have held he is not entitled. See Lightbourne , 235 So.3d at 286 ; Hitchcock , 226 So.3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Lightbourne's motion.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Lightbourne, we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

PARIENTE, J., concurring in result.

I agree with the per curiam opinion that we have formerly denied Lightbourne's claims to Hurst1 relief pursuant to Hitchcock ,2 which, of course, is now final. Nevertheless, as I have expressed several times, I would apply Hurst retroactively to Lightbourne's case. See Hitchcock , 226 So.3d at 221-23 (Pariente, J., dissenting). Applying Hurst to Lightbourne's case, in which the jury's vote is unclear, I would grant a new penalty phase because the State cannot prove that the Hurst error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.


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