BEN-JAY INVESTMENT CO., A FLORIDA CORPORATION; SARAH DEETHS, MARGARET MARINUS, ANNA M. GOEDEKE, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND, LAWRENCE F. GOEDEKE, ADOLPH ROSENAK, AND BERTHA ROSENAK, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND, ADOLPH ROSENAK, BERNARD SZOID, LILLI CORPORATION, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, EDITH ROBERTSON, AND CLARENCE G. STEPHENS AND OLLIE STEPHENS, HIS WIFE, AND ANY AND ALL OTHER PERSONS CLAIMING ANY RIGHT, TITLE OR INTEREST IN AND TO THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION,
v.
MARIE DE C. STILLMAN, AS TRUSTEE FOR RONALD Y. STILLMAN, MARIE DE STILLMAN AND RONALD Y. STILLMAN
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Ben-Jay Investment Co. and other parties appealed a decision denying their motion to dismiss a bill of complaint seeking to quiet title to disputed Government land in Volusia County. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that a suit to quiet title may be maintained in equity and that platting and selling land constitutes sufficient adverse possession to cloud title.
The court held that suits to quiet title may be maintained in equity under Chapter 11383, Acts of 1925, and that platting and laying off land into town lots for sale constitutes adverse possession capable of clouding title against which equity will grant relief.
“A complete answer to this contention contrary to appellants' view, is found in Chapter 11383, Acts of 1925, and in McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820, construing said Act.”
Establishes statutory authority for maintaining suit to quiet title in equity
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellees sought to quiet title to part of Government Lot 2, Section 36, Township 14 South, Range 32 East in Volusia County, alleging they had been in…
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— This cause grew out of a controversy between the parties hereto, as to the ownership of part of the overplus of Government Lot 2, Section 36, Township 14, *704South, Range 32 East. Appellees, as complainants, brought their bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of Volusia County, to quiet title to the lands in question. The bill alleges that they have been in possession of said lands for more than seven years' last past, and recites their chain of title which is shown to have been deraigned from the Federal' Government. A motion to dismiss on the part of appellants as defendants was overruled, and the instant appeal is from that decree.
It is first contended that there is no equity in the bill, that a suit to quiet title cannot be .maintained in equity hut must be prosecuted at common law. A complete answer to this contention contrary to appellants’ view, is found in Chapter 11383, Acts of 1925, and in McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820, construing said Act.
The claim of ownership adverse to that of complainant consisted in platting and selling according to said plat, the lands brought in question. It is contended that such exercise of ownership does not constitute a cloud upon the title against which equity will relieve.
There is no general rule prescribing the particular acts of ownership which constitute adverse possession, but in the light of the purpose for which it is done, it certainly could not be questioned that- platting and laying off into town lots for the purpose of sale, is one of them.
The judgment below must be and is hereby affirmed.
Davis, C. J., and Whitfield, Ellis, Brown and Buford, J. J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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COX v. Game, 373 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)…considered in deciding whether title by adverse possession has been acquired. Measured against the foregoing criteria, the appellants failed to sustain their claim of adverse possession. Appellants rely primarily upon Ben-Jay Inv. Co. v. Stillman, 114 Fla. 703, 154 So. 829 (1934). In affirming the denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint for quiet title the court said: The claim of ownership adverse to that of complainants consisted in platting, and selling according to said plat, the lands brought in q…
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Sucro v. Worthington, 104 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1939)…e Supreme Court of North Carolina, it has been held in other jurisdictions that platting lands and laying them off into town lots for purposes of sale are acts of ownership constituting adverse possession. Ben-Jay Inv. Co. v. Stillman, 114 Fla. 703, 154 So. 829; Ross v. Houston Oil Fields Ass’n, Tex.Civ.App., 88 S.W. 2d 586, 594. See also Cashion v. Meredith, 333 Mo. 970, 64 S.W. 2d 670, 673. Such acts certainly evidence the exercise of dominion quite as clearly as the building of a fence. As said by Judge…
Authorities Cited
- Nannie McDaniel v. McElvy, 108 So. 820 (Fla. 1926)