RAYMOND E. MILLER, PETITIONER,
v.
BREWER COMPANY OF FLORIDA, INC., LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, AND FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS
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A worker injured in 1952 sought additional remedial treatment under Florida's workers' compensation statute. The Florida Industrial Commission denied his 1959 claim because his right to seek remedial treatment had been barred by a two-year statute of limitations that ran from the last payment of compensation in 1953, not from remedial treatment voluntarily provided by the carrier in 1957.
The court held that the claimant's right to remedial treatment was barred as of 1955, two years after the last payment of compensation in 1953. The voluntary provision of remedial treatment by the carrier in 1957 did not operate to revive the claimant's statutory right to additional remedial treatment.
“the right to remedial treatment 'shall be barred unless claim therefor is filed * * * within two years after the date of the last remedial treatment furnished by the employer, or after the date of the last payment of compensation'”
The statutory provision cited by the Industrial Commission establishing the two-year limitations period for remedial treatment claims.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePetitioner was injured in an industrial accident in 1952 and received a lump-sum workers' compensation award in 1953. In April and November 1957, the …
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Petitioner-claimant has applied for review on certiorari of an order of the Florida Industrial Commission denying his claim for additional remedial treatment under the provisions of § 440.13, Fla.Stat., F.S.A.
The facts were that claimant was injured in an industrial accident in 1952, the last payment of workmen’s compensation therefor having been made under a lump-sum *566award, in 1953. Some four years later— in April and November of 1957 — the carrier complied with a request of the claimant for further remedial treatment. The instant claim for additional treatment was made on May 2, 1959, - which was within two years of the date of the remedial treatment furnished in 1957. The Commission held, however, that the claimant’s right to additional remedial treatment had been barred since 1955 (two years after the date of the last compensation payment) under the provisions of Subsection (3) (b) of § 440.13, supra, providing that the right to remedial treatment “shall be barred unless claim therefor is filed * * * within two years after the date of the last remedial treatment furnished by the employer, or after the date of the last payment of compensation”; and that the fact that the carrier voluntarily complied with the claimant’s request for remedial treatment in 1957 should not and did not operate to revive the right of the claimant to remedial treatment under the statute.
This court on numerous occasions has held that the construction given a statute by the administrative agency charged with its enforcement and interpretation is entitled to great weight, and that the court generally will not depart from such construction except for the most cogent reasons and unless clearly erroneous. We are not persuaded that the language of the statute compels an interpretation contrary to that given it by the Commission, as here contended for by the petitioner-claimant. Cf. 2 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 78.43(b), page 271.
Accordingly, certiorari should be and it is hereby
Denied.
THOMAS, C. J., and TERRELL and DREW, JJ., concur.
HOBSON, THORNAL and O’CON-NELL, JJ., dissent.
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Cited By (11 total)
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Brown v. Giffen Indus., Inc., 281 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1973)…ding that the claimant is entitled to additional compensation for permanent partial disability. Without the reissuance of the lost check, the Statute of Limitations would have barred any further consideration of the claim. “In Miller v. Brewer Co., 122 So. 2d 565 (Fla.1960), a claim for further medical care was held barred by the Statute of Limitations. The injury was in 1952, the last payment of compensation was in 1953, however, in 1957 the employer/carrier voluntarily complied with a request for additiona…
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ABC Liquors v. Dep't of Bus. Reg., 397 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)…1956); Green v. Stuckey’s of Fanning Springs, Inc., 99 So. 2d 867 (Fla.1957); United States Gypsum Co. v. Green, 110 So. 2d 409 (Fla.1959); State ex rel. Volusia Jai-Alai, Inc. v. Ring, 122 So. 2d 4 (Fla.1960); Miller v. Brewer Co. of Florida, Inc., 122 So. 2d 565 (Fla.1960); Fidelity Constr. Co. v. Arthur J. Collins & Son, Inc., 130 So. 2d 612 (Fla.1961); Henderson v. Sol Walker and Co., 138 So. 2d 323 (Fla.1962); State v. Florida Dev. Comm., 211 So. 2d 8 (Fla.1968); Daniel v. Florida St. Turnpike Auth., 213…
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Henderson v. SOL Walker & Co., 138 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 1962)…as it is clearly limited to cases of ‘disability partial in character but permanent in quality’, while Section 440.15(1) governs cases of ‘total disability adjudged to be permanent.’ ” As we held in Miller v. Brewer Company of Florida, Inc., Fla., 122 So. 2d 565, the construction given the act by the commission is entitled to great weight, and this court will not adopt a contrary interpretation except for the most cogent reasons. Moreover, where the Act is susceptible of disparate interpretations, the court…
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