ARCHIE FOY
v.
STATE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Archie Foy was tried for statutory burglary in Florida. The trial court improperly allowed the State Attorney to cross-examine Foy and his witnesses about pending indictments and other criminal accusations unrelated to the charges, which violated fundamental rules against character impeachment and improper suggestion of general criminality. The Florida Supreme Court reversed and ordered a new trial.
The trial court's permission for such cross-examination constituted reversible error. The prosecution cannot, through cross-examination, use innuendo and suggestions of general criminality to lead the jury to believe the defendant is guilty of the charged crime because he is suspected or accused of other offenses or has connections with other accused persons. A new trial is warranted to correct this prejudicial abuse.
“the prosecution in a criminal case cannot call witnesses to impeach the character of the defendant unless the defendant puts it in issue”
Establishes the foundational rule that character evidence is generally barred unless the defendant raises the issue
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceArchie Foy was on trial for the felony of statutory burglary. During cross-examination, the State Attorney asked Foy whether he knew he was under indi…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Cross-Examination Scope cases and more on FLexlaw
Archie Foy while on trial for the felony of statutory burglary became a witness in his own behalf. While on the stand the Court permitted (over appropriate objections by counsel for defendant) the State Attorney to interrogate the defendant as follows:
“And you know at this time you are under indictment with respect to both of these breakings and enterings?”
The court also permitted over objection of defendant’s counsel, the State Attorney to ask of defendant’s witness, Clyde Whitted:
“Did you know that the Grand Jury at the present term ' of court had returned an indictment against you and Archie Foy?” (the defendant); and kindred questions of like import, concerning other cases.
*246• It is well settled that the prosecution in a criminal case cannot call witnesses to impeach the character of the defendant unless the defendant puts it in issue. Mann v. State, 22 Fla. 600. Nor can the prosecution accomplish the same forbidden end by indirection through pursuing a method of questioning defendant and his witnesses on cross examination that is principally designed, by means of innuendo and suggestions of-general criminality on accused’s part, to lead the jury to believe that the accused should be found guilty of the particular crime charged, because of his being suspected or accused of other offenses, or because of his connections' or associations with other accused persons under indictment for different crimes not constituting a part of the charge on trial.
The record in this case demonstrates .such abuse by the State Attorney at the trial below of his right of cross examination of the defendant and his witness concerning irrelevant matters, that the injury done defendant can only be corrected by a new trial which, in the opinion of a majority of the Court, should be now awarded.
Reversed for new trial.
Davis, C. J., and Whitfield, Ellis and Buford, J. J., concur.
Brown, J., concurs specially.
(concurring). — The Attorney General contends that these questions adverted to in the above opinion were proper under Wallace v. State, 41 Fla. 547, 26 So. 713, and Squires v. State, 42 Fla. 251, 27 So. 864, but a reading of these cases' convinces me that they do not apply here. I concur in the conclusion that the objections to these questions should have been sustained, and that, for these and other reasons going to the sufficiency of the evidence, which I deem it unnecessary to discuss, the judgment should be reversed and the plaintiff in error granted a new trial.
Brown, J.
(concurring). — The Attorney General contends that these questions adverted to in the above opinion were proper under Wallace v. State, 41 Fla. 547, 26 So. 713, and Squires v. State, 42 Fla. 251, 27 So. 864, but a reading of these cases' convinces me that they do not apply here. I concur in the conclusion that the objections to these questions should have been sustained, and that, for these and other reasons going to the sufficiency of the evidence, which I deem it unnecessary to discuss, the judgment should be reversed and the plaintiff in error granted a new trial.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Robertson v. State, 829 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 2002)…ate court may uphold a lower court ruling on an alternative ground not considered by the lower court. The Third District’s decision also misapplies this Court’s opinions in Jordan v. State, 107 Fla. 333, 144 So. 669, 669-70 (1932), and Foy v. State, 115 Fla. 245, 155 So. 657, 658 (1934), regarding the permissible scope of impeachment of a testifying defendant. Based on the conflict created by these misapplications, we have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(3), of the Florida Constitution. See Flori…1 / 2
-
Wadada Delhall v. State, 95 So. 3d 134 (Fla. 2012)…harged, because of his being suspected or accused of other offenses, or because of his connections or associations with other accused persons under indictment for different [*166] crimes not constituting a part of the charge on trial. Foy v. State, 115 Fla. 245, 155 So. 657, 658 (1934) (citation omitted). In the present case, the prosecutor’s question violated the rule laid down in Messer and Foy in that it suggests criminality on Delhall’s part, and specifically accuses him of the murder of Gilbert Bennet…
-
State Ex rel. R. D. Hawkins v. McCALL, 158 Fla. 655 (Fla. 1947)…uash alternative writ, the court entered its order and judgment quashing the alternative writ and dismissed the cause at the cost of relator. That mandamus is a proper remedy in such cases is well settled in this jurisdiction. See Hammond v. Curry, 115 Fla. 245, 14 Sou. (2) 390; Nelson v. Lindsey, 151 Fla. 596, 10 Sou. (2) 131; Nichols v. State, 138 Fla. 648, 190 Sou. 11, and cases there cited. In this jurisdiction municipal officers are subject to removal only in the manner and by the authority determine…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Wallace v. State, 26 So. 713 (Fla. 1899)
- Mann v. State, 22 Fla. 600 (Fla. 1886)
- Squires v. State, 42 Fla. 251 (Fla. 1900)