MOSES BLACKMAN, A MINOR, BY HIS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, JAMIE BLACKMAN AND JAMIE BLACKMAN, INDIVIDUALIY, APPELLANTS,

v.

MIAMI TRANSIT COMPANY, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEE

CARROLL, CHAS., Judge.

The appellant Moses Blackman, a boy 8 years of age, joined by his father, sued the Miami Transit 'Company for damages for personal injuries which he received while riding as a passenger on a bus operated by the defendant. The cause proceeded to trial before a jury. At the close of the plaintiffs’ case, a motion by the defendant for a directed verdict was granted, and judgment was entered thereon.

Plaintiffs appealed, and assigned as error that “the court erred in directing a verdict in favor of the defendant at the close of plaintiffs’ case inasmuch as the plaintiffs had adduced a prima facie case.”

The evidence disclosed that on an afternoon, between 2 and 3 o’clock, the minor plaintiff and his mother were passengers on the defendant’s bus. They were seated toward the front of the bus, on a longitudinal seat on the right-hand side. The boy was sitting forward of his mother. *129The bus made a sudden or “quick” stop. The boy fell over or was thrown forward (to his right) and struck his head against a metal bar. The only evidence of the speed of the bus was testimony by the boy and his mother that the bus was going “fast”, and the only evidence of a sudden stop was the mother’s testimony that it stopped “quickly.1 ”

The testimony as to speed of the bus was not in miles per hour. When asked about its speed the witness said, “He was going faster than he usually goes.” She testified that she had ridden the bus numerous times, but nothing was shown to establish the speed at which “lie usually goes.” No basis for a comparison was furnished.

It was brought out that when the bus stopped it was traveling in a straight line. There was no evidence that it swerved or swayed. The stop was described as sudden or “quick,” but there was no evidence bearing on the cause or reason for it. The boy was sitting on the longitudinal seat with his feet dangling, and thus was in a position to be toppled over by moderate force. No other passengers were injured or thrown from their seats.2

Testimony relating to speed of a vehicle, which does not give the speed in miles per hour, but states only that the vehicle was going “fast” (implying too fast), is lacking in quality and probative force.3 We have been shown no Florida decision ruling on the question of the admissibility or value of testimony that a vehicle was going “fast”. Although in some jurisdictions such testimony has been held inadmissible when offered to show negligence through speed,4 generally it is received in evidence for such value as it may have.5 But testimony that a vehicle was driven “faster than usual,” without showing its speed on that occasion, or its usual rate of speed, does not furnish a basis to find that an improper speed was used. Standing alone, testimony that the *130vehicle was going fast or faster than usual, is insufficient to establish excessive speed.6

Appellant contends testimony that the bus was going “fast” or “faster than usual,” coupled with testimony that it stopped suddenly or “quickly,” was sufficient evidence of negligence to have required the trial judge to submit the case to the jury. We do not agree. The ap-pellee argues, and we feel correctly, that with the evidence as to speed of the bus being inadequate upon which to find excessive speed, the testimony that the bus stopped suddenly, without showing the reason or circumstances, did not make out a prima facie case of liability, notwithstanding the conceded duty of the defendant as a common carrier to exercise the highest degree of care consistent with practical operation of the bus.

Ruling out stops of extraordinary violence, not incidental to ordinary travel, as inapplicable to the stop which occurred here,7 the sudden stopping of the bus was not a basis for a finding that the bus was negligently operated, in the absence of other evidence, relating to the stop, of some act of commission or omission by the driver which together with the “sudden” stop would suffice to show a violation of the carrier’s duty. This is so because a sudden or abrupt stop, which could be the result of negligent operation, could as well result • from conditions and circumstances making it entirely proper and free of any negligence.8 Affirmed.

HORTON, C. J., and WALDEN, JAMES H., Associate Judge, concur.