BRYANT

v.

STATE

Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed January 31, 2018. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D17-2237 Lower Tribunal No. 84-9397A

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James Allen Bryant,

Appellant,

vs.

The State of Florida,

Appellee.

An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Alan S. Fine, Judge.

James Allen Bryant, in proper person.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Magaly Rodriguez, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before LOGUE, SCALES and LINDSEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

James Allen Bryant appeals an order on his Florida Rule of Criminal

Procedure 3.800(a) postconviction motion seeking both: (i) a correction of jail credit, and (ii) prison credit for the time Bryant served in prison between his initial conviction and the date of Bryant’s second conviction after retrial. While the trial court found that Bryant was entitled both to a correction of jail credit and to prison credit, the court declined to determine the exact number of days he should receive.¹

First, we reverse that portion of the trial court’s order finding that Bryant is entitled to a correction of jail credit. A claim for jail credit must be raised under

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.801. See Curtis v. State, 197 So. 3d 135,

136 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (“Rule 3.801 provides for the correction of a sentence that fails to award a defendant credit for time the defendant spent in jail prior to sentencing; it does not provide for the correction of prison credit. Instead, a claim for credit for prison time is properly raised in a motion filed pursuant to Florida

Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a).”). Though the trial court properly treated

Bryant’s jail credit claim as being raised under rule 3.801,2 the jail credit claim is

Second, we affirm that portion of the trial court’s order determining that

Bryant is entitled to prison credit. The October 22, 1993 sentencing order reflects that the box for prison credit was unchecked. On this appeal, the State properly and commendably concedes that Bryant is entitled to prison credit for the time

Bryan served in prison between his initial conviction and the date of Bryant’s second conviction after retrial. Our judicial labor on this issue, however, is not done.

“Once the sentencing judge has awarded a defendant prior prison credit, the

Department of Corrections has primary responsibility for calculating the credit.”

Hardenbrook v. State, 953 So. 2d 717, 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). It is, therefore,

“permissible for the trial court to delegate to DOC the administrative task of calculating the amount of prison credit which is due” after the court fulfills its responsibility of ordering that prison credit be provided. Thistle v. State, 769 So. because it sought to correct a miscalculation in his jail credit after his sentence became final.”).

2d 1149, 1149 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Although the trial court in this case determined that Bryant is entitled to prison credit, it does not appear that the trial court ever delegated the responsibility of calculating the amount of prison credit to the Department. For this reason, as suggested by the State, we remand this cause to the lower court with instructions that it direct the Department to calculate the appropriate amount of prison credit pursuant to the order on review.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded with instructions.