DORIS M. HAY, APPELLANT,
v.
DEXTER E. HILDRETH, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In a wrongful death action, the court held that a widow was not bound by a prior judgment of negligence entered in a separate suit between a third party and her deceased husband's employer, where the deceased husband was not a party to and had no beneficial interest in that prior suit. The court reversed the trial court's summary judgment and ruled that res judicata and estoppel by judgment could not bind the widow under these circumstances.
The widow was not bound by the prior judgment because her deceased husband was not a party to the Hildreth suit nor a privy to it, and had no beneficial interest in a judgment in favor of his employer. The doctrine of res judicata and estoppel by judgment does not apply to bind a party when prior litigation involved different parties and distinct causes of action.
“Hay was not a party to the Hildreth suit nor a privy to the action. He had no beneficial interest in a judgment in favor of Central. Under those circumstances Hay would not have been barred from maintaining an action in his own right had he lived.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that res judicata does not apply when the deceased was not a party to or privy of the prior suit.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHildreth, driving a pickup truck, collided with a tractor-trailer driven by Hay, an employee of Central Truck Lines. Hay was killed in the accident an…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Counterclaim For Property Damage cases and more on FLexlaw
Hildreth, driving a pickup truck, collided with a tractor-trailer driven by Hay as an employee of Central Truck Lines, Inc. Hay was killed and Hildreth was injured. Hildreth sued Central basing his claim upon the alleged negligence of Hay. Central denied negligence on the part of its servant and pled contributory negligence by Hildreth. Central also counterclaimed for damage to its tractor-trailer based upon the alleged negligence of Hildreth.
In another suit, the widow of Hay sued Hildreth for the wrongful death of her husband. Mrs. Hay successfully resisted an effort by Central to have the two cases tried together. The Hildreth suit was tried first and resulted in a judgment in his favor *773against Central. The Hay suit next came on for trial and Hildreth advanced the defense of res adjudicata or estoppel by judgment. The lower court ruled that Mrs. Hay was bound by the determination in the Hildreth suit that the sole proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of her deceased husband. A summary final judgment was accordingly entered against Mrs. Hay and she appealed.
The parties agree, and so do we, that if Hay could not have recovered for his own injuries had he lived, because of the adjudication of negligence on his part in the Hildreth suit, then his widow would likewise be barred in her action for his wrongful death. See Duval v. Hunt, 34 Fla. 85, 15 So. 876, and Epps v. Railway Express Agency, Fla.1949, 40 So.2d 131.
Hay was not a party to the Hildreth suit nor a privy to the action. He had no beneficial interest in a judgment in favor of Central. Under those circumstances Hay would not have been barred from maintaining an action in his own right had he lived.
In Youngblood v. Taylor, Fla.1956, 89 So.2d 503, the father sued as next friend for injuries to his minor son and lost. He then sued in his own right for damages personal to himself. It was held that res adjudicata did not apply to the father’s suit, the two causes of action being independent of each other and the parties plaintiff different. In Martin v. Arrow Cabs, Inc., Fla.App.1958, 107 So.2d 394, four passengers were injured in a taxi cab accident. Two of the passengers sued and lost. The other two then sued and it was held that they were not barred by res adjudicata or estoppel by judgment, because the parties plaintiff were different in the two actions and the causes of action were distinct and independent of each other.
Hildreth cites Epps v. Railway Express Agency, Fla.1949, 40 So.2d 131, and Rehe v. Airport U-Drive, Inc., Fla. 1953, 63 So.2d 66, as authority for the proposition that the parties need not be identical to invoke the doctrine of res adjudicata or estoppel by judgment. Those cases can be distinguished from the instant suit, however, in that the parties plaintiff in those cases stood to gain even though not actual parties to the entire litigation, which is not the situation here. As to this distinction see the opinion in the Rehe case.
Hildreth would have us say that the determination of a servant’s negligence in a suit involving only the master and a third party is binding upon the servant although not a party to the cause. We are not persuaded of the wisdom or the justice of extending the doctrine of res adjudicata or estoppel by judgment that far, nor do we feel impelled to do so by the authorities submitted.
Hildreth refers us to King v. Stuart Motor Co., D.C., 52 F.Supp. 727, where in effect, a servant was sued for his act of negligence and the plaintiff lost. The plaintiff then sued the master for the same act of negligence of the servant and it was held that the latter action was barred by res adjudicata. In that suit, however, the plaintiff had his day in court on the issue of the servant’s negligence, which is not so in the instant suit.
Hildreth makes the further contention that Mrs. Hay had her day in court by resisting Central’s effort to have her suit and the Hildreth suit tried together, but there is no merit to this.
Reversed.
WIGGINTON, C. J., and CARROLL, DONALD K., J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. J. C. Penney Co., Inc., 166 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)…5, 49 (Fla.App.1st, 1963). . Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. American District Electric Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So. 316 (1932). . Suwannee Valley Electric Co-op v. Live Oak, Perry & Gulf R. Co., 73 So. 2d 820 (Fla.1954). . Hay v. Hildreth, 125 So. 2d 772 (Fla.App. 1st, 1961). . Columbia Casualty Company v. Hare, 116 Fla. 29, 156 So. 370, 373, 377 (1934). . Wright v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y., 139 So. 2d 913, 915 (Fla.App.1st, 1962).…
-
Gen. Portland Land Dev. Co. & Greater Fla. Inv. v. Stevens, 395 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…Weber was Hembree’s employee, undeniably if privity existed between them res judicata would apply and Hembree would be barred from relitigating the same issue of Weber’s negligence. Apparently there is no Florida case on point, but Hay v. Hildreth, 125 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961), is helpful. That case held that an employee was not in privity with his employer in an action brought by a third party against the employer for its employee’s negligence. Although judgment was entered in favor of the third party…
-
Racino v. Saxon, 222 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)…or its purpose.3 For the foregoing reasons certiorari is granted and the order of the trial court striking the defense of res judicata is quashed with directions to reinstate the same. CROSS and OWEN, JJ., concur. . Hay v. Hildreth, Fla.App.1961, 125 So. 2d 772. . See Hay v. Hildreth, Fla.App.1961, 125 So. 2d 772. . Hinchee v. Fisher, Fla.1957, 93 So. 2d 351; Thoman v. Ashley, Fla.App.1964, 170 So. 2d 332.…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Duval v. Hunt, 34 Fla. 85 (Fla. 1894)
- Am. Cont'l, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 89 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1956)
- Epps v. Ry. Express Agency, 40 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1949)
- Rehe v. Airport U-Drive, Inc., 63 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1953)
- Martin v. Arrow Cabs, Inc., 107 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)