RUIZ
v.
STATE
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A trial court abuses its discretion by restricting voir dire questioning about a defendant's sole theory of defense, as prospective jurors' attitudes about that defense theory are essential to determining challenges for cause.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by curtailing defense counsel's voir dire questioning about the sole defense theory.
[2] Voir dire must include questions about a particular legal doctrine when a juror's attitude toward that doctrine is essential to determining challenges for cause or peremp…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the single thing that defense counsel needed to know was whether the prospective jurors could fairly and impartially consider the defense of [excessive use of force].”
Lavado v. State, 492 So. 2d 1322, 1323 (Fla. 1986), discussing why voir dire about the core defense theory is critical.
David Ruiz was charged with battery on a law enforcement officer, resisting an officer with violence, and simple battery. His defense theory was that …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed March 20, 2019. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D18-193 Lower Tribunal No. 15-17145
________________
David Ruiz,
Appellant,
vs.
The State of Florida,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Stacy D. Glick, Judge.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Gabrielle Raemy Charest-Turken, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before SALTER, LINDSEY, and HENDON,1 JJ.
SALTER, J.
The defendant, David Ruiz, appeals his judgment of conviction and sentences for battery on a law enforcement officer, resisting an officer with violence, and simple battery. We reverse the convictions under Mosely v. State,
842 So. 2d 279, 280-81 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in curtailing defense counsel’s questions of the jury venire about the sole defense theory.2
The theory of defense at trial was that the officers used excessive force during Ruiz’s arrest. During voir dire, the defense attempted three times to ask the prospective jurors their views about police use of excessive force. Each question was met with an objection by the state. After a side bar on the state’s objection to the third question, the trial court ordered defense counsel not to discuss excessive force. This line of questioning ceased.
The trial court’s ruling denied the defendant his right to a fair trial and to an impartial jury by restricting questioning of the prospective jurors about the sole defense in the case. Mosely, 842 So. 2d at 280-81. Mosely concluded that “where a juror's attitude about a particular legal doctrine . . . is essential to a determination of whether challenges for cause or peremptory challenges are to be made, it is well settled that the scope of the voir dire properly includes questions about and
references to that legal doctrine . . . .” Id. at 281 (quoting Lavado v. State, 469 So. 2d 917, 919-20 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (Pearson, J., dissenting) (dissent adopted in
Lavado v. State, 492 So. 2d 1322, 1323 (Fla. 1986)).
It is improper to curtail questioning on the theory of defense, even where counsel is permitted to inquire generally. Counsel must be permitted to question the prospective jurors about their willingness and ability to accept the defense’s theory. Harrison v. State, 172 So. 3d 1018, 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). If defense counsel knew nothing else about the prospective jurors, “the single thing that defense counsel needed to know was whether the prospective jurors could fairly and impartially consider the defense of [excessive use of force].” Lavado v. State,
492 So. 2d 1322, 1323 (Fla. 1986).
Reversed and remanded.
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Beer v. State (Fla. 4th DCA 2024)
Authorities Cited
- Younghans v. State, 90 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1956)
- Lavado v. State, 492 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 1986)
- Baker v. State, 213 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968)
- State v. Hewitt, 702 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
- Mosely v. State, 842 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)
- Dumas v. State, 889 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)
- Harrison v. State, 172 So. 3d 1018 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)
- Robinson v. State, 201 So. 3d 666 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)