LUTHER
v.
FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT CO. OF MARYLAND

S.D. Fla. | 1986-08-15
No. 85-2762-CIV
Kehoe
679 F. Supp. 1092 District Court, S.D. Florida (1986) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 1987 WL 42588 · 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21462
Cited by 3 cases

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Holding

The court held that the insurance policy's clause regarding advancement of defense costs was permissive, not mandatory, and therefore the insurer was not obligated to advance fees before final disposition of claims.


Facts & Procedural History

Plaintiff, an officer of ASLA, was sued in multiple lawsuits arising from his dealings with E.S.M. ASLA had a directors and officers liability policy …

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

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Opinion of the Court

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

KEHOE, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

The facts in this case are not in dispute. Plaintiff, Robert A. Luther, was an officer of American Savings & Loan Association of Florida (ASLA) from October, 1982 to January, 1985. ASLA purchased from the Defendant insurer, Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland (F & D), a directors and officers liability insurance policy which was in effect from June 3,1982 until September 23, 1985. Under the terms of the policy, F & D agreed to pay ASLA and/or its officers and directors all losses (including

*1093

costs, charges and expenses) incurred as a result of claims filed against ASLA and/or its officers and attributable to the wrongful acts of said officers and directors. During the period of coverage ASLA had dealings with the E.S.M. Government Securities and its affiliates (E.S.M.). In April, 1985, Plaintiff was named as a party defendant in a lawsuit arising out of his dealings as an officer of ASLA with E.S.M. Subsequently, Plaintiff was named as a party defendant in four (4) other lawsuits also based upon his business transactions with E.S.M. Thereupon, Plaintiff notified F & D of these lawsuits and requested F & D to advance him attorneys’ fees and costs of defense pursuant to the policy. F & D, citing Clause 5 of the subject policy, refused to advance costs and attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff filed the instant suit for declaratory relief seeking a determination that F & D had an obligation to pay the costs and attorneys’ fees incurred by him in defending the actions. F & D answered and filed a counterclaim and third party complaint naming as defendants all individuals arguably insured under the policy issued to ASLA. In its counterclaim and third party complaint, F & D seeks determination that it is not obligated to advance expenses, including costs and attorney’s fees until

final disposition

of the claims brought against those insured under the policy.

The dispositive issue to be determined by the Court is the interpretation of Clause 5(c) of the subject policy which reads:

The Company

may at its option

and upon request, advance on behalf of the Directors and Offices, or any of them,

expenses which they have incurred in connection with claims made

against them prior to disposition of such claims....

The law is well established that where the language in a clause of an insurance contract is plain and unambiguous,

no

special construction or interpretation is required and the language will be given that meaning which it clearly expresses.

Brown v. Lee County Mosquito Control Dist.,

352 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1977);

U.S. Liability Ins. Co. v. Bove,

347 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977);

State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Oliveras,

441 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).

The Court finds that the language in Clause 5(c) set out above is plain and unambiguous. The language contained therein clearly reflects that F & D, if it so chooses,

may

advance expenses including attorney’s fees to insured officers and directors. However, it is equally clear tht F & D is not obligated to do so (prior to final disposition of any claim). Thus, no further construction or interpretation by this Court is necessary or required.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

SUMMARY FINAL JUDGMENT

Pursuant to this Court’s Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, it is

ORDERED & ADJUDGED that Summary Judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant, Counterclaimant and Third Party Plaintiff, Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland and against Plaintiff Robert A. Luther and all Third Party Defendants.

It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Court hereby reserves jurisdiction to award costs and attorney’s fees.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Little v. Mgic Indem. Corp. & Am. Cas. Co., 836 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1988)
    …reached [*796] the opposite result in cases involving identical policy language, holding that the option clause unambiguously places pre-disposition payment of defense costs within the discretion of the insurer. See Luther v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 679 F.Supp. 1092 (S.D.Fla.1986); Enzweiler v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., No. 85-99, slip op. (E.D.Ky. May 13, 1986) [Available on WESTLAW, 1986 W.L. 20444]; Clandening v. MGIC Indem. Corp., No. CV-83-2432-LTL, slip op. (C.D.Cal. May 23, 1983). For the reasons set forth…
  • Nat. Union Fire Ins. of Pittsburgh v. Brown, 787 F. Supp. 1424 (S.D. Fla. 1991)
    …borac is inapplicable. 16 Indeed, three of the other cases cited by National Union are inapplicable because of the existence of an option clause similar to that found in Zaborac. See Luther v. Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, 679 F.Supp. 1092, 1093 (S.D.Fla.1986) (Kehoe, J.) (finding no duty to pay defense costs as incurred because the policy contained an “option clause” similar to that found in Zaborac); Enzweiler v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., Civ.A. No. 85-99, *1433 1986 WL 20…
  • TIG Ins. v. Smart Sch., 401 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (S.D. Fla. 2005)
    …l abuse occurrence” ambiguous. However, there is no legal requirement that TIG employ any particular language in order to describe the occurrence for which it agreed to in *1344 demnify the Smart School. Luther v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 679 F.Supp. 1092, 1093 (S.D.Fla.1986) (“[t]he law is well established that where the language in a clause of an insurance contract is plain and unambiguous, no special construction or interpretation is required and the language will be given that meaning which it cl…

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