DADE COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
J. ALLAN CROSS, JR., AS TRUSTEE, RESPONDENT
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This case concerns whether architect fees for planning building alterations, presented as an element of damage in an eminent domain suit, can also be recovered as costs. The court held that such fees, if claimed as damages, cannot be awarded again as costs.
No, the architect fees, having been presented as an element of damage in the main eminent domain action, cannot be subsequently awarded as costs. Allowing them as costs would constitute an abuse of discretion.
“The county contends here that the item should not have been állowed as a cost because it was offered as an element of damage in the main action.”
States the appellant's primary argument on appeal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDade County, as petitioner in an eminent domain suit, was ordered to pay costs, including $2,432.49 for architect services. These services were for pl…
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After judgment in an eminent domain suit in which Dade County was the petitioner, an order was entered charging costs of the proceeding against the petitioner. Section 73.16, Fla.Stat., F.S.A.; Dade County v. Brigham, Fla.1950, 47 So.2d 602, 18 A.L.R.2d 1221. Included in the allowed items of costs was $2,432.49 for services of an architect for planning alterations and additions .to two buildings made necessary to preserve their usefulness. Dade County petitioned to review the cost judgment. Rule 3.16(c), F.A.R., 31 F.S.A. The county contends here that the item should not have been állowed as a cost because it was offered as an element of damage in the main action. The item was shown in evidence and claimed in argument at the trial as an allowable element of damage as severance expense. Respondent contends that the expense played a dual role, as an element of damage and also as a cost by serving to show the necessary alterations, etc. The petitioner agrees, but contends that the item can not be claimed both as an element of damage and as costs. The verdict rendered was some $5,000 above the value or appraisal amounts testified to by witnesses on behalf of the county, but was substantially less than the values advanced by witnesses for respondent. The cost order does not state the reason or ground on which the judge held this item allowable as a cost. Respondent argues that the judge concluded the jury had rejected it from their verdict. There is nothing in the record to support a surmise that the element was not included in the verdict. Evidence regarding it as an element of damage was allowed to go before the jury, and the verdict was adequate in amount to have included it. We conclude, therefore, that the learned trial judge was in error in including the bill for architect’s services in the judgment for costs, and its allowance represented an abuse of discretion for which the challenged cost order should be and hereby is modified, to eliminate therefrom the said cost item number 11, for architectual services.
It is so ordered.
HORTON, C. J., and PEARSON, J., concur.
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Chatlos v. City OF Hallandale, 220 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1968)…try of said judgment.” . City of Hallandale v. Chatlos, Fla.App. 1968, 211 So. 2d 53. . Manganelli v. Covington, Fla.App.3rd 1959, 114 So. 2d 320; In re Carol Florida Corp., Fla.App.3rd 1960, 118 So. 2d 837; Dade County v. Cross, Fla.App.3rd 1961, 127 So. 2d 141; Horner v. State, Fla. App.3d 1963, 148 So. 2d 553, and Dames v. Dames, Fla.App.3rd 1963, 156 So. 2d 532. . See cases cited in footnote 4. . Compare Jacksonville Terminal Co. v. Blanchard, Fla.1919, 77 Fla. 855, 82 So. 300; De Soto County v. Highs…
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Jacksonville Transp. Auth. v. Titus Harvest Dome Spectrum Church, Inc., 87 So. 3d 1290 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)…of damages. Treating these AVA services as costs as well as part of the Church’s “cost to cure” sought as damages was improper. The damages awarded by the jury greatly exceeded and presumptively included the “cost to cure.” See Dade Cnty. v. Cross, 127 So. 2d 141, 142 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961), overruled in part on other grounds by Chatlos v. City of Hallandale, 220 So. 2d 353 (Fla.1968). * "In effect, the 'cost to cure’ is the cost of an attempt to ameliorate the damage to value sustained by the property as a…