ALLIE PITTMAN, APPELLANT,

v.

WILLIAM RAYMOND MEHAFFEY, APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By (41 total)

• Sistrunk v. Sistrunk, 235 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)
  …the entirety during the marriage, automatically became owned by the parties after divorce as tenants in common in the absence of a finding of special equity in such property arising on behalf of one party or the other. Bergh v. Bergh, Fla.App.1961, 127 So. 2d 481; Latta v. Latta, Fla.App.1960, 121 So. 2d 42. Neither the final judgment nor the order here appealed contained a finding of any special equity on behalf of the wife in the jointly owned stock. To the contrary, the transcript of the hearing held on t…
• Rankin v. Rankin, 258 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)
  …reto the trial court stated in the amended final decree that it was specifically requested without objection during the final hearing to-divide the jointly owned properties,” it did not come within the rule laid down in Bergh v. Bergh, Fla.App.1961, 127 So. 2d 481. The Butcher case however turned on the pleadings for division and by our affirmance we held that the pleadings were sufficient. Therefore, we must examine the pleadings in the instant case to see if they are sufficient. We believe that in this case…
• Niemann v. Niemann, 294 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
  …property of the parties in a dissolution of marriage is restricted to an award of lump sum alimony, a determination of a special equity, a partition of the property, or a division based upon an agreement of the parties. Bergh v. Bergh, Fla.App.1961, 127 So. 2d 481; Rankin v. Rankin, Fla.App.1972, 258 So. 2d 489; Coscia v. Coscia, supra; Harder v. Harder, supra. Of course, the facts of the particular case will control which, if any, of the alternatives is appropriate. To justify partition one of the parties m…

Authorities Cited

• Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1959)