ANNETTE GINSBERG, APPELLANT,
v.
ANNA GINSBERG, SYDNEY GINSBERG AND DANIEL GINSBERG, APPELLEES. IN RE VENETIAN REALTY CORP.

Fla. 3d DCA | 1961-04-06
No. 61-34
HORTON, C. J., and PEARSON and CARROLL, CHAS., JJ., concur.
128 So. 2d 435 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1961) Caution
Cited by 7 cases

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Synopsis

In this interlocutory appeal, the court reversed an order awarding attorney's fees and certain costs in a corporate dissolution proceeding, holding that attorney's fees require statutory authority or contractual agreement, and costs for depositions that were not used at trial cannot be taxed as costs.


Holding

Attorney's fees cannot be awarded in the absence of statutory authority or agreement. Additionally, costs for depositions that were not offered or admitted in evidence and did not serve a useful purpose cannot be taxed as costs. The order awarding attorney's fees and deposition costs was reversed.


Key Quotes

“attorney's fees cannot be charged as a general rule in the absence of statutory authority or agreement”

Establishes the controlling legal standard that attorney's fees require either statutory or contractual authority

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellant Annette Ginsberg appealed an order in a proceeding to dissolve Venetian Realty Corp. that awarded attorney's fees and costs to the appellees…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This interlocutory appeal seeks the review and reversal of an order awarding attorney’s fees and costs in a proceeding for the dissolution of a Florida corporation under the provisions of § 608.28, Fla.Stat., F.S.A.

The appellant contends that the decree should be reversed (1) because there was no statutory or contractual right to attorney’s fees, and (2) because a portion of the costs assessed against the appellant was for depositions which were not offered or admitted in evidence. The appellees urge that their counsel was employed by the president of the corporation sought to be dissolved and that said officer had authority to employ counsel and thereby bind the corporate assets to the payment of counsel fees.

After oral argument, and a consideration of the briefs and the appendices of both parties, we conclude that the decree should be reversed. It has long been held in this state that attorney’s fees cannot be charged as a general rule in the absence of statutory authority or agreement. Our attention has not been directed to any contract of appellees for the payment of attorney’s fees, or any statutory support therefor, and in the absence of same, we conclude that the able chancellor was without authority to make the award. See Thibert v. Thibert, Fla.App.1958, 106 So.2d 918; Hoffman v. Barlly, Fla.App.1957, 97 So.2d 355.

As to the appellant’s second contention, that the cost of taking and transcribing depositions which were not offered or admitted in evidence was not taxable as costs, we conclude that this contention is well taken. There appears in the appendix a certificate of the chancellor to the effect that no depositions were used at the hearing upon petition for attorney’s fees, and further, it would appear that the decree of dissolution was entered upon an amended complaint and the answer thereto. In the absence of any finding by the chancellor to the effect that the depositions had served a useful purpose, the award of costs for taking and transcribing of such depositions was without basis. See Emigh v. Tinter, Fla.App.1959, 108 So.2d 913; Dorner v. Red Top Cab & Baggage Company, 160 Fla. 882, 37 So.2d 160.

That portion of the order awarding attorney’s fees and costs of the depositions is reversed, and the cause is remanded for the entry of an amended order awarding costs in the sum of $18.40.

It is so ordered.

HORTON, C. J., and PEARSON and CARROLL, CHAS., JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Postol, 142 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
    …e action. The appellant urges the applicability to this case of the rule that attorney’s fees cannot be charged in the absence of statutory authority, unless the defendant is bound for their payment by contract. Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, Fla.App. 1961, 128 So. 2d 435; Thibert v. Thibert, Fla.App.1958, 106 So. 2d 918; Dorner v. Red Top Cab & Baggage Co., 160 Fla. 882, 37 So. 2d 160; Brite v. Orange Belt Securities Co., 133 Fla. 266, 182 So. 892. The situation involved in the instant case does not appear to be wit…
  • Lockwood v. Test, 160 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
    …generally within the discretion of the trial court. The trial judge, in taxing the costs, specifically found in his order that the depositions for which the costs had been allowed had served a useful purpose. See Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, Fla.App.1961, 128 So. 2d 435. We do not find that he erred as to this. Other points raised by appellants have been considered, hut this court has discerned no prejudicial error which could result in a reversal. The judgment, appealed is accordingly affirmed. Affirmed. SMITH,…
  • Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, 133 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1961)
    …Certiorari denied without opinion. 128 So. 2d 435.…

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