MARIE EVENSON, A GUARDIAN OF THE PROPERTY OF GERALD JOHN EVENSON, INCOMPETENT, APPELLANT.
v.
MIAMI MEDICAL CENTER, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A guardian sued a mental hospital for injuries sustained by her incompetent son while confined there. The trial court granted summary judgment on a negligence count and dismissed a contract count. The appellate court affirmed the negligence dismissal but reversed the contract dismissal, holding that a claim for breach of a special contract requiring 24-hour attendant care states a viable cause of action distinct from negligence.
The court affirmed the summary judgment on the negligence count but reversed the dismissal of the contract count. A hospital's breach of a special contract requiring care exceeding ordinary standards states a separate and viable claim, and damages for such breach are those reasonably foreseeable or contemplated by the parties at the time of contracting.
“Under ordinary circumstances a hospital has the duty to provide such attendance as is necessary to prevent reasonably foreseeable injury to the patient in its care.”
Establishes the baseline duty of hospitals to provide ordinary care and supervision.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGerald Evenson, an incompetent person, was confined to Miami Medical Center, a mental hospital. While in the hospital's care, Gerald escaped and susta…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Negligence cases and more on FLexlaw
Marie Evenson is the guardian of Gerald Evenson, her son, who is incompetent. *627The Miami Medical Center, Inc., operates a mental hospital. Marie Evenson, as guardian, brought an action for injuries sustained by Gerald Evenson while confined in the hospital and she suffered a summary final judgment. She appeals from that judgment and we reverse.
The complaint contained two counts. The first count charged the hospital with negligent failure to attend Gerald, which allegedly resulted in the escape of the ward from the hospital and in injuries to him during the escape. The second count claimed the breach by the hospital of an oral contract whereby the hospital undertook to provide a 24-hour attendant for Gerald Evenson in order to prevent him from doing harm to himself. Upon motion of the hospital the trial judge dismissed the count sounding in contract; thereafter the summary final judgment was entered for the hospital, upon the count sounding in negligence. The order dismissing the count sounding in contract and the summary judgment are assigned as error.
The summary judgment on the negligence count was based upon plaintiff’s answers to interrogatories, the deposition of Doctor P. L. Dodge, operator of the hospital, and the affidavit of Frank Taylor, a guard who was overcome by the ward at the time he made good his escape. A review of these documents in the light of the briefs and oral arguments fails to demonstrate that the entry of the summary judgment was error.
The count sounding in contract alleged an oral contract for the benefit of Gerald whereby the defendant was to provide attendants to watch Gerald twenty-four hours every day. Under ordinary circumstances a hospital has the duty to provide such attendance as is necessary to prevent reasonably foreseeable injury to the patient in its care.1- We have held, supra, that the summary judgment against plaintiff on the count sounding in negligence was correctly entered, which, of course, means there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant provided the kind of attendance as would be ordinary or proper. In most situations where a patient’s right of action against a hospital on contract is based on the latter’s employees’ negligent treatment which amounts to a violation of a duty arising out of the assumption of the contractual relation, the same transaction would likewise support an action ex delicto.2 In the instant case, however, we are confronted with an alleged contract which by its terms required special care, exceeding that which meets ordinary standards. The damages recoverable for breach of a special contract are those said to be reasonably foreseeable, or those said to be in the contemplation of the parties at the time of the making of the contract.3 Thus if the contract and breach thereof are proved the guardian may recover for the foreseeable or contemplated damages. We find the damages are not nicely pleaded in the second count but this does not subject the count to final dismissal.
The judgment is affirmed as to the first count and reversed as to the second count, and the order dismissing the second count is reversed and the cause remanded, for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
HORTON, C. J., and CARROLL, CHAS., J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
F & B Ceco v. Galaxy Studios, Inc., 216 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)…der either of these points. Affirmed. . The term “foreseeable damages” is equivalent to the term “damages -within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the making of the contract.” See Evenson v. Miami Medical Center, Inc., Fla.App.1961, 128 So. 2d 626.…
-
MacALPINE v. Martin, 205 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)…1960, 121 So. 2d 682, 684. Under ordinary circumstances a hospital has the duty to provide such attendance as is necessary to prevent reasonably foreseeable injury to the patient in its care. See Evenson v. Miami Medical Center, Inc., Fla.App.1961, 128 So. 2d 626. There is no doubt that the evidence supports a finding that Mrs. Mould required assistance in undressing and preparing for bed and that defendants knew of this and were aware that she had “slumped to the floor” twice before. No evidence was presen…
-
F & B Ceco v. Galaxy Studios, Inc., 201 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)…ggage.” Even though the opinion in Brock v. Gale is early in the legal history of our State, it has been often followed. See Atlanta & St. A. B. Ry. Co. v. Thomas, 60 Fla. 412, 53 So. 510 (1910); Evenson v. Miami Medical Center, Inc., Fla.App.1961, 128 So. 2d 626; Olin’s Inc. v. Avis Rental Car System of Florida, Inc., Fla.App. 1965, 172 So. 2d 250. See also Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Reprint 145, 5 Eng. Rui. Cas. 502; 5 Corbin, Contracts, § 1013; McCormick, Damages, § 138. In applying this…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Parrish v. Clark, 107 Fla. 598 (Fla. 1933)
- Holbrook v. City of Sarasota, 58 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1952)
- Brook v. Gale, 14 Fla. 523 (Fla. 1874)
- Mem'l Hosp. v. Otto Doring, 106 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)
- Marsh v. City OF ST. Petersburg, 106 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)