TEW EX REL. ESTATE OF E.S.M. GOVERNMENT SECURITIES, INC.
v.
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, N.A.

S.D. Fla. | 1990-07-24
No. 88-6728-CIV
Gonzalez
741 F. Supp. 220 District Court, S.D. Florida (1990) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 1990 WL 108849 · 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9973
Cited by 4 cases

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Holding

The court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion for reconsideration, amending its prior order based on specific objections.


Facts & Procedural History

The defendant bank sought to amend a prior court order regarding its assessment of a company's financial health. The bank argued that its assessment w…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

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Opinion of the Court

GONZALEZ, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE has come before the court upon the letter dated January 29, 1990 from defendant’s counsel, George H. Bailey, Esquire. By this court’s order dated January 31, 1990, the letter was treated by this court as a motion for reconsideration and/or a motion for correction of order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a).

The plaintiff, Thomas Tew, has filed its response to the defendant’s motion and the defendant Chase has replied. Accordingly, the motion is ripe for decision.

The defendant Chase requests that this court change certain language in its order dated January 22, 1990, 728 F.Supp. 1551. The bank states that its suggested revisions are “nonsubstantive modifications.” The suggested changes and the court’s ruling on each are as follows:

Page 7, Line 11

[728 F.Supp. at 1556, col. 2, line 23]

Chase requests amendment of the last sentence in the paragraph because the bank’s assessment of E.S.M. Government Securities, Inc.’s financial health was allegedly based on review of audited, not unaudited, financial statements. Therefore, the word “unaudited” shall be deleted from the order and the word “audited” substituted therefor. Page 8, Line 5

[728 F.Supp. at 1556-57, Last line, First line]

Chase's request as to this language is without merit. The opening line to the first paragraph on page 8 explicitly states that the statements therein are the trustee’s version of the facts. Moreover, the second paragraph discusses Chase’s arguments to the contrary. Finally, even if Chase’s argument had merit, the suggested revision is no improvement on the clarity of the court's order. Page 8, Line 16

[728 F.Supp. at 1557, Col. 1, Line 15]

Chase’s objection shall be granted. The following language shall be deleted from the order, “Of course, this lack of reliance is contradictory to Chase’s position above that Hanley relied on the statements to assess Government’s net worth.” As already ruled upon by the court above, Han-ley’s professed assessment of Government’s worth was based on the audited financial statements.

Page 34, Line 9

[728 F.Supp. at 1566, Col. 1, Line 42]

The bank is correct, in part, as to the accuracy of the language. Specifically, Chase objects to the phrase, “and the testimony of Hanley”, which implies that he had personal knowledge of Government’s fraud and did not want it to be discovered while Chase’s loans were outstanding. The bank is correct that Hanley’s version of the facts was that he never knew about the fraud and therefore, took no action based upon a nonbelief. However, as noted by the Trustee, Hanley did testify in his deposition that he did not want to be left with loans outstanding and subject to the claims of other E.S.M. creditors if Government’s insolvency became known. This testimony when considered with the plaintiff’s allegations and the clear caveat that the interpretation of Hanley’s testimony in the order was referring to Tew’s version of the facts, does not justify amendment of the order. *221

Page 35, Lines 14-27

[728 F.Supp. at 1566, Col. 2, Lines 34-42];

Page 36, Lines 1-6

[728 F.Supp. at 1567, Col. 1, Lines 1-8]

Because of this court’s clarifications above that Chase had audited financial statements for the years prior to 1983, the following language shall be deleted from the order at page 35, lines 18-19: “Rather than require audited financial statements prior to granting such credit.” The sentence shall now read, “The bank acted first and investigated later.” In all other regards, the order shall stand, as entered.

Having considered the motion and the record in this cause, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the motion of Chase Manhatten Bank, the defendant, for reconsideration shall be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. This court’s order dated January 22, 1990 is hereby AMENDED as noted above.

DONE AND ORDERED.


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Citator

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  • Davies v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 632 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
    …s in workers in the insulation trade as early as 1941. We agree. It is well settled that the actions of corporate directors and officers are attributable to the corporation itself. Tew v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 728 F.Supp. 1551 (S.D.Fla.), modified, 741 F.Supp. 220 (S.D.Fla.1990). Whatever knowledge an agent acquires within the scope of his authority is imputed to his or her principal. Lan-Chile Airlines v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 759 F.Supp. 811 (S.D.Fla.1991); Anderson v. Walthal, 468 So. 2…
  • Banco Latino Int'l v. Gomez Lopez, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (S.D. Fla. 2000)
    …Young, 967 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir.1992). The imputation doctrine is rooted in the general principal that a corporation acts only through its agents. See Tew v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 728 F.Supp. 1551, 1559 (S.D.Fla.), amended by, 741 F.Supp. 220 (S.D.Fla.1990). In Florida’s leading case on the imputation doctrine, Seidman & Seidman v. Gee, 625 So.2d 1 (Fla.App.1992), 11 the court reviewed the case law from various jurisdictions and then adopted a broad variation of the rule that…
  • …igh it and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom, and judge a witness’ credibility prior to determining such issues.” Tew v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 728 F. Supp. 1551, 1555 (S.D. Fla. 1990), opinion amended on reconsideration in other parts, 741 F. Supp. 220 (S.D. Fla. 1990). “As a general rule, a party’s state of mind (such as knowledge or intent) is a question of fact for the factfinder, to be determined [at] trial.” Rodriguez v. GeoVera Specialty Ins. Co., 426 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2019)…

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