ROBERT SAVARESE AND STANLEY MERVIN GLICK, APPELLANTS,

v.

RAYMOND ARTHUR HILL AND ALMA MULLIS HILL, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1961-04-17

No. 60-422

HORTON, C. J., and PEARSON and CARROLL, CHAS., JJ., concur.

128 So. 2d 775 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1961) Positive Treatment

Cited by 20 cases

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Holding

The court held that the trial judge erred in granting a directed verdict, as questions of contributory negligence and proximate cause were for the jury.

Facts & Procedural History

Plaintiffs were injured when their car was sideswiped by a defendant driver who crossed the center line. The impact caused the plaintiff driver to bra…

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Topics

Intervening Cause Foreseeability Contributory Negligence Directed Verdict

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Opinion of the Court

PER CURIAM.

The appellants filed separate actions at law against appellees for damages for personal injuries received in an automobile accident. Each plaintiff alleged the negligence of the defendant driver was the proximate cause of his injury. Defendants denied negligence, claimed unavoidable accident, and pleaded contributory negligence. The cases were consolidated and proceeded to trial before a jury. At the close of the presentation of evidence by the plaintiffs, the trial judge granted defendants’ motion for directed verdict. Judgment was entered thereon and the plaintiffs appealed.

The basic facts, as a jury would be entitled to find them from the evidence, were the following: The plaintiff Glide’s automobile, in which the plaintiff Savarese was a passenger, was sideswiped by one driven by the defendant Raymond Hill and owned by his wife, the defendant Alma Hill. The accident occurred in the daytime, on a two lane city street. The automobiles involved were proceeding in opposite directions. *776The defendant Raymond Hill drove to his left, across the center line, and struck the left rear side of Glick’s car. The impact knocked the Glick car sideways approximately one foot and caused it to swerve, and Glick immediately put on his brakes and stopped suddenly. Glick received a head injury,1 and Savarese’s knee was injured when he was thrown forward against the dash when the Glick car swerved and was decelerated following the collision.2

The evidence was sufficient to support a finding of negligence, since it disclosed that Glick was proceeding on his side of the street when the Hill car was driven across the center line and struck the Glick car. We agree with appellants’ contention that the questions of contributory negligence and of proximate cause were for the jury. It could have been found that Glick’s injury was a direct result of the collision.3 If the jury should conclude that Glick’s injury was brought-about when he applied his brakes, as was the injury to Savarese, then for him as well as for Savarese, the jury would be required to determine whether Glick’s action in stopping suddenly, if an independent and intervening cause, was or was not reasonably to be foreseen and reasonable conduct as a consequence of such a sideswipe collision. By refusing to submit such questions to the jury and in concluding as a matter of law that the injuries were not the proximate result of negligence of the defendant driver, the trial judge was in error. See Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Taylor, 94 Fla. 841, 114 So. 529, 531; Mayhew v. Pierce Tire Co., Fla.App.1958, 104 So.2d 862, 864-865; 23 Fla.Jur., Negligence, §§ 38, 39.4

The judgment appealed from is reversed, and the cause is remanded for new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

HORTON, C. J., and PEARSON and CARROLL, CHAS., JJ., concur.

. “The general rule is that whoever acts negligently is answerable for all the consequences that may ensue in the ordinary course of events, even though such consequences are immediately and directly brought about by an intervening cause, if that intervening cause was set in motion by the original wrongdoer.” 23 Fla. Jur., Negligence, § 38.

“The rule that the causal connection between a person’s negligence and an injury is broken by the intervention of a new, independent, and eificient intervening cause so that the negligence is not actionable is subject to the qualification that if an intervening cause was foreseen or reasonably might have been foreseen by the wrongdoer, his negligence may be considered the proximate cause of an injury, and he may be held liable, notwithstanding the intervening cause. That is, the intervention of independent intervening causes does not break causal connection if the intervention of such forces was itself probable or foreseeable.” Id., § 39.

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Citator

Cited By

Gibson v. AVIS Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 386 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1980)

…. Florida Nat’l Bank of Jacksonville, 292 So. 2d 361 (Fla.1974); Cruz v. Hundley, 371 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Garland, 269 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972) cert. denied 275 So. 2d 14 (Fla.1973); Savarese v. Hill, 128 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961). Another way of stating the question whether the intervening cause was foreseeable is to ask whether the harm that occurred was within the scope of the danger attributable to the defendant’s negligent conduct. A person who create…
Stahl v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 438 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)

…. Florida Nat’l Bank of Jacksonville, 292 So. 2d 361 (Fla.1974); Cruz v. Hundley, 371 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Garland, 269 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972) cert. denied 275 So. 2d 14 (Fla.1973); Savarese v. Hill, 128 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961). Another way of stating the question whether the intervening cause was foreseeable is to ask whether the harm that occurred was within the scope of the danger attributable to the defendant’s negligent conduct. A person who create…
Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. Garland, 269 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)

…the case at bar, it was properly left to the jury to determine whether the intervening cause (the stopping of the bus to pick up the box) was set in motion by the original wrongdoer or was foreseen or reasonably foreseeable by him. Savarese v. Hill, 128 So. 2d 775 (Fla.App.1961). See also Ellingson v. Willis, 170 So. 2d 311 (Fla.App.1964), wherein this court held that it was a jury question whether defendant’s negligence in causing a collision in which plaintiffs were moderately injured was also the proximate…

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Authorities Cited

W. Union Tel. Co. v. Taylor, 94 Fla. 841 (Fla. 1927)
Mayhew v. Pierce Tire Co., 104 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)

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