FRANK A. GORY, D/B/A GORY ROOFING TILE MFG., APPELLANT,
v.
KARL C. WHITE AND FLORENCE DALE WHITE, HIS WIFE, AND CARIB ROOFING COMPANY, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A materialman who supplied roofing tiles to a subcontractor, and was not paid, appeals the dismissal of his mechanic's lien foreclosure action against the property owners.
The materialman is not entitled to foreclose a mechanic's lien because the case is governed by precedent that dictates the outcome under these specific circumstances.
The property owners contracted with a general contractor, who subcontracted roofing to Carib Roofing Company. Carib purchased tiles from Gory, a mater…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Implied Agency cases and more on FLexlaw
Frank A. Gory, doing business as Gory Roofing Tile Mfg., was a materialman supplying roofing tiles to a residence being built by Karl C. White and Florence Dale White, his wife. From a final decree dismissing Gory’s complaint to foreclose a mechanic’s lien for the unpaid purchase price of the roofing tiles, Gory appeals, and we affirm.
Mr. and Mrs. White, as the owners of the property, entered into a contract with a general contractor for the erection of the building. The general contractor subcontracted the roofing work to Carib Roofing Company; Carib purchased the roofing tiles from Gory. The material was delivered to the job site and in the ordinary process of work became a part of the building. Carib failed to complete the job and to pay Gory for the tiles. Because of a misplaced confidence in Carib, the contractor paid Carib prior to its default upon the job all but $84 of the agreed subcontract price. At this juncture Gory filed his claim of lien and served a copy thereof on the Whites. Thereafter, it was necessary for the general contractor to pay a second roofing company $250 to install gutters and downspouts in order to complete the roofing subcontract. Subsequent to the receipt of a copy of the claim of lien the owners made the final payment to their general contractor. This payment was approximately $919. Thereupon, Gory, as materialman under the mechanics’ lien law instituted this action to foreclose the claimed lien against the real property.
The chancellor, after hearing the testimony, dismissed the claim of the material-man, specifically finding “that this case is governed by the case of Richard Store Company v. Florida Bridge & Iron, Inc., Fla.1954, 77 So.2d 632.” The cited case was decided by the Supreme Court upon a petition for a writ of certiorari directed to the Circuit Court of Dade County to re*447view an affirmance of a judgment of the civil court of record. The action of the civil court of record had arisen from an attempted enforcement in that court of a lien claimed by Florida Bridge & Iron for work done and materials furnished by it as a sub-subcontractor. The first question that the Supreme Court considered was “whether under the circumstances the respondent sub-subcontractor Florida Bridge & Iron is entitled to a mechanic’s lien for the full contract price in accordance with the oral agreement with Ferguson, the sub-contractor”. [77 So.2d 634] The facts as they appear were that Richard Store, as owner, gave a general contract to one Howland, and that Howland as the prime contractor in turn contracted with Ferguson for the latter to perform a part of the contract. Thereafter, Ferguson subcontracted a certain portion of its own subcontract to Florida Bridge & Iron. Ferguson defaulted in its contract, but Florida Bridge & Iron completed its portion of the sub-subcontract and upon nonpayment of amounts due it from Ferguson, instituted an action to foreclose its lien, which was the subject matter of the suit.- In deciding the question of whether the sub-subcontractor is entitled to a mechanic’s lien the court held as follows:
“The Mechanics’ Lien Law is in apposition with the theory of subrogation. We do not adhere to the lien law as grounded on implied agency, ratification or quantum meruit followed in approximately 20 states. See 6 Miami L. Q. 246,250, Note 36. There is no provision under the lien law casting a burden upon the owner or contractor to see that a defaulting subcontractor pays his sub-contractors or materialmen.”
Accord, Phoenix Indemnity Co. v. Board of Public Instruction, Fla.App.1959, 114 So.2d 478, 481; cf. Sterling Apartments, Inc. v. Arch Creek Lumber Co., Fla.App.1959, 113 So.2d 711.
A distinction is apparent between the case just discussed and the one now under consideration in that the Richard Store case dealt with a claim of lien by a sub-subcontractor and the instant case deals with a claim of lien by a materialman for materials furnished to a subcontractor. But is such a distinction a real distinction? We hold that it is not and that the holding in the Richard Store case precludes recovery in the instant case. There is logically no difference in the legal position of a materialman who provides building material pursuant to a contract with a subcontractor and that of a sub-subcontractor who provides labor and building material pursuant to a contract with a subcontractor. The Mechanics’ Lien Law does not make such a distinction.1 A mechanic’s lien claimant acquires a lien only by virtue of the provisions of the Mechanics’ Lien Law and his compliance therewith. See cases cited at 22 Fla.Jur., Mechanics’ Liens § 8. Therefore the chancellor correctly dismissed the case.
Affirmed.
HORTON, C. J., and PROBY, LUCIEN C., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Quality Lime Prods., Inc. v. Acme Paving Co., Inc., 134 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)…cases, which, he asserts, preclude the appellant from a mechanic’s lien, Since the original briefs were filed, leave was given and the appellant filed a supplemental brief in which he cites the case of Gory v. White, Fla.App.1961 (Third District), 129 So. 2d 446; and in addition to this case he cites an act of the Florida Legislature, Ch. 61-326, Laws of Florida, 1961. The legislative act provides in part as follows : “Section 1. Chapter 84, Florida Statutes is hereby amended to add an additional section t…
-
J. P. Driver Co. v. Claxton, 193 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)…olved here is governed by Chapter 84, Florida Statutes (1963) F.S.A. Section 84.02, Florida Statutes (1959) F. S.A., provided for extending a lien to a sub-subcontractor and materialmen on the real property improved. In Gory v. White, Fla.App.1961, 129 So. 2d 446, the Third District Court of Appeal held that materialman who furnished materials under a contract with a defaulting subcontractor could not assert a lien. The 1961 Legislature adopted Section 84.021, which provided that it was the Legislative inte…
-
Cole Supply, Inc. v. Ludwig Spiegel, 143 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)…oration v. Harrison, Fla., So. 2d [*522] -, 1962. See also The Richard Store Company v. Florida Bridge & Iron, Fla. 1954, 77 So. 2d 632; Phoenix Indemnity Co. v. Board of Public Instruction, Fla.App.1959, 114 So. 2d 478; Gory v. White, Fla.App.1961, 129 So. 2d 446; Quality Lime Products, Inc. v. Acme Paving Company, Fla.App.1961, 134 So. 2d 42, and General Capital Corporation v. Adobe Brick and Supply Co., Fla.App. 1962, 138 So. 2d 82. KANNER, A. C. J., and SMITH and WHITE, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Phoenix Indem. Co. v. Bd. OF Pub. Instruction OF Alachua Cnty., 114 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959)
- Nicholson v. G. Q. Wyatt and his wife, 77 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1955)
- The Richard Store Co. v. Fla. Bridge & Iron, Inc., 77 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1954)
- Sterling Apts., Inc. v. ARCH Creek Lumber Co., 113 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)