ZUPANSIC
v.
HYMAN (IN RE ZUPANSIC)
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A trustee is not time-barred from challenging the value of property claimed as exempt if the stated exemption does not equal the property's full value.
Debtors claimed a vehicle as exempt with a stated value and exemption amount. The Trustee later sought to compel turnover of the vehicle, arguing its …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Credit Bid cases and more on FLexlaw
WHITTEMORE, District Judge.
Appellants (“Debtors”) appeal an Order of the Bankruptcy Court compelling them to relinquish a 1993 Mercury Villager to the Chapter 11 Trustee as property of the bankruptcy estate. Appellee counters that the Order was an appropriate exercise of the Bankruptcy Court’s discretion.
A.Factual and Procedural Background
On December 29, 1999, Debtors filed a Voluntary Petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. In their filing, Debtors listed a 1993 Mercury Villager (the “vehicle”) with a market value of $2,525.00 as personal property with an exempt value of $2,000.00. A meeting of creditors held pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) was concluded on January 28, 2000. Subsequent to this meeting, the Trustee had the vehicle appraised and determined that the vehicle had a market value of $5,500.00.
On March1, 2000, the Trustee filed an objection to the Debtors’ exemption as applied to the vehicle. The Bankruptcy Court overruled the Trustee’s objection as untimely.
See
Fed.R.BaNKR.P. 4003. The Trustee’s subsequent motion to compel the Debtors to turn over the vehicle to the Trustee for liquidation as property of the estate was granted by the Bankruptcy Court. The Court directed the Debtors to relinquish the vehicle to the Trustee for it to be sold. The Trustee was to remit the exempt portion ($2,000.00) to the Debtors.
1
This appeal followed.
B.
Standard of Review
Upon review of bankruptcy proceedings, the Court will not set aside findings of fact unless such findings are clearly erroneous.
See
Feb.R.BaNKR.P. 8013;
In re Downtown Properties, Ltd.,
794 F. 2d 647, 651 (11th Cir.1986). WThile conclusions of law are reviewed de novo,
In re Owen,
86 B.R. 691, 693 (M.D.Fla.1988),
rev’d on other grounds,
500 U.S. 305, 111 S.Ct. 1833, 114 L.Ed.2d 350 (1991), discretionary rulings made pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code are reviewable only for abuse of discretion.
See In re Albany Partners, Ltd.,
749 F. 2d 670, 674 (11th Cir.1984).
C.
Discussion
The underlying issue in this case is whether the Trustee is time barred from challenging the Debtors’ stated value of the vehicle to which a $2,000 statutory exemption applies.
2
The Trustee does not challenge application of the statutory exemption, only the stated value.
*390
Rule 4003, Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Claim of exemptions
A debtor shall list the property claimed as exempt under § 522 of the Code on the schedule of assets required to be filed by Rule 1007....
(b) Objections to claim of exemptions The trustee or any creditor may file objections to the list of property claimed as exempt within 30 days after the conclusion of the meeting of creditors held pursuant to Rule 2003(a) ...
(c) Burden of proof
In any hearing under this rule, the objecting party has the burden of proving that the exemptions are not properly claimed....
It is undisputed that the Trustee did not object to the Debtors’ “list of property claimed as exempt within 30 days after the conclusion of the meeting of creditors.... ” Appellant urges that the Trustee is accordingly barred from contesting both the claimed exemption and the stated value of the vehicle, relying on
In re Green,
31 F. 3d 1098 (11th Cir.1994), and
Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz,
503 U.S. 638, 112 S.Ct. 1644, 118 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992). The facts in
Green
and
Taylor
are distinguishable, however. In
Green,
the Court applied the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Taylor
in rejecting as untimely a trustee’s attempt to challenge a claimed exemption of the full value of a contingent personal injury claim, where the trustee had not objected to the claimed exemption within the 30 days provided for by Rule 4003.
Id.
at 1101;
see Taylor,
503 U.S. at 644, 112 S.Ct. 1644. In contrast to the debtors in
Green
and
Taylor,
the Debtors in this case did not attempt to exempt the entire value of the vehicle. In fact, the tendered to the Trustee the difference between the statutory exemption and the stated value of the vehicle.
The Court agrees with Appellants that, consistent with the holdings in
Green
and
Taylor,
a Trustee can be time barred from contesting the value of property listed as exempt pursuant to Rule 4003. However, after a careful reading of
Green
and
Taylor,
the Court concludes that a Trustee is barred from challenging the value of property claimed exempt
only
when the listed exemption equals the stated value of property, which would effectively render the entire asset exempt.
3
See
In
re
Shelby,
232 B.R. 746 (Bankr. W.D.Mo.1999);
In re Ehr,
116 B.R. 665 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.1988). That is, a trustee’s failure to object to the value of a stated exemption does not waive the estate’s right to recover sums in excess of the claimed exemption.
See In re Bronner,
135 B.R. 645, 646 (9th Cir. BAP 1992).
By agreeing (or not objecting) to a valid claim of exemption, an estate is not forced to abandon a valuable asset.
In re Bronner,
135 B.R. at 647 (citing
In re Hyman,
123 B.R. 342 (9th Cir. BAP 1991)). Where surplus value might exist in property for which a debtor claims an exemption, a trustee has a duty to attempt to collect and reduce the property to cash for the benefit of creditors, consistent with the trustee’s duties pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 704(1). The holdings in
Green
and
Taylor
do not restrict this duty of a trustee to recover the full non-contingent value of an estate asset, subject to any claimed exemption, or, as in this instance, any surplus value of an estate asset where a trustee challenges the debtor’s stated value of the asset. “Thus, the excess value above encumbrances and the exemption amount is available to creditors.”
In re Bronner,
135 B.R. at 648.
*391
Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the Debtors to turn over the vehicle to the Trustee for sale, subject to the Debtors’ statutory exemption.
The order of the Bankruptcy Court is AFFIRMED. The Clerk is directed to close this case.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (U.S. 1992)
- In re Albany P'rs, Ltd. v. W.P. Westbrook, Jr., 749 F.2d 670 (11th Cir. 1984)
- Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (U.S. 1991)
- In re Downtown Props., Ltd. v. Hartman, 794 F.2d 647 (11th Cir. 1986)
- Owen v. Owen (In Re Owen), 86 B.R. 691 (M.D. Fla. 1988)
- In re Green v. Green, 31 F.3d 1098 (11th Cir. 1994)