GROFF

v.

CHANDRIS, INC.

K. MICHAEL MOORE, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendants Chandris, Inc. and Ajax Navigation Corporation’s request that the jury verdict form ask the jury to apportion the amount of the damages, if any, between Plaintiff Susanne Groff, Defendants, and the Grand Cayman Port Authority, a non-party to this lawsuit.

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In this case, Plaintiff was allegedly injured during an ocean cruise. Groff alleges that during a stop at the Grand Cayman port, Cayman Islands, she fell from a 15-inch drop on the dock that had no handrails or warnings. Plaintiff alleges she was injured due to the dangerous condition and that Defendants had a duty to warn her of that condition.

Recently the Florida Supreme Court decided

Fabre v. Marin,

623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla.1993) and interpreted Florida Statutes § 768.81(3) which reads:

(3) APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES.—In cases to which this section applies, the court shall enter judgment against each party liable on the basis of such party’s percentage of fault and not on the basis of the doctrine of joint and sever

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al liability; provided that with respect to any party whose percentage of fault equals or exceeds that of a particular claimant, the court shall enter judgment with respect to economic damages against that party on the basis of joint and several liability.

The court in

Fabre

held that “party” is not limited to participants in the lawsuit and that “the only means of determining a party’s percentage of fault is to compare that party’s percentage of fault to all of the other entities who contributed to the accident, regardless of whether they have been or could have been joined as defendants.”

Fabre,

623 So. 2d at 1185. As a result, Defendants in this case contend that the jury should consider the degree of fault of the non-party Grand Cayman Port Authority.

In the parties’ March 17,1993 Joint Pretrial Stipulation, Plaintiff and Defendant correctly assert that “[tjhis matter is controlled by the substantive General Maritime Law of the United States.”

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Federal courts possess jurisdiction over admiralty claims to further the important national interest in establishing a uniform body of maritime law.

Brockington v. Certified Electric, Inc.,

903 F. 2d 1523, 1528 (11th Cir.1990),

cert. denied,

498 U.S. 1026, 111 S.Ct. 676, 112 L.Ed.2d 668 (1991). As a result, the “ ‘general maritime law’ ” is drawn from both state and federal sources and is an ‘amalgam of traditional common-law rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created rules’ which includes a ‘body of maritime tort principles.’ ”

Brockington,

903 F. 2d at 1529 n. 2 (quoting

East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval,

476 U.S. 858, 865, 106 S.Ct. 2295, 2299, 90 L.Ed.2d 865 (1986)). Under federal maritime law, plaintiffs may obtain judgment for the full amount from any and all joint tortfeasors under the doctrine of joint and several liability.

Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,

443 U.S. 256, 260 & n. 7, 99 S.Ct. 2753, 2756, 61 L.Ed.2d 521,

reh’g denied,

444 U.S. 889, 100 S.Ct. 194, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979);

The “Atlas",

Ebanks v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,

688 F. 2d 716 (11th Cir.1982),

cert. denied,

460 U.S. 1083, 103 S.Ct. 1774, 76 L.Ed.2d 346 (1983).

In the past, the Fifth Circuit

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has refused to permit application of a Florida statute when such a law conflicted with federal maritime law.

See Branch v. Schumann,

445 F. 2d 175, 178 (5th Cir.1971) (“[This] supplementation necessarily entails alteration of an admiralty norm in direct contravention of the quest for uniformity”.... [W]e fail to see how application of the Florida statute would not impose on the defendant a burden which maritime law does not require.”).

Athough there do not appear to be any federal cases applying the recent Florida Supreme Court decision in

Fabre

to federal admiralty claims, this Court is guided and persuaded by analogous cases in this Circuit. For example, in

Ebanks v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,

plaintiffs were members of the crew of a dredge and barge owned by defendant Great Lakes, their employer. The crewmen were thrown into the water when the barge was overturned by a collision with a tanker; one crew member drowned. The plaintiffs brought suit alleging that Great Lakes had a contractual obligation to follow certain Corps of Engineers safety requirements and brought suit under their employer under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688. The

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owner of the tanker, Chevron, was not a party to the suit.

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At the request of Great Lakes, the court asked the jury to make findings as to the degree of liability and causation attributable to Great Lakes and the non-party Chevron. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit restated general maritime law principles of joint and several liability under which a plaintiff may obtain judgment for the full amount against any and all joint tortfeasors without regard to percentage of fault.

Ebanks,

688 F. 2d at 718-19. In reversing the district court, the Eleventh Circuit held that it was error to require the jury to allocate fault between the defendant and a non-party.

Id.

at 722. The Court explained that the issue of the non-party’s liability should have been determined “at a different time and between two live opponents” rather than by plaintiffs and defendant.

Id.; see also Drake Towing Co. v. Meisner Marine Constr. Co.,

765 F. 2d 1060, 1067 (11th Cir.) (approving and following the analysis in

Ebanks), reh’g denied,

773 F. 2d 1239 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc).

Accordingly, under existing law in this Circuit, Defendants are not permitted to have the jury determine the percentage of liability or fault of the non-party Grand Cayman Port Authority.

DONE AND ORDERED.