FRANK MATHEWS, APPELLANT,
v.
HARRY FRANCIS CARLSON, JR., AND CARYL SINTON CARLSON, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES
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A pedestrian struck by a motorist appeals a jury verdict in favor of the defendant, challenging the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony regarding the driver's reaction time and stopping distance. The appellate court reversed, holding that such evidence was material to determining whether the driver had a 'last clear chance' to avoid the collision.
Expert testimony regarding reaction time and the stopping distance required for a vehicle at a given speed and under given road conditions is admissible and material to the jury's determination of whether a motorist had a reasonable opportunity to avoid hitting a pedestrian. The exclusion of such evidence was not harmless, particularly where the plaintiff lacked only a single step from achieving safety.
“The question for the jury was whether the defendant had a reasonable opportunity, under all the circumstances, to avoid hitting the plaintiff, after she was, or should have been, aware of the dangerous position in which the plaintiff's negligence had placed him.”
Establishes the legal standard for the 'last clear chance' doctrine in this negligence case.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFrank Mathews, a pedestrian, was struck by a vehicle driven by Harry Francis Carlson, Jr., while crossing a four-lane highway at night. An eyewitness …
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One of the issues properly submitted to the jury under appropriate instruction was whether the defendant-motorist had a last clear chance to avoid hitting the plaintiff-pedestrian who was crossing a four-lane highway in the dark. From an adverse judgment based on a jury verdict, the plaintiff appeals, complaining of the rejection of proffered testimony of a traffic expert to show the time it took for the plaintiff to cross the range of the defendant’s vision, and to show the stopping time of the defendant’s automobile. An eye witness, on whom both sides relied, observed the plaintiff crossing the highway from the defendant’s left to her right, walking “fast.” After crossing in front of defendant’s vehicle, plaintiff was struck a glancing blow by the right front fender of the automobile. Defendant estimated her speed at thirty miles per hour.
The question for the jury was whether the defendant had a reasonable opportunity, under all the circumstances, to avoid hitting the plaintiff, after she was, or should have been, aware of the dangerous position in which the plaintiff’s negligence had placed him. To do this, the jury needed all the evidence they could get to determine the defendant’s distance from the plaintiff when the point of defendant’s duty began. The jury did not need an expert to translate thirty miles per hour into forty-five feet per second, but it is not a matter of common knowledge as to the average person’s *626reaction time .or the distance required to stop a given vehicle at a given speed under given conditions of road surface. Having the benefit of.expert opinion evidence, the jury could better estimate whether the defendant did or did not have a reasonable opportunity to avoid the harm,. While obviously the defendant had no great amount of available time, we cannot hold that the exclusion was harmless in view of the fact that it was not necessary to come to a complete stop to avoid the harm, since the plaintiff lacked a single step, with no slackening of speed, from achieving safety after his hazardous crossing.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial consistent with the views expressed.
Reversed and remanded.
HORTON, C. J., and PEARSON, TILLMAN, J., concur.
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Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Watson, 341 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)…read Wall’s testimony as essentially concerning what physically could have been done under the circumstances, which is a permissible subject of an expert opinion such as this one, e.g., Kerr v. Caraway, 78 So. 2d 571 (Fla.1955); Mathews v. Carlson, 130 So. 2d 625 (3 D.C.A. Fla. 1961); Seibels, Bruce & Co. v. Giddings, 264 So. 2d 103 (3 D.C.A. Fla.1972); rather than expressing a view as to whether Clements did what he should have done, which is an impermissible one. See Smaglick v. Jersey Ins. Co. of N.Y., 20…
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Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Hill, 250 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)…roblems which an average driver would have encountered in seeing the standing train. In our opinion this does not rendered the testimony irrelevant, but relates basically to the weight to be given the testimony. See Mathews v. Carlson, Fla.App.1961, 130 So. 2d 625, wherein the Third District held that the trial court was in error in refusing to allow a traffic expert to testify for the plaintiff as to the average person’s reaction time. Finally, although we do not rest our conclusion on this, we consider the…