FRAZIER
v.
T-MOBILE USA, INC.

M.D. Fla. | 2003-11-04
No. 6:03-cv-00764
Schlesinger
495 F. Supp. 2d 1185 District Court, M.D. Florida (2003) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 2003 WL 25568332 · 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27291
Cited by 3 cases

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Holding

The Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) does not provide a cause of action for pregnancy-based employment discrimination because it is preempted by Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.


Facts & Procedural History

Plaintiff sued for pregnancy-based employment discrimination under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA). Defendant moved to dismiss the F…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

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Opinion of the Court

See O’Loughlin v. Pinchback,

579 So. 2d 788, 791 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court held that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not sex discrimination under Title VII.

See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,

429 U.S. 125, 136, 97 S.Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976). Congress responded by amending Title VII with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978(PDA), which specified that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was sex discrimination and violated Title VII.

See O’Loughlin

579 So. 2d at 791. In 1991, the First District Court of Appeal held that the Florida Human Rights Act did not state a cause of action for discrimination based on pregnancy, as it was preempted by Title VII “to the extent that Florida’s law offers less

*1187

protection to its citizens that does the corresponding federal law.”

O’Loughlin

579 So. 2d at 792. In 1992, Florida reenacted the Florida Human Rights Act, renaming it the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) and using the same language as its predecessor, without the language found in the federal PDA. See Walsh v. Food Supply, Inc.,

1997 WL 401594, *2, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9644, *5 (M.D.Fla.1997).

Federal district courts are split about whether the FCRA allows a claim for pregnancy-based discrimination. Two courts have followed

O’Loughlin

and held that a claim of pregnancy-based discrimination under FCRA was preempted.

See Swiney v. Lazy Days R.V. Center,

2000 WL 1392101 (M.D.Fla.2000);

Walsh v. Food Supply, Inc.,

1997 WL 401594, *2, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9644, *5 (M.D.Fla. 1997). Two other courts, citing

Brand v. Florida Power Corp.,

633 So. 2d 504, 507 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), have held that because the FCRA is based upon Title VII, federal case law dealing with Title VII applies, and therefore the FCRA permits a state law claim for pregnancy-based discrimination.

See Jolley v. Phillips Educational Group of Central Florida, Inc.,

1996 WL 529202, *6 (M.D.Fla.1996);

Kelly v. K.D. Const. of Florida,

866 F.Supp. 1406, 1411 (S.D.Fla.1994).

1

Analysis

This Court is of the opinion that the FCRA does not provide for a claim of pregnancy-based discrimination. The legislature passed the FCRA after the

O’Loughlin

decision, and as the Florida Supreme Court stated, “when the legislature reenacts a statute which has a judicial construction placed upon it, it is presumed that the legislature is aware of the construction and intends to adopt it, absent a clear expression to the contrary.”

Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. Dept. of Bus. Regulation,

441 So. 2d 627, 628 (Fla.1983). As the legislature did not include the language from the PDA, it is presumed that it was aware of the

O’Loughlin

opinion and did not intend to include pregnancy-based discrimination in the FCRA.

Further, the Court disagrees with the reasoning found in

Jolley,

which found that “[s]ince no other Florida courts hold that Title VII preempts state law pregnancy-based discrimination claims, this Court adopts the traditional statutory constructional rule that Florida laws which mirror federal laws will be construed identically.”

Jolley v. Phillips Educational Group of Central Florida, Inc.,

1996 WL 529202, *6. First, the Court agrees that a Florida law that mirrors a federal law should be construed identically, but the FCRA mirrors Title VII before the PDA. And Title VII, without the PDA, was construed not to include a pregnancy-based discrimination claim.

See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,

429 U.S. 125, 136, 97 S.Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976). Additionally, federal courts must follow state intermediate appellate courts absent convincing evidence the state supreme court would rule differently.

See Swiney v. Lazy Days R.V. Center, Inc.,

2000 WL 1392101 *1, n. 1

(citing Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co.,

311 U.S. 464, 467, 61 S.Ct. 336, 85 L.Ed. 284 (1940)).

Accordingly, Plaintiffs Second Claim is preempted by Title VII, and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count II is GRANTED.

Footnotes
1 It is worth noting that Jolley and Kelly cases were decided on the merits with plaintiffs failing to satisfy their burdens, arguably making those holdings dicta. See Jolley 1996 WL 529202 at *6; Kelly, 866 F.Supp. at 1414. And Swiney and Walsh, like the instant case, were decided on motions to dismiss a claim brought under FCRA. See Swiney, 2000 WL 1392101 at *1; Walsh, 1997 WL 401594, at *2-3, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9644 at *6.

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Cited By

  • Peguy Delva v. The Cont'l Grp., Inc., 96 So. 3d 956 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)
    …emedy than under the federal statute, the fact remains that pregnancy discrimination is not prohibited by the Florida Civil Rights Act and therefore the state statute provides no remedy for pregnancy discrimination.”); Frazier v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1187 (M.D.Fla.2003) (“This Court is of the opinion that the FCRA does not provide for a claim of pregnancy-based discrimination.”); Swiney v. Lazy Days R.V. Ctr. Inc., No. 00-1356, 2000 WL 1392101 (M.D.Fla.2000) (relying on O’Loughlin and dismissin…
  • Boone v. Total Renal Labs., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (M.D. Fla. 2008)
    …ancy discrimination. As noted in the original order on Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 9), federal courts are divided on the issue of whether the FCRA bars discrimination based on pregnancy. See generally Frazier v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 495 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1187 (M.D.Fla.2003) (noting the split and collecting cases). On its face, the FCRA does not cover pregnancy, and surprisingly, there is not a definitive statement from a Florida state court regarding whether the act’s prohibition on discrimination…
  • DuChateau v. Camp Dresser & McKee, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2011)
    …for pregnancy discrimination), Whiteman v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, Case No. 04-80389-CIV-PAINE, D.E. 114 at 11 (S.D.Fla. May 3, 2006) (same), aff'd, 273 Fed.Appx. 841 (11th Cir.2008) (per curiam), and Frazier v. T-Mobile USA dnc., 495 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1187 (M.D.Fla.2003) (same), with Constable v. Agilysis, Inc., 2011 WL 2446605, at *6 (M.D.Fla. June 15, 2011) (concluding that the FCRA does provide a cause of action for pregnancy discrimination), and Terry v. Real Talent, Inc., 2009 W…

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