AMERICAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORENCE U. LORD, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE, AND WILLIAM W. LORD; BLAND-PRUITT LUMBER & SUPPLY COMPANY, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION; AND D. G. BLAND LUMBER COMPANY, A GEORGIA CORPORATION AUTHORIZED TO DO BUSINESS IN FLORIDA, APPELLEES
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American Mortgage Corporation appealed the dismissal of its complaint to quiet title to accreted land. The court held that a deed's description of land, even when expressed in two different modes (words and a map), includes accretions unless explicitly excepted, and thus the mortgagee's complaint stated a valid cause of action.
The deed conveyed the accreted land to the grantee because neither the words nor the map excepted the accretions from the conveyance. The complaint stated a valid cause of action to quiet title to the accreted land. The order dismissing the complaint was reversed.
“In short the tail goes with the hide unless excepted.”
Establishes the fundamental rule that accretions pass with title to land unless the deed explicitly excepts them.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA deed conveyed land described both by words (identifying specific U.S. Government Lots in named sections and township/range) and by a map showing the…
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The question is whether a description of land in a deed includes accretions. Both sides agree that unless excepted the title to accretions passes with the title to the land to which the accretions are appurtenant. Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Company, 1890, 134 U.S. 178, 10 S.Ct. 518, 33 L.Ed. 872; Mexico Beach Corporation v. St. Joe Paper Company, Fla.App. 1957, 97 So.2d 708. In short the tail goes with the hide unless excepted. Both parties urge rules of construction. The description in question is as follows:
“U. S. Government Lot 5, Section 20; U. S. Government Lots 3 and 4, Section 29; U. S. Government Lots 3, 6 and 7, Section 19; all of the above described lands lying in Township 41 South, Range 20 East.”
The appellant, the grantee, insists that the first description controls and that the second description should be ignored. The appellees insist that the second description constitutes an exception to the first; that is that by attaching a map of the lands conveyed is equivalent to excepting the accretions as lands not conveyed. To avoid the force of rules of construction, appellees say that there is only one description and not two conflicting descriptions. We agree. Each description is complete. Each, if standing alone, is a complete description. Each conveys the accretions since neither mode of description excepts the accreted land. The differences between the two descriptions is in the mode of expression. The first uses words; the second uses a map. The lands colored yellow on the map are the same lands previously described by words. One might say that there are two descriptions but it is more accurate to say that there are here two different methods of describing the same thing. At any rate there is no conflict between them. Repetition does not create a qualification. Since there is no conflict there is no ambiguity and no occasion to resort to rules of construction. These rules are helpful to determine what one has said; they are of no use to determine what one meant to say. What the grantors here have said is plain enough. They have conveyed the accretions because nowhere have they excepted the accretions. If because of a mutual mistake of fact something has been said that was not meant to be said in an instrument, although on its face what was said is clear, the remedy must be sought by reformation, not by construction of language or maps.
The present appeal is from an order dismissing the amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The appellant is seeking to quiet title to the accreted land against the cloud cast by the quiet decree to these lands obtained by appellees in a suit to which appellant was not a party. *42Since on the face of the deed appellant acquired title to the accretions, its complaint stated a cause of action. The order appealed from is reversed.
KANNER, Acting C. J., and SHANNON, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Ford v. Turner, 142 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)…4; Mexico Beach Corporation v. St. Joe Paper Co., Fla.App.1957, 97 So. 2d 708, 710. Unless excepted, title to these accretions passes with the title to the land to which the accretions are appurtenant. American Mortgage Corp. v. Lord, Fla.App. 1961, 132 So. 2d 40. In Siesta Properties, Inc. v. Hart, Fla.App.1960, 122 So. 2d 218, 223, Associate Judge Sebring speaking for this court said: “The rule we think should govern in such a situation is set forth in In re [*341] City of Buffalo, 206 N.Y. 319, 99 N.E.…
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Burkart v. City OF Fort Lauderdale, 168 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1964)…retions generally belong to the owner of the upland to which they attach. Ford v. Turner, Fla.App., 142 So. 2d 335. Title to the accretions, unless excepted passes with the land to which they are appurtenant. American Mortgage Co. v. Lord, Fla.App., 132 So. 2d 40. The decree below goes further than merely to deny petitioners’ right to fill these submerged lands or to appropriate to themselves full dominion over the accretions, for it denies petitioners all riparian privileges incident to the reservation of…
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Saltzman v. Lacey N. Ahern, 306 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)…btful. If there is no ambiguity in the language employed then the intention of the grantor must be ascertained from that language. (See Thompson v. Ruff, Sup. Ct.Fla. 1918, 75 Fla. 476, 78 So. 489; American Mortgage Corp. v. Lord, Fla. App.2nd 1961, 132 So. 2d 40 and 23 Am. Jur.2d, Deeds, § 159) Technical words of grant or conveyance are not essential in order for a deed to operate as a conveyance. (See Tucker v. Cole, Sup.Ct.Fla. 1941, 148 Fla. 214, 3 So. 2d 875; Sanders v. Ransom, Sup.Ct.1896, 37 Fla. 457,…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jefferis v. E. Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178 (U.S. 1890)
- Mexico Beach Corp. v. ST. JOE Paper Co., 97 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1st DCA 1957)