WEST

v.

TOWN OF JUPITER ISLAND

neys’ Fees and Costs, filed on May 3, 2001 (D.E.#82). In response to this court’s Omnibus Order Granting Defendant’s Emergency Motion for Reconsideration of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Voluntary Dismissal (D.E.#79), and in conjunction with Local Rule 7.3, defendant has moved this court for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred while defending the instant action.

In reviewing the file, this court notes that the action has been actively litigated for approximately lié years. Ultimately, this court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, after finding that plaintiffs action could no longer be supported in light of the requirements enunciated by the Eleventh Circuit in

Maynard v. Pneumatic Products Corp.,

233 F. 3d 1344 (11th Cir.2000). This court finds that instead of recognizing the action could no longer be maintained in light of

Maynard,

plaintiff continued to litigate the matter instead of seeking voluntary dismissal. It was only after defendant reopened plaintiffs deposition that plaintiff, apparently unable to comply with this court’s Order Requiring Comparative Evidence (D.E.# 73), finally moved for dismissal — some four months after the

Maynard

decision.

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 12205, the court has discretion to allow the prevailing party in this disability harassment and wrongful termination action a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses and costs. The Eleventh Circuit recently adopted the

Christianburg

standard for assessing attorney fees under the ADA. See Bruce v. City of Gainesville, Georgia,

177 F. 3d 949 (11th Cir.1999). The

Christianburg

standard, a method of awarding prevailing party fees under Title VII, recognizes that a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily be awarded attorney’s fees, but a prevailing defendant should recover fees only “upon a finding that the plaintiffs action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.”

Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,

434 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978).

In considering defendant’s motion, the court has reviewed the history of this case, and notes that plaintiff

may

have had a viable action up and until the pronouncement issued by

Maynard

on November 22, 2000. After the

Maynard

decision was announced, plaintiffs action was without foundation in the law. Had plaintiff taken the initiative and sought a voluntary dismissal upon learning of the

Maynard

pronouncement, this court would be disinclined to award fees. However, plaintiff maintained the action up and until he realized he could not cooperate with the court’s instruction to provide evidence of how his impairments restrict major life activities

compared to the general population,

as required by

Maynard.

Thus, this court finds that an award of fees is appropriate under the

Christianburg

standard, since plaintiff continued this action well after any legal foundation for the action was dissipated by

Maynard.

Accordingly, this court will award defendant, prevailing party, attorneys’ fees and costs incurred after November 22, 2000 (the date of the

Maynard

decision).

The court has reviewed the submission of fees and costs contained in Defendant’s Motion.

1

Using defendant’s submission as

*1304

a guide, and finding the asserted fees and costs therein

2

to be reasonable, including the hourly rates for all legal personnel, the court awards defendant the following costs and fees:

Costs Fees Sub-Total

Nov. 23, 2000-Nov. 30, 2000 109.00 519.50 628.50

December 2000 290.02 11,483.50 11,773.52

January 2001 3,353.49 22,462.00 25,815.49

February 2001 1,245.36 1,337.50 2,582.86

March 2001 122.54 3,976.50 4,099.04

TOTAL $44,899.41

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant’s Verified Motion to Tax Attorneys’ Fees and Costs is GRANTED IN PART. It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that defendant is hereby awarded forty-four thousand, eight hundred ninety-nine dollars and forty-one cents ($44,899.41) as the prevailing party in the instant action.