WANZA

v.

AETNA HEALTH, INC.

among other things, breach of contract under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq.

See

Complaint [D.E.¹]. On August 31, 2004, Aetna filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that (1) Ms. Wan-za failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing suit, and (2) she cannot maintain a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty as an individual beneficiary.

See

Motion to Dismiss [D.E.⁴]. On January 10, 2005, I granted Aetna’s request to convert its motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment only on the issue of whether Ms. Wanza exhausted her administrative remedies.

See

Order [D.E. 35]. Currently, the motion to dismiss is pending only on Aetna’s contention that Ms. Wanza cannot maintain a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. For the reasons set forth below, Aetna’s motion to dismiss [D.E.⁴] is GRANTED.

Aetna’s motion to dismiss should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that Ms. Wanza could prove no set of facts in support of her claim which would entitle her to relief.

See Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). I must take the allegations of the complaint as true and must read the complaint to include any theory on which she can recover. See Linder v. Portocarrero,

963 F. 2d 332, 334-36 (11th Cir.1992). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “is viewed with disfavor and rarely granted.”

Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc.,

116 F. 3d 1364, 1368-69 (11th Cir.1997) (citing

Madison v. Purdy,

410 F. 2d 99, 100 (5th Cir.1969);

International Erectors, Inc. v. Wilhoit Steel Erectors & Rental Serv.,

400 F. 2d 465, 471 (5th Cir.1968) (“Dismissal of a claim on the basis of barebone pleadings is a precarious disposition with a high mortality rate.”)).

Aetna contends that, as an individual beneficiary, Ms. Wanza is not entitled to maintain an action for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA. See

Motion to Dismiss at 6. Ms. Wanza responds that Aetna “mischaracterize[s]” the complaint, which simply alleges a breach of contract cause of action under ERISA pertaining to her specific health insurance policy.

See

Response, ¶ 5 [D.E. 6]. Athough Ms. Wanza appears to respond that the complaint only alleges breach of contract and does not allege a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, she does indeed allege in her complaint that “[t]o the extent that the Defendant was and is in a fiduciary relationship to the Plaintiff, the acts and/or omissions of the Defendant as alleged herein constituted

a breach of the fiduciary duties

owed to the Plaintiff by the Defendant.”

See

Complaint, ¶ 19 (emphasis added). Thus, the complaint alleges a cause of action of breach of fiduciary duty.

1

Furthermore, although Ms. Wanza alleges jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., and the allegations in her complaint are sufficient to meet the “exceedingly low” standard of Rule 8(a),

2

she does not allege any specific provisions of

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ERISA to support her breach of fiduciary-duty claim against Aetna. Nor does she does cite to any specific provisions to support her claim of breach of fiduciary duty in her response to Aetna’s motion to dismiss.

Aetna argues that Ms. Wanza’s claim of breach of fiduciary duty fails as a matter of law under 29 U.S.C. § 1109. Specifically, § 1109 of ERISA provides for liability for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.³

ERISA, specifically 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2), authorizes a beneficiary to bring an action against a fiduciary who has violated § 1109.

As Aetna points out, the Supreme Court limited the relief available under § 1109 in

Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Russell,

473 U.S. 134, 140, 144, 105 S.Ct. 3085, 87 L.Ed.2d 96 (1985), by holding that § 1109 does not provide for an award of extra-contractual or punitive damages to an individual participant or beneficiary. Rather, any recovery for a breach of fiduciary duty under § 1109 or § 1132(a)(2) must be on behalf of the plan as a whole.

See id.

at 140, 105 S.Ct. 3085 (holding that “recovery for a violation of § 409 inures to the benefit of the plan as a whole”);

Amos v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama,

868 F. 2d 430, 431 (11th Cir.1989) (holding that ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme under § 1132(a) does not include extra-contractual or punitive damages to individual plaintiffs);

Horan 'v. Kaiser Steel Retirement

Plan, 947 F. 2d 1412, 1418 (9th Cir.1991). Thus, under

Russell,

Ms. Wanza does not have an individual cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty under § 1109. In other words, under ERISA, Ms. Wanza can only obtain equitable relief or relief that her contract provides.

See Hunt v. Hawthorne Assocs.,

119 F. 3d 888, 907 (11th Cir.1997) (stating that the Eleventh Circuit treats actions to recover benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B) as equitable in nature).

See also Horan,

947 F. 2d at 1417-18 (“An individual beneficiary may not pursue a fiduciary breach claim to recover benefits or remedies beyond those provided by a plan.”). Accordingly, Ms. Wanza fails to state a claim as a matter of law for a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.⁴

Aetna’s motion to dismiss/motion to, strike Ms. Wanza’s claim for breach of

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fiduciary duty [D.E.⁴] is ORANTED. The case remains pending on Ms. Wanza’s other claim.