J. TURNER BUTLER AND WILLIAM A. HALLOWES, AS TRUSTEES OF THE PROPERTY OF THE FLORIDA EAST COAST RAILWAY COMPANY, A CORPORATION, APPELLANTS,
v.
WILLIE MAE WILLIAMS, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF THOMAS EUGENE WILLIAMS, DECEASED, FOR THE USE AND BENEFIT OF HERSELF, AS WIDOW OF THOMAS EUGENE WILLIAMS, AND FOR THE USE AND BENEFIT OF MARIE WILLIAMS, THOMAS WILLIAMS, BETTY JO WILLIAMS, LEROY WILLIAMS, WYNETTE WILLIAMS AND WENDELL WILLIAMS, MINOR CHILDREN OF THOMAS EUGENE WILLIAMS, DECEASED, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1961-09-26
No. 60-642
Before PEARSON, TILLMAN, C. J., and HORTON and CARROLL, JJ.
133 So. 2d 109 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1961) Positive Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

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Holding

The court held that while the judgment was otherwise valid, the jury's award of damages to the decedent's children was excessive and required a remittitur or a new trial on damages.


Facts & Procedural History

A signal maintainer employed by the railroad was electrocuted, leaving a widow and five minor children. The widow, as administratrix, sued under the F…

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Opinion of the Court
CARROLL, Judge.

CARROLL, Judge.

Thomas Eugene Williams, aged 42, a signal maintainer employed by appellants at a wage of $5,888 per year, was killed by electrocution in a signal station maintained by the railroad at Jupiter, Florida, on November 19, 1959. He left a widow and five minor children.1 The widow, as adminis-tratrix, instituted this suit under the pro*110visions of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51-59) on behalf of herself and the children in the circuit court in Dade County. She obtained a verdict in the aggregate sum of $150,000 which was therein apportioned $50,000 to the widow Willie Mae, and $20,000 to each of the five children. Judgment was entered on the verdict. Defendants’ motion for new trial was denied and they appealed. Eighty assignments of error were filed, and thirteen points briefed and argued, but error was not disclosed except for a showing of ex-cessiveness in the amount of the verdict.

Allowance by the jury of $20,000 to each of the five children is unrealistic and its excessiveness is apparent on the record. In a case of this character the elements of damage to a minor child from a parent’s death may be materially different from those allowable to a spouse or collateral dependent relative.2 Their loss may be of parental society, companionship, acts of kindness in the relation and of nurture involving care, training, advice, guidance and education;3 and in the absence of a reasonable necessity for dependence beyond majority such damages are restricted to the years of minority.4 Giving the children the most favorable benefit of the jury’s compensation to them, by leaving undisturbed the allocation of $20,000 to the youngest, Marie, who at ten years of age had between ten and eleven years of remaining minority, excessiveness became clear when $20,000 was allowed to Wendell who would attain his majority in a little more than one year. The same is true proportionately of the three other children who were aged twelve, fifteen and sixteen.

The ordering of a remittitur to remove excessiveness from a verdict is proper and is not usurping a jury function when the excess is disclosed on the record of the case or shown to have resulted from a misconception of the law or elements of damage. Compare Patton v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., D.C.W.D.Pa.1953, 120 F.Supp. 659, 665-667. This case presents such an instance, in the respects outlined above; and a verdict in an F. E. L. A. action is susceptible to a remittitur order when tried in a state court. Union P. R. Co. v. Hadley, 246 U.S. 330, 38 S.Ct. 318, 62 L.Ed. 751.

In the case of Bartholf v. Baker, Fla. 1954, 71 So.2d 480, 484, the Supreme Court upon concluding that a verdict was excessive and shown on the record to be without basis in the evidence, remanded the cause with directions to the trial court to enter an appropriate remittitur, or if unable to determine upon such, to grant a new trial as to damages. In so holding the Supreme Court said: “ * * * we have never hesitated to reverse a case because of an excessive verdict if the verdict which was rendered is not even suggestively sustained by the evidence.”

Accordingly, though otherwise the judgment is affirmed, this cause is remanded to the circuit court with directions that the able trial judge enter an appropriate re-mittitur which he is in a better position to do than are we because of having heard the case as it was tried before him and the jury. And we further direct, as was done in Bartholf v. Baker, supra, that if the trial judge should conclude that he is unable to determine a proper amount of remittitur, *111then in the alternative he is directed to grant a new trial on the question of damages only.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded with directions.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Clay, 586 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
    …the amount of the awards was excessive given the absence of “evidence of a substantial impact on the child.” Salazar, 537 So. 2d at 1051; cf. also Pidcock-Jones Co. v. Watson, 141 Fla. 376, 193 So. 305 (1940) (monetary damages); Butler v. Williams, 133 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961). That decision cannot control this case, in which the trial court denied the motion for new trial on excessiveness grounds, and the record provides ample individual basis for each of the jury’s separate conclusions. Ill The appe…
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  • Salazar v. Santos (Harry) & Co., Inc., 537 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
    …under Florida law, would necessarily require different amounts for surviving children of different ages.” Davis v. Marsh, 807 F. 2d 908, 913 (11th Cir.1987). See Pidcock-Jones Co. v. Watson, 141 Fla. 376, 193 So. 305, 307 (1940); Butler v. Williams, 133 So. 2d 109,110 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961). Accordingly, we affirm the order on appeal as it relates to the awards to the decedent’s sons. On the other hand, we do not uphold the order inasmuch as it overturns the awards to the estate and to the decedent’s wife. In hi…
  • Gordon v. Cove Realty Int'l, Inc., 288 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
    …the judgment, so that in sum and substance the judgment will stand corrected so’ as to read in the amount of [*536] $51,800; otherwise, the judgment shall stand reversed for a new trial as to the amount of damages. Butler v. Williams, Fla.App.1961, 133 So. 2d 109; Great American Ins. Co. v. Suarez, 1932, 107 Fla. 705, 146 So. 644; Aylesworth v. London, Fla.App.1960, 119 So. 2d 816; South Florida Farms Co. v. Stevenson, 1922, 84 Fla. 235, 93 So. 247. It is so ordered. WALDEN and CROSS, JJ., and POUL-TON, TI…

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