POWELL

v.

CAREY INTERNATIONAL, INC.

judgment primarily on the issue of damages, [DE 272, 274]. The parties’ dispute two critical components for determining the amount of overtime wages. First, they disagree as to the applicable regulation for determining their regular hourly rate of pay — whether²⁹ C.F.R. § 778.109 applies because Plaintiffs were paid in multiple ways, which results in time and half overtime pay, or whether²⁹ C.F.R. § 778.112 applies because Plaintiffs were paid by the job, which results in half overtime pay. Second, they contest which work activities are compensable, which determines the number of hours worked per week, which in turn is divided into the weekly compensation to ascertain the regular hourly rate of pay.

Having reviewed the motions, the responses and the replies thereto, the entire factual record and the relevant legal authorities, the Court finds that pursuant to § 778.112, Plaintiffs’ are compensated on a per job basis. Therefore, any overtime hours worked are compensated at one half of the hourly rate of pay multiplied by the number of hours worked overtime. The per job pay consists of the base percentage plus the fixed gratuity with expenses for tolls, parking fees and fuel surcharges netted out. Additionally, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to be compensated for the following activities: driving with customers in the vehicle, driving between jobs, attending mandatory meetings, waiting for customers or being engaged to wait, and waiting for no-shows or cancellations. Plaintiffs are not entitled to be compensated for commutes between work and home and time spent changing clothes. Also, the I/Os are not entitled to compensation for time spent cleaning, inspecting or maintaining their vehicle. Furthermore, issues of fact remain as to the com-pensability of the following activities: the time spent obtaining and placing amenities in vehicles; the time that Carey House Chauffeurs spent cleaning, inspecting and maintaining the Defendants’ vehicles; the time spent calling. dispatch and checking flight times; and the time spent “waiting to be engaged.” In addition, as a- matter of law, Plaintiffs aré not entitled to social security payments or compensatory damages for minimum or overtime wage claims. Finally, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment regarding Plaintiff Powell’s retaliation claim.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, limousine drivers, seek Overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”),²⁹ U.S.C. § 201 et seq., from three Defendants, who were involved in the limousine transport business at the time- relevant to this lawsuit 1 After extensive procedural activities, both the Plaintiffs and Defendants seek summary judgment as to the calculation of the overtime hourly wage and the determination of which activities are compensable. The parties set forth the following facts.

Defendant Carey International, Inc. owns a number of subsidiary corporations that engage in limousine services. One of Carey International’s subsidiariés is Defendant Carey Limousine Florida, Inc. (d/ b/a Carey South Florida and successor in interest to Campanile Motor Services, Inc. and Club Limousine Service, Inc.). (Affidavit of Robert Michael Sobol (“Sobol Deck”), December 1, 2006, ¶2). Defendant Vince Wolfington is the former Chief *1308 Executive Officer of Carey International, Inc. Throughout this Order, the term Defendants shall collectively refer to Carey International, Inc., Carey Limousine Florida, Inc. and Vincent Woffington. Likewise, Defendant Carey Limousine Florida, Inc., when discussed individually, shall be referred to as Carey South Florida.

Plaintiffs are drivers who worked for and were paid by Carey South Florida to provide chauffeur services to Defendants’ customers in South Florida. (See Fourth Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs can be divided into two groups: those who own their vehicle (“I/Os”) and those who use the vehicles owned or leased by Defendants (“Carey House Chauffeurs”). 2 (Sobol Deck ¶3.) The Plaintiffs claim that they were employees for the purposes of the FLSA and, therefore, were entitled to overtime wages at the statutory rate for all compensable time worked.³ As part of their claims, Plaintiffs maintain their compensable hours should include the time spent adhering to Defendants various requirements concerning personal appearance, grooming, dressing, as well as vehicle maintenance, including placing the required supplies in the car. (Plaintiffs’ Statement of Facts (“Plaintiffs’ SOF”) ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs- also assert that they were required to contact dispatch prior to leaving their house. (Plaintiffs’ SOF ¶¶ 4-5.)

Michael Sobol, the Vice President and General Manager of Carey South Florida, has described the manner in which Defendants assert that Plaintiffs were compensated each month.⁴ (Id. ¶ 9, 13.) Both Plaintiff groups received a percentage of the -adjudged gross revenue that Carey South Florida received from a limousine customer for a particular trip. Those Plaintiffs who were Carey House Chauffeurs received 18% of the adjusted gross revenue received from the customer for a particular trip, plus a pre-determined gratuity (20%), plus any cash gratuity paid by the customer. (Id. ¶ 9.) The Plaintiffs who were I/Os received 60% of the adjusted gross revenue received from the customer for a particular trip, plus a pre-determined gratuity, plus any cash gratuity paid by the customer. (Id. ¶ 13.) The adjusted gross revenue is equal to the base rate charged to the customer less taxes, surcharges, commissions, discounts, rebates, tolls, parking and credit card fees. (Id.) I/Os also had a contractual obligation to maintain their vehicles in a safe, clean and presentable condition and the vehicle had to be no more than three years old. (Id-¶ 16.) The I/Os were responsible for all fees and expenses incurred in the operation and maintenance of their vehicles, *1309 including expenses such as gas, licences, vehicle maintenance and repairs, parking, traffic citations and permits. (IdA 18.) Further, I/Os were required to pay for supplies, such as clothing, radios, cellular phones, beepers, umbrellas, water, magazines, candy, newspapers, and any other amenities that they chose to provide to customers. (IdA 20.) The customers were required to pay for parking and tolls, and these expenses were often advanced by the I/O during the trip. (IdA 22.) The I/O was then reimbursed when the customer paid Carey South Florida. (Id.) Also, since June 1, 2004, customers had been required to pay a fuel charge to off-set escalating fuel prices. (IdA 22.) The fuel surcharge was then paid to the I/O. (Id.)

Plaintiffs assert that in addition to being paid the fixed base percentage of the adjusted gross revenue and the gratuities, they were also paid as compensation the fuel surcharge, and hourly payments for stand-by situations, miscellaneous occurrences and-wait times, and-“as directed” jobs. (Plaintiffs’ SOF ¶¶ 15-20.)

Each I/O’s revenues and expenses were reconciled once a month and recorded in an Account Liquidation Report (the “Report”). (7&¶ 25.) The Report identified the vehicle revenue and fees due to the I/O (“Total Fees Due”) and then subtracted all expenses that .the I/O owed Carey South Florida, such as fees for creditors or vendors (“Total Deductions”). (Id-¶¶ 28-29.) Subtracting the Total Deductions from the Total Fees Due resulted in the Net Fees Due. (IdA 29.) Gratuities are then added to the Net Fees Due which then resulted in the Total Payment Amount to the I/O. (Id. ¶ 31.) Finally, Defendants kept track of the hours that Plaintiffs worked as they performed their trips. (IdA 35.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is authorized only when the moving party meets its burden of demonstrating that “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits,” show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Supporting and opposing affidavits must be made based upon personal knowledge. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The Supreme Court explained in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970), that when assessing whether' the movant has met this burden, the court should view the evidence and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.

The party opposing the motion may not simply rest upon mere allegations or denials of the pleadings; after the moving party has met its burden of coming forward with proof of the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving part must make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of an essential element to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Poole v. Country Club of Columbus, Inc., 129 F. 3d 551, 553 (11th Cir.1997).

If the record presents factual issues, the court must not decide them; it must deny the motion and proceed to trial. Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F. 2d 983, 991 (5th Cir.1981). 5 Summary judgment may be inappropriate even where the parties agree on the basic facts, but disagree about the inferences that should be drawn from these facts. Lighting Fixture *1310

& Elec. Supply Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 420 F. 2d 1211, 1213 (5th Cir.1969). By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Court is not to resolve factual issues, but may only determine whether factual issues exist. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A material fact is one which “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law....” Id.

III. ANALYSIS

There are two main issues in the parties’ cross-motions for partial summary judgment: the method for computing Plaintiffs’ regular hourly rate of compensation and the determination of those tasks for which Plaintiffs are entitled to compensation.⁶ Part A, below addresses the first issue and Part B focuses on the second.

As to the first issue, FLSA administrative regulations provide guidance for determining an employee’s regular hourly rate, or Regular Rate, which is a key determination for calculating overtime pay. The parties rely on different regulations to support their positions. Plaintiffs argué that²⁹ C.F.R § 778.109 governs the dispute and results in one of three manners of calculating the Regular Rate.⁷ All three of these methods result in the overtime rate being one and a half times the Regular Rate. In taking these positions, Plaintiffs are arguing against the application of²⁹ C.F.R. § 778.112, which would result in the overtime rate being only half of the Regular Rate.

In contrast, Defendants claim that Plaintiffs were paid by the job and, therefore,²⁹ C.F.R § 778.112 applies. Application of § 778.112 would result in the Regular Rate being the result of dividing the Weekly Pay by the total weekly hours that were compensated. The overtime hourly rate is then half of the Regular Rate.²⁹ C.F.R. § 778.112. Defendants further claim that in calculating the Regular Rate, such reimbursable expenses as tolls, parking fees and fuel surcharges must be netted out.

As to the second issue, Plaintiffs assert that. they are entitled to compensation for the time spent doing various activities associated with their job, other than transporting passengers, such' as vehicle maintenance, wait times, cleaning, etc. Defendants, on the other hand, claim that the time spent doing activities related to the job such as daily commutes, vehicle maintenance and changing into uniforms are not compensable under the FLSA. *1311 A. The Calculation Of The Regular Rate And The Overtime Hourly Rate.

The Department of Labor is responsible for promulgating regulations interpreting the overtime pay requirements under the FLSA and these regulations are entitled to judicial deference as the primary source of guidance for determining the scope and extent of exemptions to the statute. Spradling v. City of Tulsa, 95 F.Sd 1492, 1495 (10th Cir.1996). Exemptions from, or exceptions to, the statute are narrowly construed against the employer asserting them and it is the employer’s' burden to affirmatively show that these exemptions apply in a particular case. Cowart v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 213 F. 3d 261, 264 (5th Cir.2000).

1.

Subchapter B of Title²⁹ of the Code of Federal Regulations contains statements of general policy or interpretation promulgated by the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor. Subpart B of part 778 of Title²⁹ governs the overtime requirements imposed by the FLSA, and §§ 778.107 through 778.122 establish principles for determining the Regular Rate at which an employee is compensated in order to calculate the overtime pay to which the employee is entitled. Section 778.107 explains that overtime must be compensated “at a rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.”²⁹ C.F.R. § 778.107. Section 778.109, entitled “The regular rate is an hourly rate,” explains:

The “regular rate” under the [FLSA] is a rate per hour. The [FLSA] does not require employers to compensate employees on an hourly rate basis; their earnings may be determined on a piece-rate, salary, commission, or other basis, but in such case the overtime compensation due to employees must be computed on the basis of the hourly rate derived therefrom and, therefore, it is necessary to compute the regular hourly rate of such employees during each workweek, with certain statutory exceptions discussed in §§ 778.400 through 778.421. The regular hourly rate of pay of an employee is determined by dividing his total remuneration for employment (except statutory exclusions) in any workweek by the total number of hours actually worked by him in that workweek for which such compensation was paid. The following sections give some examples of the proper method of determining the regular rate of pay in particular instances: (The maximum hours standard used in these examples is 40 hours in a workweek).

8

The sections following §. 778.109, however, give some examples of the proper method of determining the Regular Rate of pay in particular instances. Defendants maintain that one of these sections, § 778.112, governs the calculation of wages in this case because Plaintiffs were paid by the job. Section 778.112, entitled “Day rates and job rates,” provides:

If the employee is paid a flat sum for a day’s work or for doing a particular job, without regard to the number of hours worked in the day or at the job, and if he receives no other form of compensation for services, his regular.rate is determined by totaling .all the sums received at such day rates or job rates in the workweek and dividing by the total hours actually worked. He is then entitled to extra half-time pay at this rate for all hours worked in excess of 40 in the workweek.

*1312 Thus, under § 778.112, the Regular Rate is determined by taking an employee’s Weekly Pay and dividing it by the total hours that he actually worked. The employee’s overtime hourly wage is then half of the Regular Rate. 9 29 C.F.R. § 778.112 (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs make three arguments against the application of § 778.112 in this case: 10 (1) there was no agreement as to the form of payment and Plaintiffs did not know how much they were to be paid for a job; (2) Plaintiffs were not paid for all jobs; and (3) Plaintiffs were not paid by the job, but rather they were paid multiple forms of compensation, including an hourly rate for various activities.

2. Section 778.112 Does Not Require An Agreement As To The Form Of Payment.

As to Plaintiffs’ first argument against the application of § 778.112, the law does not require that Plaintiffs understand that a job-rate cover the hours the job demands. Dufrene v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 207 F. 3d 264, 268 (5th Cir.2000) (holding that the plain language of § 778.112 only requires that the employee be paid a day or job rate, not that employee consents to such); see also Hartsell v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. of Tx., 207 F. 3d 269, 273 (5th Cir.2000) (holding that the plain language of § 778.112 only requires that the employee be paid by the job, not that employee and employer have a mutual understanding). 11 Even if the regulation required an agreement as to the manner of compensation, however, the evidence indicates that Plaintiffs were aware of how they would be paid in advance of the job. (See Plaintiffs’ SOF ¶¶ 2-3 indicating that Plaintiffs had knowledge that they were paid a percentage charge and a fixed gratuity.) Thus, Plaintiffs’ assertion in this regard is without merit.

3. The Fact That Plaintiffs May Not Have Been Paid For All Jobs Is Irrelevant To The Application Of § 778.112.

Plaintiffs next claim that they did not get paid for all of the jobs. Such assertion, however, is not determinative of whether § 778.112 applies in this case. If Plaintiffs were not paid for a particular job, then Plaintiffs are entitled to relief under the appropriate minimum wage statute; however, such fact does not render § 778.112 inapplicable. Ironically, Plaintiffs assertion that Defendant failed to pay them for certain jobs, implicitly acknowledges that Plaintiffs were in fact paid by the job.

4. The Six Different Methods Of Compensation Alleged By Plaintiff Do Not Prevent The Application Of § 778.112

Plaintiffs also argue that because they received six different types of compensation, § 779.112’s clause barring “other form[s] of compensation” prevents the application of the provision. Plaintiffs allege that the six different types of compen *1313 sation received include: (1) a paid percentage of the adjusted gross revenue received from the customer (60% to I/Os and 18% to Carey House Chauffeurs); (2) a 20% fixed gratuity; 12 (8) a fuel surcharge paid to I/Os; (4) a payment for standby situations and site inspections; (5) a payment for miscellaneous occurrences such as no shows, excessive waits, etc.; and (6) payment for “as-directed” jobs. As discussed below, none of these arguments, individually or collectively, support Plaintiffs’ position.

(i) Fixed Percentage of Adjusted Gross Revenue from Customer

Plaintiffs are paid a base percentage of adjusted gross revenue received from the customer. Such payment makes up a portion of the “flat sum” for a particular job, to which § 778.112 applies. The I/Os received 60% of the adjusted gross revenue received from a customer for a particular trip plus a pre-determined gratuity, while Carey House Chauffeurs received 18% of the adjusted gross revenue received from a customer for a particular trip plus .a predetermined gratuity. Accordingly, Defendants argue that the base percentage plus the fixed gratuity added together make up a total amount paid per job, or the “flat sum” per job.

Nothing in § 778.112 precludes a “flat sum” from having multiple components, as long as the compensation is paid on a per job basis. See Dufrene, 207 F. 3d at 268 (holding that plain language of the provision indicates that the principal requirement of § 778.112 is that the compensation be paid per job). Further, the fact that the amount charged to customers, which then affects the amount paid to Plaintiffs, may depend on such a variable as the distance traveled for a particular trip, does not render § 778.112 inapplicable, so long as the compensation is paid by the job. Dole v. Trusty, 707 F.Supp. 1074, 1076 (W.D.Ark.1989) (applying § 778.112 to truck drivers delivering milk where the compensation depended on the trip); see also Herman v. Hector I. Nieves Transport, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 435, 441-42 (D.P.R.2000) (applying § 778.112 to truck drivers delivering petroleum). Here, in addition to the abundance of Defendants’ evidence regarding the components of Plaintiffs’ compensation, Plaintiffs’ briefs and statement of facts essentially concede that they were paid on a per job basis. For example, Plaintiffs themselves, not only testified but set out in their statement of facts that a “driver could perform two identical transfers back-to-back, one taking 2 hours and one taking 5 hours, and the driver would be paid the same.” (Plaintiffs’ SOF ¶ 9; see also Alba Deposition, Aug. 22, 2006 (stating that two identical jobs, one lasting two hours and one lasting seven hours, would pay the same.)) Thus, the record demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of fact that Plaintiffs were paid a “flat sum” on a per job or per trip basis similar to the truck drivers in Dole and Herman.

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*1314

(ii) Fixed Gratuity

Further, the 20% gratuity paid by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs does not constitute “other compensation” under the regulation. Sections 531.50 through 531.60 of Title²⁹ of the Code of Federal Regulations regulate payment of wages to tipped employees. Subsection 531.55(a) makes clear that “[a] compulsory charge for service, such as 10 percent of the amount of the bill, imposed on a customer by an employer’s establishment, is not a tip and, even if distributed by the employer to the employee, cannot be counted as a tip received in applying [the term ‘wage’ under the FLSA.]” Foody v. Carey International, et al., (04-21104-Civ-Ungaro-Benages, November 10, 2004, “Omnibus Order”). Thus, the fixed gratuities make up part of Plaintiffs’ compensation and do not constitute “other form[s] of compensation” under § 778.112.

(iii) Fuel Surcharge

The facts demonstrate that the fuel surcharge is not compensation for time worked, but rather a reimbursement for fuel expense. As such, the fuel surcharge is not part of the Regular Rate and its payment does not render § 778.112 inapplicable. Brennan v. Padre Drilling Co., 359 F.Supp. 462 (S.D.Tex.1973) and Berry v. Excel Group, Inc., 288 F. 3d 252 (5th Cir.2002). In Brennan, employees of an oil drilling company were paid a dollar per hour for expenses incurred during travel required by the employer. 359 F.Supp. at 463-64. In Berry, an employee electrician worked for subcontractors and received a per diem daily payment. 288 F. 3d at 253. Both courts in these cases held that such amounts fell within²⁹ U.S.C. § 207(e) and its administrative interpretation in²⁹ C.F.R. §§ 778.216 14 and 778.217, 15 and were incurred by the employee on the employer’s behalf and, thus, were not compensation for services for purposes of calculating the Regular Rate. Id. at 466-67.

In this case, to the extent that Plaintiffs claim that Carey House Chauffeurs were paid the fuel surcharge, 16 such amounts would not be categorized as compensation because Defendants were responsible for *1315 fueling the vehicle, 17 and if a Carey House Chauffeur paid for fuel out of pocket, the fuel surcharge paid to him was necessarily a reimbursement. Therefore, such payments are not used in the calculation of the Regular Rate.

With regard to the I/Os, however, the situation is less clear. After June 2004, customers were required to pay a fuel surcharge to offset escalating fuel prices. (Sobol Deck ¶ 23.) These fuel surcharges were then paid to the I/O, who were contractually responsible for the payment of gas. (See Sobol Decl. ¶ 18.) To be a reimbursed expense excluded from the Regular Rate under the regulation, the employee must incur the expense on his employer’s behalf or for the convenience of his employer.²⁹ C.F.R. § 778.217(a). Here, Plaintiffs incurred the expense of the escalated price of fuel for both themselves as independent contractors engaged in the limousine business as well as for Defendants in that the fuel was necessary to transport passengers on their behalf. Thus, 'it is not clear whether such payments of fuel surcharges falls within the parameters of § 778.217. However, the fact that the customer was charged the fuel surcharge and then the I/O was reimbursed for this expense make it akin to a toll or parking fee for which customers are billed and the I/O was reimbursed.

Also, payment of the fuel surcharge resembles the payment of the “per diem” in both Brennan and Berry. In Brennan, the defendants -reduced the wage by an hour and'paid the employees an extra'dollar an hour to offset work-related travel expenses. The court found-that such payments should not be included in the calculation of the Regular Rate. 359 F.Supp. at 466. The fuel surcharge the I/Os received in this case was almost identical to the per diem rate in Brennan in that it was a flat sum to offset travel expenses. Further, in Berry, the court found that per diem amounts paid to an employee were reimbursed expenses for on-site living, utilities, meals and other daily charges that the employee incurred so that he could be present at the work site. 288 F. 3d at 254. Here, the fuel surcharge reimburses Plaintiffs for escalating fuel prices. Accordingly, the fuel surcharge here is no different from the reimbursed expenses in Brennan and Berry and thus, such payments are not “other form[s] of compensation” that renders § 778.112 inapplicable. 18

(iv) Payment for Standby Situations or “Site-Inspectiorps ”

Plaintiffs also argue that they received an “hourly rate” for standby situations, commonly called “site inspections,” which Plaintiffs allege constitute “other form[s] of compensation” under § 778.112. (Plaintiffs’ SJ Motion at 1-2, 4.) Defendants,'on the other hand, maintain that Plaintiffs were paid by the job in these situations as *1316 well. (Defendants Reply at 7.) In support of their contention that they were paid hourly for these jobs, Plaintiffs submit various documents and deposition testimony.

It is necessary to review Plaintiffs’ documents to determine if Plaintiffs were in fact paid hourly for standby time. A key document is the Driver Payment Report. Plaintiff Betancourt’s May 16, 2002 to May 31, 2006 Driver Payment Report indicates that Betancourt was paid $40 for various “Stand-By-Drive” assignments. The report, however, does not indicate that the $40 was compensation for a certain number of hours worked. (Betancourt Depo., Aug. 23, 2006, Exh. 11-CI 029512.) Furthermore, in his deposition, when asked if the $40 was an hourly rate, Betancourt stated “I recall that $40 was for like eight hours standby, eight to ten hours standby.” (Betancourt Depo. at 208.) It was only after Betancourt was asked whether he believed that he was being paid roughly five dollars an hour, that he stated, “[ajround that if I say correctly.” 19

(Id. at 209.) However, such testimony does not indicate that Plaintiffs were paid on a per hour basis. Any job can be calculated on per hour basis; the pivotal issue is if the job was paid on a “per hour” basis. Here, the fact that Betancourt and Kralovic knew that they were paid $40 for a standby assignment, but do not know for how many hours such payment constituted compensation, bolsters the Defendants’ argument that the $40 was paid on a per job basis. 20 Moreover, Plaintiff Mazzeo testified that he believed the $40 rate for standby jobs was consistent, regardless of the amount of time spent doing the standby job. (Mazzeo Deposition at 240-41.) Thus, the statements of Betancourt and Kravolic that they were paid on an hourly basis for stand-by assignments equates to speculation as a matter of law, and not based on personal knowledge. 21

(v) Payments for Miscellaneous Occurrences

Plaintiffs next argue that they received various miscellaneous payments that were paid by the hour, not the job, including: payments for wait times, payments if there was a problem on a particular trip, payments for garage to garage trips, and payments for no-shows or cancellations. As discussed below, none of these types of payments undermine the application of § 778.112.

In support of the assertion that payments for excessive wait times were on a per hour basis, Plaintiffs submit the testimony of Plaintiffs Pereira and Humphreys. (Plaintiffs Response at 8; Plaintiffs SOF ¶ 17.) Pereira speculates that he may have been paid hourly for wait times, but when asked if he was paid an hourly fee or a flat fee, he says “I don’t know.” (Pereira Depo., Sept. 20, 2006 at 242.) Humphreys also indicated he is unaware of *1317 how he was paid for wait times when he states “I believe I get a slice of that hour that they’re waiting.” (Humphreys Depo. Sept.²⁹, 2006 at 102-03.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not provided evidence based on personal knowledge that they were paid hourly for wait times. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 66(e).

To support the proposition that they were paid by the hour when problems arose, Plaintiffs offer the testimony of Plaintiff McIntyre. McIntyre testified about a situation where a customer complained about his performance and he was not given his compensation. (McIntyre Depo., July 27, 2006 at 220-21.) Then, two months later, he was given $15 for the job. McIntyre’s testimony does not indicate that he was paid hourly in this situation and the fact that he received a flat amount without regard to time actually evidences that he was compensated by the job.

Plaintiffs also submit the testimony of Humphreys 22 in support of their argument that Plaintiffs were paid hourly for longer trips. However, a review of the relevant testimony indicates just the opposite. Humphreys testified regarding a pickup in Orlando that “if they just did it hourly, it would cost you three hours to go from here to Orlando, which would be $215, but we charge $450 to take someone from here to Orlando, because they have it figured in the price, the return, and everything.” (Humphreys Depo. 148-49.) Humphreys then testifies that with respect to such job, that he was paid for the time that there was no customer in the car. Clearly, this indicates that Defendants charged $450 for the job, and Plaintiff was paid for the whole job, whether the passenger was in the car or not.

Finally, Plaintiffs state that they were paid extra money, sometimes an hourly rate, for no-shows or cancellations. To the extent that the Plaintiffs were paid a flat amount to compensate for 'Such no-shows or cancellations, such fact does not change the fact that Plaintiffs were paid by the job. However, if Plaintiffs were paid hourly, that could be considered “other form[s] of compensation” under § 778.112. Plaintiffs submit the testimony of Plaintiffs Zapata and McIntyre. Zapata makes no statement insinuating that he was paid hourly for no-shows or cancellations and McIntyre only makes the statement that he was paid $45 dollars for eight hours, not that he was paid hourly. (Zapata Depo. At 111-12; McIntyre Depo. 122, 159-60.) Such payments do not support Plaintiffs contention that they were paid in any manner other than by the job.

(vi) Payments for “As Directed” Jobs

Plaintiffs’ final assertion that the compensation for “as directed” jobs makes § 778.112 inapplicable is not persuasive. In Foody, Judge Ungaro-Benages addressed this issue explicitly, stating that the fact Defendants charged customers on an hourly basis does not mean that Plaintiffs were paid on an hourly basis. Rather, Plaintiffs were still compensated for these “as directed” trips on the same, per-job basis as all other trips. This Court agrees with Judge Ungaro-Benages well reasoned analysis and conclusion, and thus, holds that payment for “as directed” jobs does suspend the application of § 778.112.

5. Computation Of The Regular Rate Under § 778.112

Because § 778.112 applies to the facts of this case, the next step to late the regular rate by totaling the sums received for each job during the workweek and “dividing by the total hours actually *1318 worked.” Thus, each Plaintiffs Regular Rate is equal to the total amount paid for all jobs in a workweek, divided by the total hours spent actually working on Defendants’ behalf, i.e. the total number of hours spent driving customers and any additional time spent on tasks which may be found to be compensable. 23

Plaintiffs invite the Court to calculate the Regular Rate by dividing the total compensation per workweek only by the time when customers are in the car, which they argue is consistent with § 778.109. As stated above, Section 778.109 computes the regular rate by dividing a worker’s Weekly Pay by the total number of hours actually worked during the workweek for which compensation was paid. By claiming that they were only compensated when customers were in the car, Plaintiffs seek a denominator that is significantly smaller than the total of the time spent on each job plus the time spent for additional compensable activities. Application of this formula would yield a higher Regular Rate.

Plaintiffs, however, do not explain why they should be entitled to add up only the time spent driving customers on each job for purposes of calculating the Regular Rate, while including the additional time spent on other compensable tasks for purposes of determining the total amount of time during each week for which Plaintiffs are entitled to be compensated. This result would not only be inequitable, but also inconsistent with the terms of § 778.109, which refers the reader to § 778.112 for an example of the “proper method of determining the regular rate of pay in particular instances.” Section 778.112, by design, squarely anticipates the situation in these cases through its reference to the total hours actually worked, rather than the total hours for which compensation was paid, and allows the Court to reconcile Plaintiffs’ payment on a per job basis with the fact that Plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for time spent on tasks other-than those for which they were paid.

6. Defendants are Entitled To Net Out Expenses Prior To Calculating The Regular Rate.

Defendants also state that in determining the Regular Rate for I/Os, all sums must be excluded from compensation which are reasonably calculated to reimburse that employee for tolls, parking fees and fuel surcharges incurred in connection with work. Consistent with the terms of §§ 778.216 and 778.217, these expenses which the I/O pays and for which he is. reimbursed should not be used in the calculation of the Regular Rate. As discussed supra, § 778.217(a) states that “where'an employee incurs expenses on his employer’s behalf or where he is required to expend sums solely by reason, of action taken for the convenience of his employer, section 7(e)(2) is applicable to reimbursement for such expenses. Payments made by the employer to cover such expenses are not included in the employee’s regular rate.” To the extent Carey House Chauffeurs were reimbursed for the expenses they paid out of pocket, such payments should not be included in the calculation of the Regular Rate.

With regard to I/Os, the question is more complicated because the I/Os must pay for all expenses associated with the operation of their vehicles operation. (Sobol Deck ¶ 18.) A reasonable conclusion might be that the I/Os incur these expenses on behalf of themselves as independent businesses rather than for the benefit of Defendants. However, a finding that such expenses should be included in the calculation of the Regular Rate would have the unintended result that hourly rates are *1319 higher if a particular trip involves more of these expenses. For example, if toll expenses were not netted before the Regular Rate was calculated, a passenger trip that arbitrarily required travel on many tolled highways would result in a greater Regular Rate because the Weekly Pay would increase by the amount of the extra tolls, thereby, increasing the hourly rate. On top of that, the driver would also be reimbursed for the extra toll expenses. Thus, not only would the driver be repaid .for his out of pocket toll expenses, but the extra toll payments would increase his Regular Rate. Furthermore, although the I/Os ben-efitted their business in paying these tolls, parking and gas expenses, the primary beneficiary was Defendants whose business depended on the trips that Plaintiffs performed for them. Finally, if the customers were to reimburse the I/Os directly for these expenses and not involve Defendants as an intermediary, such amounts would not be considered compensation. Thus, it follows that making the Defendants the collection agent for these expenses should not alter the effect that these payments have on the Regular Rate. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to net out the expenses for parking, tolls and the fuel surcharges that they received from the customer and paid out to the I/Os.

B. Compensable Working Time Under The FLSA

Having decided that Plaintiffs’ overtime compensation should .be calculated based on the flat fee per job, net of reimbursed parking fees, tolls and fuel surcharges, it is necessary to determine which activities áre compensable under the FLSA to calculate the hours worked in a workweek. Plaintiffs assert that compensable activity under the FLSA includes any activity or inactivity “required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business.” Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that the following activities are compensable under the FLSA: 24 (1) home to work commutes; (2) cleaning, inspecting and maintaining the vehicles; (3) obtaining and placing amenities in the vehicle; (4) putting on and taking off uniforms; (5) calling dispatch to get assignments and flight times; (6) driving between jobs and mandatory meetings; and (7) waiting time to pick up passengers. The Court addresses each of these activities below.

1. Home To Work Commutes

Plaintiffs claim there daily commute is compensable because the Portal-to-Portal Act, 25 which provides that ordinary home-to-work and work-to-home travel is not usually compensable, does not apply because Plaintiffs’ drive to the work site occurs after they commence their principal activity or activities. (Plaintiffs’ SJ Motion at 6.) Plaintiffs claim that they engage in numerous work activities prior to commuting to work, such as: washing, cleaning and inspecting their vehicles; obtaining and placing amenities for customers in' the vehicle; and other preparatory tasks. (Id. at 5.) The Employee Commuting Flexibility Act (“ECFA”),²⁹ U.S.C. § 254(a), which amended the Portal-to-Portal Act, provides that the following activities are not compensable:

(1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is employed to perform, and

*1320 (2) activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal activity or activities,

which occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which such employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at which he ceases, such principal activity.

To determine whether activities prior to commencing work are preliminary, the courts look to whether they are an integral and indispensable part of the principal activity. Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 76 S.Ct. 330, 100 L.Ed. 267 (1956); Dunlop v. City Elec., Inc., 527 F. 2d 394 (5th Cir.1976); Marshall v. Gerwill, Inc., 495 F.Supp. 744 (D.Md.1980). However, even if the activities qualify-as integral, if they are de minimus, the are not compensable. Dunlop, 527 F. 2d at 400-01; Marshall, 495 F.Supp. at 749. 26

Here, it is not necessary to make those determinations to rule that commuting time is not compensable. Despite Plaintiffs’ efforts to start the workday with these activities, even if they were compensable, there is nothing in the statutes, regulations, or case law to suggest that they could operate to make the subsequent drive to the principal activity anything other than noneompensable commuting time under the Portal-to-Portal Act. The Plaintiffs could choose to perform these activities anywhere on the path to the principal activity, or at the employer’s place of business, and they cannot make their commute compensable by choosing to do them at home. Regardless of where they perform these activities, and regardless of whether they are compensable, the drive from home to the place of performance of the principal activity is excludable under²⁹ U.S.C. § 254(a). 27

2. Vehicle Cleaning, Inspection And Maintenance

Plaintiffs also claim that time spent cleaning, inspecting and maintaining their vehicles is compensable time. Defendants claim that these activities are considered preliminary or postliminary under the ECFA and are therefore not compensable. The analysis for determining whether the activities are compensable will differ between the Carey House Chauffeurs and the I/Os. With regard to the I/Os, the answer is simple. Because the I/Os own or lease their vehicles, they are responsible for all expenses associated with them. (Sobol Decl. ¶ Í8.) This includes gas, licences, maintenance & repairs, parking, traffic citations and permits. (Id.) Therefore, it logically follows that while conducting these activities was necessary to the performance of Defendants’ work, because the I/Ós own or lease the vehicles, the time spent doing these activities is predominantly in the Plaintiffs’ own interests. Dunlop, 527 F. 2d at 398-99. Thus, the time taken to complete such tasks is mot compensable.

The same analysis, however, does not apply to the Carey House Chauffeurs because they drive vehicles owned by the Defendant. The House Report accompanying the ECFA states that “it is not possible to define in all circumstances what specific tasks and activities would be considered ‘incidental’ to the use of an em *1321 ployers [sic] vehicle for commuting.... Routine vehicle safety inspections or other minor tasks have long been considered preliminary or postliminary activities and are therefore not compensable.” H.R.Rep. No. 104-585 (1996); see also Aiken v. City of Memphis, 985 F.Supp. 740, 744 (D.Tenn.1997). Here, there is a factual question regarding the extent of cleaning, inspection and maintenance activities that Defendants required the Carey House Chauffeurs to perform. Thus, it is impossible to determine from the present record whether, and which, activities may have been .de minimus. Accordingly, summary judgment as to whether the cleaning, inspection and maintenance activities of Carey House Chauffeurs is compensable is denied.