MORGAN A. LEPPERT
v.
STATE

Fla. 5th DCA | 2018-07-09
No. 5D16-2238
42 Fla. L. Weekly D363 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (2018) Negative Treatment

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Holding

The trial court did not err in making the factual determination under section 775.082 that the defendant killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim, rather than requiring the jury to make such finding, and the trial court erred in setting judicial review eligibility at twenty-five years instead of twenty years for robbery and burglary convictions.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court may make the factual determination as to whether a defendant actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill a victim for sentencing purposes.

[2] A defendant convicted of robbery and burglary is entitled to a review of their conviction after twenty years pursuant to section 921.1402(2)(d), Florida Statutes.

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Key Quotes

“Our supreme court has expressly authorized a trial court to make the factual determination as to whether a defendant actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill a victim.”

Court justifying why trial court did not err in making the section 775.082 determination without jury involvement, citing Falcon v. State

Facts & Procedural History

Morgan Leppert was convicted of first-degree murder, burglary with assault or battery, and robbery with a deadly weapon. The trial court imposed a fif…

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Opinion of the Court

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED MORGAN AMANDA LEPPERT, Appellant,

v. Case No. 5D16-2238 STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. ________________________________/ Opinion filed March 27, 2017 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Putnam County, Patti A. Christensen, Judge.

Valarie Linnen, Atlantic Beach, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Koller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM. Morgan Amanda Leppert appeals her judgment and sentence for first-degree murder, burglary with assault or battery, and robbery with a deadly weapon. Leppert raises four issues: 1) her lengthy sentence violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment laid out in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010);

2) the trial court erred in not having a jury determine whether she killed, intended to kill,

or attempted to kill the victim; 3) the trial court erred in finding that she killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim; and 4) Leppert’s fifty-year sentences for the burglary and robbery charges violate the Eighth Amendment because they are de facto life sentences that fail to provide her with a meaningful opportunity for release and rehabilitation. We affirm on these issues.

As to the second issue, the trial court made the requisite finding required by section

775.082, Florida Statutes (2016), that Leppert killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim. Leppert contends that the jury was required to make this finding under the statute. In a strikingly similar case, this court recently determined that the trial court did not err in making such a finding. Williams v. State, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D363 (Fla. 5th DCA

Feb. 10, 2017) (“Our supreme court has expressly authorized a trial court to make the factual determination as to whether a defendant actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill a victim.” (citing Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 963 (Fla. 2015))).

Lastly, we note that the trial court provided in Leppert’s sentence that she was eligible for a judicial review hearing after twenty-five years for all three charges. Pursuant to section 921.1402(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2016), Leppert was entitled to a review of her robbery and burglary convictions after twenty years. § 921.1402(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2016).

We accordingly reverse that part of the sentencing order and remand this case for entry of an amended sentencing order consistent with this opinion.

As we did in Williams, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme

Court as one of great public importance:

DOES ALLEYNE V. UNITED STATES, 133 S. CT. 2151 (2013), REQUIRE THE JURY AND NOT THE TRIAL COURT TO MAKE THE FACTUAL FINDING UNDER SECTION 775.082(1)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES (2016), AS TO

WHETHER A JUVENILE OFFENDER ACTUALLY KILLED, INTENDED TO KILL, OR ATTEMPTED TO KILL THE VICTIM?

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED; QUESTION CERTIFIED.

SAWAYA, BERGER and WALLIS, JJ., concur.


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