L. H. RIDDLE, ET AL.,
v.
F. B. COLLIVER

Fla. | 1934-10-01
Whitfield, P. J., and Brown and Buford, J. J., concur., Davis, C. J., and Ellis and Terrell, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
116 Fla. 723 Florida Supreme Court (1934) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 156 So. 880
Cited by 10 cases

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Synopsis

L. H. Riddle and J. P. Cochrane were sued by F. B. Colliver to recover a deficiency on a mortgage debt. The trial court initially granted motions for new trial and arrest of judgment, but later vacated those orders and rendered final judgment against both defendants. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that both defendants could be properly joined in a single action and that Cochrane's written assumption of the mortgage obligation bound him despite the deed being made only "subject to" the mortgage.


Holding

Both defendants may be properly joined in one action for the same debt where each incurred his obligation through separate written instruments. Cochrane's written agreement to assume and pay the mortgage as part of the purchase price created a binding obligation, not destroyed by the deed being made "subject to" the mortgage rather than assuming it.


Key Quotes

“The obligation of each defendant is the same debt, though each individually incurred his obligation to pay the debt by a separate written instrument; therefore one action may be maintained against them together for the same debt with appropriate allegations and proof as to each of the written instruments imposing the obligation.”

Establishes the court's holding that both defendants could be properly joined in a single action despite incurring obligations through separate instruments.

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Facts & Procedural History

L. H. Riddle executed a mortgage to secure $3,500 in notes. J. P. Cochrane agreed in writing to purchase the land, with the purchase price including a…

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Opinion of the Court
Per Curiam.

Per Curiam.

It appears that L. H. Riddle and his wife executed a mortgage upon described land to F. B. Colliver and Olive Colliver to secure notes aggregating $3,500.00; that thereafter J. P. Cochrane agreed in writing to purchase the land, a part of the consideration being “$3,500.00 First Mortgage to be assumed and paid by the purchaser at 8% interest”; that a warranty deed to the lands was executed to J. P. Cochrane; that after foreclosure proceedings and sale of the property, a portion of the mortgage debt remained unpaid, but no deficiency decree was prayed or rendered. By assignment F. B. Colliver duly acquired the interest of Olive Colliver in the mortgage debt and brought an action at law against L. H. Riddle and J. P. Cochrane to recover judgment for the balance due on the same debt that was incurred by Riddle in giving the notes and by J. P. Cochrane in his contract in writing to purchase the mortgaged land wherein he agreed that the $3,500.00 first mortgage would be “assumed and paid by the purchaser.”

. A verdict was rendered against both defendants. A motion for new trial and a motion in arrest of judgment were granted. During the same term of the Court a motion to^ set aside the orders granting a new trial and in arrest of *725judgment was filed with the judge of the court. At a subsequent term of the Court the orders granting new trial and arrest of judgment were vacated and thereupon final judgment for the plaintiff against both defendants was rendered.

On writ of error taken1 by both defendants it is in substance contended that J. P. Cochrane should not have been joined as a defendant. The obligation of each defendant is the same debt, though each individually incurred his obligation to pay the debt by a separate written instrument; therefore one action may be maintained against them together for the same debt with appropriate allegations and proof as to each of the written instruments imposing the obligation. See Marler v. Parker, 101 Fla. 780, 135 So. 400; 41 C. J. 754.

The written agreement to purchase the land expressly provided for the “mortgage to be assumed and paid by the purchaser”; and the fact that the subsequent deed conveying title to the land was only made “subject to” the mortgage, does not destroy the assumption agreement contained in the contract to purchase the land, even if the agreement to purchase was breached by failing to pay the mortgaged debt that was assumed as, a part of the purchase price.

Motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were granted during the term in which the verdict was rendered; and a motion to vacate the orders granting a new trial and in arrest of judgment was endorsed “Before me: November 29, 1932, C. E. Chillingworth, Judge,” which date was during the term in which the verdict was rendered and the orders granting a new trial and in arrest of judgment were made. This was sufficient to retain the Court’s jurisdiction of the cause. Under the usual general order of continuance all causes and matters not finally disposed of are carried forward into the succeeding term in course.

*726At the next term the orders granting a new trial and in arrest of judgment were vacated and a final judgment was rendered by the Court, to which the writ of error herein was duly taken.

Other questions including procedural .matters presented have been considered, but they need not be further discussed in view of the conclusions herein stated.

Affirmed.

Whitfield, P. J., and Brown and Buford, J. J., concur.

Davis, C. J., and Ellis and Terrell, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Soper v. Stine, 184 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
    …ing up to the sale of real estate merge in the deed. This rule is subject to the recognized exception that where there are covenants outside, collateral to, or independent of, the provisions of the deed, there is no merger. Riddle v. Colliver, 1934, 116 Fla. 723, 156 So. 880; Graham v. Commonwealth Life Insurance Co., 1934, 114 Fla. 585, 154 So. 335; Gabel v. Simmons, 1930, 100 Fla. 526, 129 So. 777; and Annot. 52 A.L.R.2d 648. Therefore, we must examine the instruments referred to by plaintiffs to determin…
  • Peterson v. Peterson, 431 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
    …. 585, 154 So. 335 (1934); Gabel v. Simmons, 100 Fla. 526, 129 So. 777 (1930); Opler v. Wynne, 402 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), rev. denied, 412 So. 2d 472 (Fla.1982); Soper v. Stine, 184 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966). Accord, Riddle v. Colliver, 116 Fla. 723, 156 So. 880 (1934). See Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 647 (1957). Here the agreement by its very terms reflects the intent of the parties that it be independent of the deed. See Industrial Development Foundation of Auburn v. United States Hoffman Machinery C…
  • Leyda v. Comptroller, 19 Fla. Supp. 184 (Dade Cty. Cir. Ct. 1962)
    …to assume the outstanding mortgage in the preliminary sales contract. It is the rule in Florida that a sales agreement providing for the assumption of a mortgage survives the deed of conveyance and is enforceable. Riddle v. Colliver, 116 Fla. 728, 156 So. 880. Accordingly, this assumption agreement formed a part of the consideration of the transaction upon which documentary stamp taxes were required under F.S. 201.02, 1961. From all that appears, there was no actual assumption agreement in the remainde…

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